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RESUME
Dans la littérature, les débats autour du fédéralisme environnemental sont persistants
et non-concluants. La Chine a poursuivi la tendance globale de la décentralisation et
adopté un de facto fédéralisme environnemental. Dans ce pays vaste et diversifié,
connaissances et compétences locales sont nécessaires pour développer des solutions
appropriées pour de nombreux problèmes environnementaux souvent avec une nature
locale ou régionale. Cependant, malgré le de facto fédéralisme environnemental
adopté, crises environnementales dramatiques et échecs de la politique sont répandus
en Chine. En particulier, plus récemment, ce pays a vu apparaître de nombreux
problèmes prédits par les opposants à la décentralisation. Il semble que, contrairement
à la décentralisation fiscale qui a été un «coup de main» dans la mobilisation des
ressources et la croissance économique au niveau sous-national, la décentralisation de
l’application de la politique environnementale a plutôt été une «main saisissant» dans
la gestion environnementale. Dans le but de fournir une compréhension meilleure et
détaillée du de facto fédéralisme environnemental en Chine, cette thèse suit les
différents critiques dans la littérature et teste empiriquement pour chacun d'eux dans
le contexte spécifique chinois. En résumé, les résultats empiriques trouvés dans cette
thèse soutiennent l'existence de problèmes liés à l'externalité environnementale, à
l'interaction stratégique et aux incitations politiques qui conduisent au compromis de
l’environnement. Par ailleurs, la décentralisation budgétaire en cours est susceptible
de renforcer les interactions interprovinciales conduites par la concurrence pour
capitaux; le déséquilibre fiscal est plus préjudiciable à l'environnement dans les
provinces pauvres. Ces résultats appellent à un «nouveau fédéralisme
environnemental» et une réforme des incitations, afin de transformer le de facto
fédéralisme environnemental chinois d’une «main saisissant» à un «coup de main»
pour une meilleure gouvernance environnementale.
vABSTRACT
In the literature, debate around environmental federalism is lasting and inconclusive.
China has followed the global tendency of decentralization and has adopted a de facto
environmental federalism. In this broad and diverse country, local knowledge and
expertise is necessary to develop proper solutions for many environmental problems
with local and regional nature. However, despite the adopted de facto environmental
federalism, dramatic environmental crises and policy failures widespread in China. In
particular, more recently, this country has seen arise many problems predicted by the
opponents of decentralization. It appears that, contrary to the fiscal decentralization
which has been a “helping hand” in resource mobilization and economic growth at the
sub-national level, the decentralization of environmental policy implementation has
rather been a “grabbing hand” in environmental management. With the purpose of
providing a better and detailed understanding of the de facto environmental
federalism in China, this thesis follows the different critics in the literature and test
empirically for each of them in the Chinese-specific context. In summary, empirical
results found in this thesis support the existence of problems related to environmental
externality, strategic interaction and politically incentivized environment-sacrificing
behaviors. Moreover, the current fiscal decentralization is likely to strengthen the
capital-competition driven inter-provincial interaction; fiscal imbalance is more
environmentally detrimental in poor provinces. These findings call for a “new
environmental federalism” and a reform of incentives, in order to transform the
Chinese de facto environmental federalism from a “grabbing hand” to a “helping
hand” for better environmental governance.
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Environment is a highlighted issue in nowadays China. Facing the strikingly high
pollution level in this country which threatens its sustainable development, the
Chinese government has engaged in a promise of environmental protection. More
efficient environmental governance is essential for China. First, it is indispensable for
the guarantee of the population’s fundamental living and health right. Secondly,
China’s economic growth will not last without an ecologically sustainable society.
Finally, environmental protection is also an inevitable responsibility of the Chinese
government in the international community. Like many other policies in this country,
environmental policy has been implemented in a decentralized way. While the
creation of most environmental laws and rules are realized by the center, their
enforcement is at the discretion of local environmental authorities. Given this context,
some interesting questions attract one’s attention: whether decentralization is an
efficient model of political arrangement for environmental protection in China? In
other words, what is the relationship between decentralization and the lasting
environmental policy failures in China?
Decentralization: a worldwide tendency
For more than two decades, decentralization has been promoted by major
international institutions in the worldwide and has become a tendency in many
developing countries including China (World Bank, 2000). Defined as transferring
authority and resources from central to lower tiers of government, decentralization is
advocated by many scholars. According to the proponents of decentralization, local
governments have greater proximity to the constituencies thus an information
advantage over a central government; as a result, decentralization allows the former to
better reveal and satisfy heterogeneous preferences of tax payers and improve local
public good provision. However, in spite of the worldwide tendency, there are lasting
and inconclusive debates over the effects of decentralization on social welfare. Quite
different points of view exist in theoretical as well as empirical literature framework.
Some scholars consider that more decentralization improves resource allocation,
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while others consider in the opposite way.
a. Proponent opinions
In the literature, studies defending decentralization are abundant. Classical channels
through which decentralization improves local public good provision rely on
assumptions that taxpayers of each jurisdiction express their preferences in their votes
and that local government responds to these revealed preferences. Based on
hypothesis of full mobility of consumer-voters, perfect information and absence of
externality, Tiebout (1956) argued that inter-jurisdictional competition would arise in
a decentralized circumstance and would beneficiate the allocation of local public
services, because consumer-voters could choose their favorite municipality by “voting
with their feet”. The advantage that local governments can provide differential public
goods in response to heterogeneous preferences is also defended by Oates (1972).
Another classical advantage of decentralization is that, due to greater proximity to the
constituencies, local governments have an information advantage in preference
revealing compared to their central counterpart (Hayek, 1945).
Recently, more explicit political economy analysis of the decentralization
attaches importance to political competition and incentives in the public sector
(Besley and Coate, 2003; Seabright, 1996). This second generation of literature often
argues that decentralization can help to increase local government’s accountability to
local citizenry through local elections. In a country like China, local accountability
can also be improved by what is known as “yardstick competition”, through which
higher-level government evaluates jurisdictions in accordance with a set of
standardized performance criteria (Liu et al., 2006). In addition, it is often argued that
decentralization can reduce corruption because politicians are held directly
accountable for their actions under decentralization (Fisman and Gatti, 2002a; Fisman
and Gatti, 2002b; Tabellini, 2000). Finally, in terms of scale and scope economy,
government size is considered to play a significant role in its efficiency performance;
losses with an excessively large government can also be an argument against
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centralization (Balaguer-Coll et al., 2010).
b. Opponent opinions
Arguments in favor of centralization have frequently been based on the Pigouvian
assumption that a government’s objective is to maximize social welfare (Liu et al.,
2006). On one hand, tax competition may create inter-jurisdictional externalities and
reduce local government efficiency (Gordon, 1983); When there is competition for
capital, it might lead to a “race-to-the bottom” in local tax rates and a distortion in
public goods provision (Oates, 1972; Oates and Schwab, 1988). On the other hand,
insufficient provision of public goods would occur particularly in case of positive
spillovers, where a jurisdiction can exploit the externality by “free riding” his
neighbors’ provision effort (Oates, 2005). Two compelling examples of “free riding”
are trans-boundary pollution control and fight against terrorism. According to Oates
(1972), there is a trade-off between decentralization and centralization whose
resolution depends on the extent of heterogeneity in tastes and the degree of spillovers.
Opposite to the proponent opinions in the second generation of literature, some
scholars argue that decentralization would generate more corruption (Prud’homme,
1995; Treisman, 2002), because local politicians are more susceptible and accessible
to local interest groups; another argument is that a centralized structure might exploit
scale and scope economy of public production, and as a result provide public goods
more efficiently (Prud’homme, 1995).
Environmental federalism
Primarily focusing on the vertical division of environmental management
responsibilities among different levels of government (Oates and Portney, 2003),
environmental federalism researchers pay great attention to the efficiency of
environmental policy decentralization. Following the first generation of
decentralization literature, of particular concern in environmental federalism is the
ability of a nationally centralized regulatory structure to address environmental
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problems that are largely local and regional in nature. Just like policies in other social
domain, “one-size-fits-all” can very easily become “one-size-fits-nobody”. It is often
argued that for environmental problems that are highly localized, it makes more sense
to set standards for environmental quality that reflect local conditions rather than
uniform national standards (Schwab, 2005). Driven by these preoccupations, a call for
a return of substantial policymaking authority to state and local governments has been
seen in the U.S. in the 1990s: according to the devolutionists, federal rules and
procedures are often too complex, conflicting, inflexible and inadaptable to local
context (Adler, 1998).
However, in the environmental federalism literature, no consensus has been
achieved on the efficiency of decentralization in providing environmental services. In
effect, on the theoretical plan as well as on the empirical plan, evidences are quite
mixed.
On the theoretical plan, three sets of arguments have been made in favor of a
strong role of the central government in the U.S. context (Stavins, 1998): The first
argument states that many environmental problems cannot be efficiently regulated by
individual jurisdictions because of their cross-boundary externalities. This argument is
solid for example in the cases of the acid rain and the trans-boundary river pollutions.
Secondly, in the absence of centralized controls, states would compete each other by
lowering their environmental standards in order to attract mobile capital, and thus
result in a so-called "race to the bottom" in environmental stringency (Kunce and
Shogren, 2002, 2005; Levinson, 1997; Markusen et al., 1995; McAusland, 2003);
Finally, the "public choice" related rationales argue that in the U.S., local political
processes systematically undervalue the benefits of environmental protection and/or
overvalue the costs, compared with Federal political processes (Revesz, 1997). It is
also presumed that environmental advocacy groups are more effective at the national
level (Stewart, 1977).
Meanwhile, theoretical arguments in favor of decentralization are also abundant.
First of all, although cross-boundary externalities are a solid drawback of
decentralization, some argue that it does not necessarily call for a centralized
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regulatory bureaucracy because other means e.g. Coasian negotiations among
jurisdictions, regional authorities, and common law nuisance actions can deal with at
least some spillover problems (Adler, 1998); others model with inter-jurisdictional
spillovers among heterogeneous jurisdictions suggest that decentralization leads to
globally efficient resource allocation, even in the complete absence of interventions
by higher-level governments or Coasian bargaining (Ogawa and Wildasin, 2009).
Then, in terms of capital competition, many studies suggest that under certain
conditions, decentralization may alternatively lead to no difference in policy
outcomes (e.g., Oates and Schwab, 1988) or efficient allocation of polluting firms
(Wellisch, 1995). Some studies even suggest that under other conditions, strategic
behavior by states would lead to standards that are excessively (inefficiently) strong
(Revesz, 1997). Finally, it is argued that positive political economy provides no
support for the assertion that environmental interests will be under-represented at the
state or local level (Stavins, 1998).
Empirical studies also find mixed results on the impact of environmental policy
decentralization. On one hand, numerous studies do find evidence on
inter-jurisdictional environmental spillovers (e.g., Gray and Shadbegian, 2004;
Helland and Whitford, 2003; Kahn, 2004). More importantly, Sigman (2005)
examines water quality in rivers around the U.S. and suggests that under the Clean
Water Act, U.S. states do free ride more when they have more autonomy in water
pollution regulatory enforcement; Sigman (2002) shows that greater decentralization
enhances stronger regional pollutant, which might result from inter-jurisdictional free
riding. On the other hand, there is a general consensus that decentralization does not
necessarily lead to a “race to the bottom” as much as the theoretical literature suggests
(Fredriksson and Millimet, 2002b; Konisky, 2007; Levinson, 2003; List and Gerking,
2000; Millimet, 2003). Finally, while List and Gerking (2000) and Millimet (2003)
find that decentralization in the 1980s hasn’t led to a degradation of air quality,
Fredriksson et al. (2006) shows that decentralization does lead to weaker
environmental policy in developing countries, particularly for air pollution.
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Environmental policy failures in China
Since the beginning of the economic reforms, China has established its environmental
institutions and a framework of environmental laws, in adopting a de facto
environmental federalism. However, despite the existing of a comprehensive
environmental policy framework, dramatic environmental degradation has
accompanied the spectacular economic growth. Environmental policy failures are
widespread in this country. The efficiency of the Chinese environmental governance
should be called into question.
a. Environmental crisis
Pollution problems in China attract worldwide attention. With the rapid
industrialization and urbanization process, pollution reaches a critical level and
threatens the sustainable economic development and public health in this country.
According to the World Bank (2007), health costs and total costs of air and water
pollution in China amount respectively to about 4.3 percent and 5.8 percent of its
GDP. Chinese official data (Ministry of Health, 2008) suggest that cancer has become
the first cause of death in China. The annual cancer death number would be about 1.8
million in the country. Cancer is the cause of 25% of total death in urban area and
21% of total death in rural area. Although without official recognition, the media talks
about some more than 100 cancer villages spread throughout the country.1 Besides
pollution crisis, China has always seen frequent natural disasters, among which a lot
are partially due to human behavior-related ecological damages.2
� Water pollution
The water pollution in China is strikingly severe. Groundwater is graded on a scale
from “I” to “V” in China, “I” being pure and safe to drink, “IV” usable only for
1 http://news.ifeng.com/mainland/detail_2011_11/15/10660031_0.shtml.
2 For example, drought and flood in many ecologically vulnerable areas.
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industry and farming, and “V” unusable for any purpose and unsafe to touch. In 2010,
water in more than 75% of 26 major lakes in China is unsafe to drink; among which
14 are grade “V” and worse. The China Watch Institute reported in 2006 that seventy
percent of the country’s rivers were contaminated (Li, 2006). A 2009 Ministry of
Environmental Protection (MEP) report suggests that previous pollution figures have
been severely conservative, in that they did not account for non-point agricultural
waste which was at least as important as industrial pollution (Golding, 2011). Xinhua
Agency, the state news agency of China reports in 2007 that 90% of Chinese cities’
underground water sources are contaminated.3
� Air pollution
A great number of Chinese cities suffer from serious air pollution. Energy
consumption (especially coal consumption), the rapid growth in use of motor vehicles
and construction are three main sources of air pollutants such as particles, SO2, NOx,
and CO in most Chinese cities (UN, 2009). According to the Word Bank (2007), the
economic burden of premature mortality and morbidity associated with air pollution
was 157.3 billion yuan in 2003, or 1.16 percent of GDP. According to the same report,
only 1% of the China’s 560 million city dwellers breathe air considered safe by
European Union standards (annual average PM10 levels below 40 μg/m3). Even if
evaluated with China’s own standard (annual average PM10 levels below 100 μg/m3),
still more than one quarter monitored cities fail to meet it in 2010.4 The World Bank
estimates that 16 of the 20 most polluted cities in the world are located in China (UN,
2009). Moreover, China overtook the United States in 2007 as the world’s largest
annual emitter of energy-related CO2, as shown by IEA (2010). In terms of policy
failure, at the end of 2005, China has met none of its 7 critical 10th five year-plan
targets for air pollution control.
3 http://news.xinhuanet.com/world/2007-03/21/content_5874562.htm.
4 Data published by the MEP in 2011, http://wfs.mep.gov.cn/dq/kqzl/201106/t20110603_211634.htm.
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� Pollution accidents
Pollution disasters has amplified since recent years: in November 2005, a major
pollution accident of the Songhua River, owing to the explosion of a petrochemical
plant, has forced the suspension of water supplies to the city of Harbin, home to 3.4
million people; In June 2007, a fetid bloom of blue-green algae in China's
third-largest lake hit the city of Wuxi in east China. Water quality deteriorated
severely and the water supply to a great number of households was contaminated; In
July 2010, one gold mine of Zijin Mining, the biggest gold mining company in China,
leaked 2.4 million gallons of acidic copper waste into the Ding River and a reservoir
in Fujian. The pollution caused major contamination: 2000 tons of fish were killed or
poisoned by the slush pond. In mid-August 2011, a chemical factory in Yunnan
province had dumped 5,000 tons of toxic chromium tailings into a reservoir. The
resulting water pollution killed fish and livestock and endangered the drinking water
of tens of millions of people downstream.5 Another highlighting issue is the heavy
metal pollution accidents. 14 officially recognized heavy metal pollution accidents
took place in 2010,6 among which 9 were related to lead. In the eight first months of
2011, another 11 accidents broke out, 9 of which were due to lead.7
b. Problems related to the de facto environmental federalism
Pollution problems in China are not only remarkable for their severity but also for
their complexity. In particular, it seems that China is seeing arise various problems
predicted by the environmental federalism literature, i.e., trans-boundary pollution,
destructive competition, and local interested environmental-sacrificing behaviors.
5 http://www.chinadialogue.net/article/show/single/en/4493.
6 MEP (2011), http://www.mep.gov.cn/zhxx/hjyw/201106/t20110604_211691.htm.
7 http://news.xinhuanet.com/fortune/2011-10/25/c_111123430.htm. Lead is a toxic metal that can damage the
brain and other parts of the body. Among other cases, in January, 2011, more than 100 children were found to have
blood lead level exceeding the national standards in Huaining County, Anhui. Two months later, more than 170
villagers were found to be contaminated by the same heavy metal in Taizhou, Zhejiang.
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� Trans-boundary pollution and inter-jurisdictional conflicts
Trans-boundary pollution in China has attracted great attention since recent years.
Very often, pollution crossing jurisdictional borders can induce fierce conflicts
between involved regions, which are generally difficult to coordinate because of
administrative discontinuity.
It is particularly the case for trans-boundary rivers, such as the famous Huai River
which flows through 4 provinces (Henan, Shandong, Anhui and Jiangsu).
Cross-province pollution has been frequently subjects of conflicts between upstream
provinces and downstream provinces. For example, during several years, downstream
cities (Bozhou, Suzhou, Huaibei and Fuyang) of Anhui province have been accusing
upstream cities (Shangqiu and Yongcheng) of Henan province of dumping great
volumes of wastewater in the Huai River, which caused enormous economic damage
to the downstream fishery resource.8 Similar cases are also relevant in the Tai Lake
Basin (Jiangsu, Zhejiang and Shanghai). For example, conflicts between the
downstream city of Jiaxing, Zhejiang province, and the upstream city of Suzhou,
Jiangsu province, had been left unresolved for ten years and led to an extreme public
event in November, 2001, when inhabitants of the former blocked the river by sinking
boats (Peng, 2009).
� Competition for polluting industries
Another recent and highlighting inter-jurisdictional environmental issue in China is
the relocation of polluting industries from more developed regions to less developed
ones. Generally, receptor provinces have less stringent environmental regulation.
Putting priority to economic growth, these provinces use not only lax environmental
regulation but also many tax exemptions and preferential land rents to attract
8 http://218.23.173.119/XxgkNewsHtml/SA028/200811/SA028011102200811003.html.
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investment. For example, according to some media reports,9 the culprit of the blood
lead accident in Huaining (Anhui) is a lead-acid battery producer who had relocated
form Changxing (Zhejiang). Former capital of lead-acid battery industry in China,
Changxing (Zhejiang) has severely regulated this sector since 2004 because of its
colossal pollution and seen almost 70% of its production relocated by 2010 to other
provinces, such as Anhui, Shandong, Henan, Jiangxi, etc. Another similar example is
the competition among the Yangtze River Basin cities for petrochemical industries.10
It is reported that many upstream provinces wait and aim for attracting chemical
industries shut down in eastern provinces like Zhejiang, because of strengthening of
environmental regulation enforcement. The consequence of these relocations is that
polluting industries like lead-acid battery continue to pollute and cause important
damages in other provinces.
Moreover, the relocation of polluting industries will probably be reinforced in the
near future. In January, 2010, the first National Demonstration Zone for Industrial
Relocation (NDZIR) was approved by the State Council to set up in Anhui province.11
After that, numerous similar zones12 have been created in other central and western
provinces, with the purpose of receiving industries which are no longer competitive in
eastern provinces. This national relocation strategy approved by the center13 can be a
significant environmental threat for receptor provinces which have a risk of becoming
“pollution haven” for polluting industries discarded by more developed regions.
� Self-interested local governments
As argued in the environmental federalism literature, one potential problem of
decentralization is the "public choice" related rationales. Assumed to be
9 http://news.163.com/11/0413/02/71G34N5700014AED.html.
10 http://env.people.com.cn/GB/5264444.html. It is reported that more than 20 chemical industry parks are under
construction along the Yangtze River in 2007.
11 http://news.xinhuanet.com/fortune/2010-01/21/content_12851189.htm.
12 In October, 2010, the 2nd NDZIR was approved to set up in the Eastern Guangxi, see
http://xbkfs.ndrc.gov.cn/cyfz/t20111213_450392.htm; in January, 2011, the 3rd NDZIR was approved to set up in
in Chongqing, see http://www.cq.xinhuanet.com/2011-01/31/content_21987054.htm. In October, 2011, the 4th
NDZIR was approved to set up in the Southern Hunan, see
http://news.xinhuanet.com/local/2011-10/28/c_122208214.htm.
13 http://www.gov.cn/zwgk/2010-09/06/content_1696516.htm.
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self-interested agents, local politicians may be incentivized to implement sub-optimal
environmental policies. This problem is also highlighted in China. Until very recently,
local governments have been primarily concerned with local economic interests and
not accountable for their environmental performance. Consequently, environment has
commonly seen being sacrificed for GDP scores, which have been equivalent to
political achievements until very recently. Destructive competition for polluting
industries is an example of self-interested behaviors. Another evidence of such
behaviors is the widespread local protectionism, under which local governments
interfere with environmental regulation in order to protect polluting but wealth
creating industries.
Problematic and plan of the thesis
As shown in the above literature review, debate around environmental federalism is
lasting and inconclusive. It seems that while decentralization has numerous merits in
resource allocation and local public good provision, it may also lead to inefficient
environmental policy making or enforcement.
Since the beginning of the economic reforms, China has adopted a de facto
federalism to organize its fiscal system as well as its environmental policy
implementation system. In this broad and diverse country, environmental concerns,
preferences, and problems vary from place to place. The local and regional nature of
many environmental problems means that local knowledge and expertise is necessary
to develop proper solutions. However, in spite of its spectacular economic growth
achievements during the last three decades, this country is experiencing dramatic
environmental crises and seeing all kinds of problems related to environmental
federalism. If there is little doubt that the fiscal decentralization has strongly
facilitated the “pro-market” reforms and led to spectacular economic performances in
China (Lin and Liu, 2000; Jin et al., 2005), it seems that decentralization hasn’t
worked as efficiently in environmental protection as in economic growth promotion.
As a result, China provides an ideal field to conduct empirical studies on the
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efficiency of environmental federalism. Meanwhile, given the current alarming
environmental state, such studies are also indispensable and have important political
implications for environmental governance improvement in this country.
In order to study the efficiency of the de facto environmental federalism in China,
the following questions need to be investigated: What is the de facto federalism in
China and for what reasons can it impact the environmental regulation enforcement?
Has the de facto environmental federalism actually led to numerous problems
predicted by the literature? And how does the de facto environmental federalism work
under a set of Chinese-specific fiscal and political arrangements? In this thesis, these
questions are studied in five chapters in an empirical way. The detailed plan of the
thesis is as follows.
The de facto federalism (both fiscal and environmental) in the Chinese context is
discussed in Chapter 1. Precisely, in presenting central-local fiscal relations and the
institutional framework of environmental policy in China, I investigate the causality
between the environmental policy failures and the de facto federalism in this country.
I explain how the de facto environmental federalism and the one-sided fiscal
decentralization have jointly provided Chinese sub-national governments incentives to
exercise weak enforcement of environmental policies.
Chapter 2 is devoted to a cross-border pollution study, with the purpose of
examining externality related problems argued by the opponents of environmental
federalism. In studying the location choice of the most polluting firms of Hebei
province over the period of 2002-2008, I try to examine, everything else being equal,
whether polluting firms are significantly more attracted by border counties than
interior ones in presence of intra or inter-provincial environmental regulation
discontinuity. If the answer is yes, one can assume that free-riding behavior does exist,
and that border counties have a risk of suffering disproportionally from environmental
damages because of externality.
Another argument of decentralization opponents, i.e., strategic interaction across
jurisdictions, is tested for in Chapter 3. Using provincial pollution levy data and SO2
emission data, and with different identification strategies, I test respectively for the
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capital-competition model and the pollution-spillover model. Precisely, using panel
spatial econometric estimators, I try to find out whether Chinese provinces engage in
strategic interaction in deciding their environmental stringency and SO2 emission
level. I also test for the asymmetric interaction pattern predicted by the race to the
bottom hypothesis, and the conditional effect of provincial fiscal imbalance on
interaction behaviors.
Chapter 4 has the objective of testing for the third argument of decentralization
opponents, i.e., the “public choice” related rationales. China has a centralized vertical
bureaucratic system and a multidivisional-form (M-form) government structure. Until
very recently, the political incentive within the bureaucratic system had been
economic-performance targeted. It seems that this political incentive has had perverse
environmental consequences in that it has incentivized sub-national officials to pursue
economic growth at the cost of environment. In a political economy point of view, I
consider a Chinese political market and examine the effect of political incentive by
studying how political competitiveness and term limit affect provincial leaders’
environmental performances. Particular attention is paid to institutional changes since
2006.
In Chapter 5, I focus on the environmental effect of the one-sided fiscal
decentralization in China. Endowed with extremely mismatched revenue and
expenditure assignments, Chinese provinces, especially the poorer ones, may have
strong economic incentives to compromise environmental protection efforts. In this
chapter, in a Stochastic Frontier Analysis (SFA) approach, I estimate the
environmental efficiency (EE) scores of Chinese provinces’ gross production as well
as score determinants. Particular interest is given to the effect of fiscal imbalance on
EE. I also examine whether the effect of fiscal imbalance is differential according to
the provincial affluence, i.e., per capita income level.
In summary, this thesis is composed of a series of empirical studies in order to
provide a better understanding of the de facto environmental federalism in China. It
investigates each aspect of potential drawbacks of this institutional arrangement in the
Chinese-specific context. It tries to identify the possible relations between the de facto
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environmental federalism and the widespread environmental policy failures in this
country. Meanwhile, special attention is paid to another side of the de facto federalism,
i.e., the central-local fiscal relations, which are high likely to work side by side with
the de facto environmental federalism and interfere with sub-national environmental
protection efforts. Interesting political implications can be drawn from the empirical
evidences found in the thesis. These results will contribute to the search of a more
efficient and well-organized environmental governance in nowadays China. In
addition, from an international point of view, besides the constitutional federalism in
the U.S. and the subsidiarity system in the E.U., China represents an alternative model
of allocating environmental governance authority within a multilayer government
(Lan et al., 2011). Thus, a careful and detailed study of this special model also
contributes to the global environmental governance literature.
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1.1Introduction
China is a country with great geographical and administrative complexity. The
administrative divisions of China consist of five levels of sub-national government,
i.e., provinces, prefectures, counties, townships, and villages. As a entity, China
administers 34 province-level regions, 333 prefecture-level regions, 2856 county-level
regions, 40906 township-level regions and even more village-level regions (NBSC,
2011). While constitutionally organized as a unitary sovereign, government authority
in China is actually a complex system of informal and formal divisions of authority
between national and various levels of local political actors. Zheng (2007) argues that
China’s central-local relations are characterized by de facto or behavioral federalism.
Although the federalism is not institutionalized, there is a long tradition of local
authority in practice in China. A great number of studies investigated central-local
relations in post-Mao era (Chung, 2000; Huang, 1996; Li, 2010; Landry, 2008; Zheng,
2007). These studies widely accept that the decentralization initiated by the 1978
reformists has endowed Chinese local governments with relevant authority in local
economic development policymaking and resource allocation. Governments at
various levels are considered to have maintained a firm hand in many economic
matters, e.g. setting industrial policies, controlling (directly or indirectly) a large set of
capital decisions, and participating directly in the management of major firms (Lan et
al., 2011). On one hand, local governments, incentivized by economic and political
interests, have become major actors in promoting China’s economic development. On
the other hand, rapid local economic growth has in turn empowered these
governments.
There is little doubt that this de facto federalism has promoted economic
development in China for three decades. However, it is also argued that the
decentralization has generated considerable problems, e.g., central-local interest
conflicts, uncoordinated policies, and in some cases, growing localism. In effect,
whatever the benefits of autonomy for sub-national governments may be, devolution
of power from the center will tend to create or exacerbate problems where local
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officials face skewed incentives (Lan et al., 2011). Numerous environmental policy
failures in China provide such a case in point.
China’s environmental policy framework has been elaborated at the beginning of
the reform era and seen a rapid expansion in the late 1990s and the beginning of the
new century (OECD, 2006). However, in spite of a quite comprehensive regulatory
and institutional framework for environmental management, the law enforcement and
policy implementation are still far from being adequate and effective. Following the
national decentralization trend, de facto environmental federalism has been adopted to
assign environmental protection responsibilities among central and local governments.
Meanwhile, since the 1978 reforms and until very recently, national development
priority has been given to economic growth over environmental protection. Given the
structural conflicts between economic growth and environmental protection, the
skewed incentive under decentralization is likely to be primarily responsible for the
ineffective enforcement of environmental policy at sub-national level in China.
In this chapter, from a political economy point of view, I try to identify the
relations between the de facto federalism and the ineffective enforcement of
environmental policy in China. I show that the one-sided fiscal decentralization and
the de facto environmental federalism have jointly provided Chinese sub-national
governments with strong economic incentives as well as effective autonomy to
exercise a weak enforcement of environmental policies. The rest of the chapter is
organized as follows: in section 2, I present the current central-local fiscal relations in
China and discuss why this one-sided decentralized system gives local governments
economic incentives to compromise environment; in section 3, I present different
elements of the environmental policy framework in China and discuss why the de
facto environmental federalism contributes to weak enforcement. Concluding remarks
are formulated in section 4.
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1.2One-sided fiscal decentralization and environmental
policy failures
The de facto federalism in China is first of all illustrated by the organization of its
fiscal system. Central-local fiscal relations in China have undergone substantial
changes during the last thirty years. Before the beginning of the reform era, the fiscal
system was fundamentally centralized, as a result of the strict central planning. In
those days, as stated by Oksenberg and Tong (1991), all taxes and profits of
state-owned enterprises accrued to the central government; local governments were in
charge of collecting all taxes and acted simply as agents of the center; moreover, the
central government set spending priorities for local governments and transferred to
the latter necessary funds to meet their spending needs. Spending autonomy of local
governments was thus extremely restricted.
Since the beginning of the 1980s, the old system had been proven inadaptable to
the pace of the market-oriented reforms. In order to give local governments incentives
to improve their tax collection, a fiscal contracting system was introduced in the
1980s. Under this system, local governments handed a fixed quota of tax revenues
over to higher levels, and gained control of much of above-quota revenues (Jin et al.,
2005). In the same period, the central government devolved responsibilities for
financing many public goods to local governments (Whiting, 2007). It is largely
accepted that this fiscal contracting system had successfully encouraged local
governments to develop economy in their jurisdictions (Lin and Liu, 2000); However,
because of the periodic renegotiation of the sharing quota, fiscal contracting also
created a strong incentive for local governments to conceal information about local
revenue from the center. In practice, local governments were incited to hide revenues
by shifting them off-budget, in order to obtain higher marginal revenue retention rates
(Ahmad et al., 2002). These strategic behaviors had resulted in serious consequences:
on one hand, the central share of budgetary revenues fell to 22% in 1993 (Wong,
2007); the central government lost control over a large share of fiscal revenue. On the
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other hand, because of the expansion of off-budgetary funds, budgetary revenues as a
share of GDP fell to about 11% by the mid-1990s.
With the purpose of restoring budgetary revenue and revamping central-local
fiscal relations, the central government introduced in 1994 the TSS reform whose
main content can be summarized as follows: first of all, taxes were divided into
central, local, and shared categories, with major revenues controlled primarily by the
central government; then, although vaguely, expenditure responsibilities of the central
government were defined; furthermore, the fiscal transfer system was redesigned. The
central government would transfer a part of the central revenues to localities, in order
to balance their budgetary; finally, tax collection authorities were also separated into
the National Tax Service (NTS) and the Local Tax Service (LTS). The NTS collects
both central and shared taxes, and the LTS collects local taxes (The State Council,
1993). The TSS reform is proven to have stopped the declining of budgetary revenues
as a percentage of GDP, which increased from 10.8% in 1994 to 20.7% in 2010.
Figure 1.1 presents the evolution of national budgetary revenues level and their share
in GDP over the last three decades.
Figure 1.1: Overall national budgetary revenues (1978-2010)
Source: China Statistical Yearbook (various issues) and author’s calculation.
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1.2.1 Overview of current central-local fiscal relations
In the 62-year evolution of central-local fiscal relations since the creation of the
P.R.China, the latest milestone is the tax sharing system (TSS) reform of 1994.
Although some small modifications were made in the last few years,14 the main
characteristics of the fiscal system have remained the same since 1994: first, revenue
allocations have been recentralized; secondly, expenditure assignments have remained
largely decentralized; thirdly, local governments depend strongly on transfers from
upper-level governments. In summary, the nowadays Chinese fiscal system is
characterized by so called “one-sided” decentralization, where important fiscal gaps
and vertical imbalances dominate.
1.2.1.1 One-sided decentralization
The TSS reform has shaped nowadays central-local fiscal relations in China. China’s
current fiscal system is characterized by some kind of “one-sided” decentralization,
where fiscal revenues are recentralized while public expenditure responsibilities are
extremely decentralized.
1.2.1.1.1 Revenue assignments
Sub-national governments in China do not have any significant degree of tax
autonomy; Taxation legislation as well as tax bases and rates are decided at central
level.15 In this context, the TSS reform has furthermore recognized the dominant role
of the central government in the intergovernmental fiscal system by introducing a
radical reform in revenue assignments. Due to the new assignments, the objective of
raising the central share of revenues has been achieved: The reallocation of revenues
14 For example, the enterprise and personal-income taxes are to be shared between the central and local
governments from January 1, 2002 onwards (Tsui, 2005).
15 Article 8, Section 1, Chapter 2 of Law on Legislation of the People’s Republic of China (2000) provides that
basic systems of finance, taxation shall only be governed by law. As a result, tax legislative power should only
exercised by The NPC and its Standing Committee. http://www.lawinfochina.com/display.aspx?id=386&lib=law.
Actually, most of existing taxation laws and regulations in China are formulated by the State Council, authorized
by the NPC.
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drove the center’s share of budgetary funds from 22% in 1993 to more than 55.7% in
1994 and 51.1% in 2010. The evolution of central and local budgetary revenues
during the last two decades is presented in Figure 1.2.
Figure 1.2: Central and local revenues (1978-2010)
Source: China Statistical Yearbook (various issues) and author’s calculation.
Although the TSS reform provided explicit revenue assignments between the
central and provincial governments, revenue assignments at the sub-national level
were left to the discretion of provincial governments (World Bank, 2002). In general,
fiscal revenue resources are largely controlled by the up two levels (provinces and
prefecture-level municipalities); while the lower two levels (counties and townships)
have only limited revenue resources. However, the situation varies from one province
to another. It seems that revenues are more “centralized” in some provinces than
others. For example, in 2007, Beijing, Shanghai, Chongqing and Tianjin (the four
provincial level municipalities) have the highest provincial level revenue shares, with
56.8%, 50.9%, 45.6% and 45.3%, respectively, while Henan, Jiangsu, Fujian and
Zhejiang have the lowest provincial level revenue shares, with 8.8%, 10.3%, 10.3%
and 10.9%, respectively.16
16 Calculated by the author based on 2007 data published in Statistical Material for Prefectures, Cities, and
Counties Nationwide (MOF, 2010)
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1.2.1.1.2 Expenditure assignments
Expenditure responsibilities were largely decentralized at the beginning of the
economic reform era. This trend has not been changed and even accentuated by the
TSS reform. In broad terms, the TTS reform discusses the division of expenditure
assignments between the central and local governments in China: the central
government has responsibilities in national defense, diplomacy, the control and
management of national agencies, and the control of macro-economy, while local
governments have responsibilities in providing social services and matters relating to
local economic development (The State Council, 1993). As shown in Figure 1.3,
while overall national budgetary expenditures have been multiplied, the central share
has seen an important decrease: in 1980, the central government spent more than 50%
of national expenditure, contrasted to only 17.8% in 2010. In other words, in 2010,
sub-national governments realized more than 80% of total expenditure responsibilities,
which is strikingly high, even when compared to some important federal countries in
the world.17
Figure 1.3: Central and local expenditure (1978-2009)
Source: China Statistical Yearbook (various issues) and author’s calculations.
17 For example, in 2010, the equivalent share in the United States and in Germany, two representative federal
nations, is 59.3% and 73.9%, respectively. See http://www.usgovernmentspending.com/total_spending_2010,
http://www.economywatch.com/economic-statistics/country/Germany/, and
http://www.bundesfinanzministerium.de/nn_103442/EN/Topics/Fiscal-policy/Articles/13012011-NKA.html?__nnn
=true.
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Meanwhile, the country lacks a formal assignment of expenditure responsibilities
among its different levels of sub-national government. Similar to revenue assignments,
the division of sub-national expenditures is left to the discretion of the provinces.
From an overall point of view, expenditures at sub-national level are strongly
decentralized. In 2007, 48.2% of total sub-national expenditures were spent by
counties’ and lower levels of government, while the provincial and the prefectural
levels accounted for only 23% and 28.8%, respectively. Tibet, Beijing, Tianjin and
Qinghai had the highest provincial shares in their total expenditures (58.2%, 47.8%,
46.8% and 44%, respectively), contrast to Guangdong, Zhejiang Shandong and
Jiangsu, with the lowest shares (10.8%, 11.5% 12.6% and 13.9%, respectively).
Provinces with the highest counties’ and lower level share are Zhejiang (66.4%),
Jiangxi (65.9%), Sichuan (65.7%) and Shandong (62.6%). On the contrary, Shanghai
(2.7%), Beijing (3.4%), and Tianjin (4.4%) had the lowest counties’ and lower level
share.18 Expenditures are also more centralized in some provinces than others.
Figure 1.4: Division between different levels of government by expenditure function
(2007)
Source: China Statistical Yearbook (2008), MOF (2010a) and author’s calculation
18 Calculated by the author based on 2007 data published in Statistical Material for Prefectures, Cities, and
Counties Nationwide (MOF, 2010)
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Sub-national expenditure assignments also vary by function. Figure 1.4 shows the
division between different levels of government by expenditure function category. It
is notable that among different functions, environmental protection is one of the most
decentralized. In 2007, more than 95% of total budgeted expenditures on
environmental protection were spent by sub-national governments, of which more
than a half was realized at sub-provincial level.
Figure 1.5: Importance of different levels of sub-national government in
environmental protection expenditure
Source: China Statistical Yearbook (2008), MOF (2010a) and author’s calculations
Concerning the assignments of environmental expenditures among different
levels of sub-national government, provincial variation is also striking. Figure 1.5
shows the shares of various levels of sub-national government in environmental
protection expenditures in 2007 by province. The importance of provincial level
expenditures varies from 5.78% (Guangdong) to 93.55% (Tibet); the importance of
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prefectural level expenditures varies from 2.95% (Qinghai) to 49.58% (Shanghai);
and the importance of county and lower level expenditures varies from 1.07%
(Shanghai) to 72.41% (Sichuan). These huge provincial heterogeneities provide
strong evidences of the discretion when provinces organize their environmental
expenditures.
1.2.1.1.3 Transfers
One of the aims of the TSS reform was to introduce a rule-based and formula-driven
intergovernmental transfer system, in order to counter equalize the regional
distribution of revenues (World Bank, 2002). The current fiscal transfer system, after
the simplification in 2009, consists of three categories of grants, i.e. tax rebate,19
specific purpose transfers (earmarked grants),20 and general purpose transfers
(subsidy transfers).21 In 2009, the central government transferred 2856.38 billion
yuan to local governments through the fiscal transfer system (MOF, 2010b). The
relative importance of these three grants is presented in Figure 1.6. In 2009, specific
transfers have the most relevant share (43%) in total grants. General purpose transfers
are also important with a share of 40%.
As a result of the recentralization of revenues and the decentralization of
expenditures, sub-national governments are largely dependent on fiscal transfers to
ensure their spending responsibilities, which are sometimes difficult to fulfill. In 2009,
total transfer grants (including tax rebate) account for almost 80% of central
government’s fiscal revenues and as much as 47% of sub-national expenditures.
19 Tax rebate are composed of three parts. First, the central government gives back to each province 30 percent of
its increased revenue from the VAT and consumption tax each year over the 1993 base; secondly, the central
government compensates each province for its loss in income tax revenue due to the 2002 income tax reform,
compared to 2001 base, and finally, after the implementing of the price and tax reform of refined oil, provinces
receive the compensation from the central government based on their revenue of “six fees” in 2007.
20 These grants are allocated on an ad-hoc base in order to ensure that certain specific policies and development
strategies are implemented efficiently at local level. They are also used to afford redress to local governments for
central-local shared affairs or missions devolved by the central government. Earmarked grants were initiated in
1999 and reflect many different government policy initiatives, e.g. infrastructure projects, agriculture, health, wage
subsidies, etc.
21 These transfers are assumed to be formula-based, with function of offsetting the gap between revenue and
expenditure at local level, and equalizing the capacity of providing public service across regions. The utilization of
general purpose transfers is left to the discretion of the provinces. Since 2009, some transfers for education, social
security and employment, public security and general public services, which were earmarked grants, have been
reclassified in general purpose transfers.
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Figure 1.7 shows the correlation between provincial dependence on central
government’s fiscal transfers and provincial economic development level in 2008.
Obviously, the dependence degree is negatively correlated to per capita gross regional
product (GRP), i.e., poorer provinces are more dependent on central government’s
fiscal transfers than more affluent ones. Among all provinces, the most dependent one
is Tibet with 94% of its total expenditures covered by transfers, while the less
dependent one is Beijing with transfers accounting for only 14% of its total
expenditures.
Figure 1.6: Relative importance of the three grants (2009)
Source: MOF (2010b).
Figure 1.7: Dependence of provinces on central government’s fiscal transfers in 2008
Source: Author’s calculation based on China Statistical Yearbook (2009) and Finance Year Book
of China (2009)
Transfers are of vital importance for sub-national governments in China.
However, the current system of intergovernmental transfers has got a lot of criticism
(Ahmad et al., 2002; Tsui, 2005). It is often considered that in spite of the large
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volume of flows, this system has not been efficient in redistributing resources,
especially at the beginning of the post-TSS era when tax rebate predominated in the
total grants.22 Tax rebate is considered to be not equalizing because it accrues to the
benefit of the wealthier provinces and intends to safeguard their immediate interests
by preventing severe decline in revenue after the TSS reform. Earmarked grants have
the potential to be equalizing, but a potentially dis-equalizing element in earmarked
grants is the requirement for matching funds from local governments in order to
access many of these grants (Whiting, 2007). Moreover, these funds are subject to
lack of transparency because they are often allocated on an ad-hoc base. Bargaining
power of provinces is still essential for these funds’ allocation (Bahl, 1999).
Figure 1.8: Dis-equalizing to equalizing transfers (1999, 2005, and 2009)
(a) 1999 (b) 2005
(c) 2009
Source: China Statistical Yearbook (2000; 2006; 2010) and Finance Year Book of China (MOF,
2000; 2006; 2010)
22 In fact, the rebate accounted for about three-quarters of central transfers during the mid-1990s (World Bank,
2002).
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Figure 1.8 (a, b and c) relates per capita transfers received by each province and
provincial GRP per capita in 1999, 2005 and 2009, respectively. According to the
figure, in 1999, transfers per capita are positively correlated to provincial GRP per
capita, i.e., richer (poorer) provinces get more (less) transfers. The transfers were thus
rather dis-equalizing than equalizing. Nevertheless, due to the decrease of the share of
tax rebate and the increase of the share of general purpose transfers in total grants,
transfers were less dis-equalizing in 2005. Figure 8(c) shows that transfers became
equalizing in 2009, when per capita transfers and provincial GRP per capita were
negatively correlated to each other.
1.1.1 Consequences of current one-sided fiscal
decentralization on environmental protection
The one-sided fiscal decentralization after the TSS reform has created significant
fiscal (revenues - expenditures) gaps at the sub-national level in China. Provincial
fiscal gaps in 2010 are illustrated in Figure 1.9: It is notable that all Chinese provinces
are exposed to fiscal (revenues - expenditures) gaps without any exception. The most
important fiscal gap is found in Tibet, which accounts for 93.35% of its expenditures
in 2010. The province the less exposed to fiscal gap is Shanghai, with 13% of its
expenditures uncovered by its revenues in 2010. Consistent with the dependence on
central transfers (illustrated in Figure 1.5), more affluent provinces have generally
less important fiscal gaps.
Generally, sub-national governments in China depend to a large extent on
intergovernmental transfers, which are not always transparent or adequate.23 It is
argued that in many poor localities, the one-sided decentralization has often led to the
under-provision of basic public services (Martinez-Vazquez et al., 2009). Several
factors can explain why environmental protection services would be underprovided
under such a system.
23 This situation has also driven sub-national governments to be reliant on informal fiscal tools, such as
extra-budgetary sources of funding, indirect borrowing at the sub-national levels and land sale.
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Figure 1.9: Provincial fiscal gaps in 2010
Source: Data published in China Statistical Yearbook (2010)
First, local governments (and their EPBs) may be obliged to maintain weak
environmental enforcement due to fiscal incapacity. Sub-national governments have
excessively heavy expenditure responsibilities which are mismatched with their
revenue assignments (World Bank, 2002). It is argued that, in many poor regions,
fiscal resources are so insufficient that public finance is reduced to some kind of
“dining finance” (chi fan cai zheng), which means the payment of civil servants’ wage
(Jing and Liu, 2009). Given the severe budgetary pressures, certain local governments,
especially those of poor localities, can fail to provide sufficient environmental
services or inspection due to lack of funding, quality personnel and (or) equipment.
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Secondly, weak environmental enforcement is also likely to arise due to
unwillingness. Qian and Roland (1998) argue that in the inter-jurisdiction competition
for foreign capital and grants from the central government, local governments will
have incentives for too much infrastructure investment and too few local public goods
for a given budget. As a result, when taking budget priority decision, local
governments may have reluctance to spend money in “unproductive” areas such as
environmental protection. Moreover, it seems that this unwillingness for more
stringent environmental enforcement can be reinforced by the severe local budgetary
pressures. On one hand, mismatched revenues and expenditure responsibilities force
local governments to trade off between different functions (e.g., infrastructure and
environmental protection.) On the other hand, in order to fulfill their responsibilities,
local governments struggle to enlarge revenue resources. In particular, they may be
incentivized to set sub-optimal environmental stringency to attract polluting capital or
to engage in other short-sighted activities that may compromise environmental
protection.24
Finally, mismatched expenditures and revenues can also affect environmental
through corruption. On one hand, as argued by Fisman and Gatti (2002b), vertical
fiscal transfers may allow local officials to ignore the financial consequences of
mismanagement. Moreover, transfers may attenuate the direct accountability of a
politician in his locality. The authors find that larger federal transfers are associated
with higher rates of conviction for abuse of public office in the U.S.; On the other
hand, corruption is found in many studies to be an important factor of bad
environmental governance and environmental deterioration (Lopez and Mitra, 2000;
Welsch, 2004). As a result, one may expect that the Chinese one-sided fiscal
decentralization may contribute to ineffective enforcement of environmental
regulations due to enlarged corruption.
In summary, it seems that the current one-sided fiscal decentralization imposes
important constraint on sub-national governments’ enforcement capacity of
24 A concrete case of the short-sighted activities is the sale of farmland to real estate developers by Chinese local
governments. It is estimated that about 40 million farmers have been stripped of their land by local governments.
http://www.china.org.cn/learning_english/2011-11/08/content_23852110.htm.
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environmental regulation. More importantly, the one-sided fiscal decentralization
generates particular economic incentives for weak enforcement of environmental
policies in China. Under the strong fiscal pressure, sub-national governments are
incentivized in several ways to neglect environmental protection or to save their
enforcement efforts.
In the following, I’ll turn to another side of federalism – the de facto
environmental federalism, which may affect environmental policy outcome more
directly.
1.3De facto environmental federalism and environmental
policy failures
In the sub-section, firstly, I present how environmental policy is designed and
implemented in the framework of de facto federalism. Then, I explain why this de
facto environmental federalism can be related to policy failures
1.3.1 Environmental policy framework in China
1.3.1.1 Environmental legislation
A comprehensive policy framework for natural resources and environmental
management has been established in China since the beginning of the economic
reforms in late 1970s (ADB, 2007). In 1978, the National People’s Congress (NPC)
added Article 26, Section 1 to the Chinese Constitution, providing that “the state
protects and improves the living environment and the ecological environment, and
prevents and controls pollution and other public hazards.” In the same year, the NPC
passed the Environmental Protection Law (EPL, for trial implementation), which
required that related departments in the central government, as well as all provincial
and municipal governments, to establish environmental protection institutes25
25Article 16, Chapter 3 of the EPL (1989) provides that “the local people’s governments of various levels shall be
responsible for the environmental quality of areas under their jurisdiction and take measures to improve the
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(Golding, 2011).
The EPL came into effect in 1989 and is the main legal basis for environmental
management in China nowadays. Since then, environmental legislation in China has
seen a rapid expansion, particularly in the late 1990s and the beginning of the new
century. A number of new environment laws were enacted, such as the Law on
Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA), the Law on Cleaner Production, and the law
on Circular Economy. Besides, a number of other legal acts were amended, including
the EPL and the Air, Water and Waste Prevention and Control Laws. Moreover, the
recently revised Criminal Law makes provisions for criminal sanctions in case of
serious harm to the environment and/or natural resources (OECD, 2006).
In addition to laws, the legal statutes of environmental policy in China are
supported by more than forty State Council regulations, approximately 500 standards,
and more than 600 other legal or norm-creating documents, which set rules and
specify tools for implementing the legislation (OECD, 2007). Furthermore, more than
1,600 regulations and administrative guidelines have been proclaimed by the
sub-national people’s congresses and governments (ADB, 2007). In principle,
provincial governments may set more stringent standards than those already covered
by the national law. Provinces can also promulgate ambient and discharge standards
for pollutants that are not specified in the national law, which must be forwarded to
Ministry of Environmental Protection (MEP) for review and recorded.26 The
significant variation among provincial standards is one of the evidences of the de
facto environmental federalism.
1.3.1.2 Environmental planning
environment quality”.
http://www.lawinfochina.com/display.aspx?id=1208&lib=law&SearchKeyword=Environmental%20Protection%2
0Law&SearchCKeyword=
26 Article 10, Chapter2 of the EPL (1989) provides that provincial “governments may establish their local
standards for the discharge of pollutants for items not specified in the national standards; with regard to items
already specified in the national standards, they may set local standards which are more stringent than the national
standards and report the same to the competent department of environmental protection administration under the
State Council for the record. Units that discharge pollutants in areas where the local standards for the discharge of
pollutants have been established shall observe such local standards”.
http://www.lawinfochina.com/display.aspx?id=1208&lib=law&SearchKeyword=Environmental%20Protection%2
0Law&SearchCKeyword=.
Chapter 1 De facto federalism in China: relations with environmental policy failures
34
Plans exist throughout the Chinese government. They may be national or local,
comprehensive or topical (for example, focused on environment). Plans are
aspirational, but also provide for required targets (Guttman and Song, 2007).27
Developed by the Chinese government and approved by the Chinese Communist
Party (CCP) and the NPC, Five-Year Plans for National Economic and Social
Development (FYPs) are the basis for coordinating Chinese public policy priorities
and provide key guidance to both central and sub-national authorities. Within the
context of FYPs, there are a number of sectoral plans, including Five-Year
Environment Plans for the environment and natural resources sectors (FYEPs). The
FYEPs are further broken down into individual specific plans (e.g. for hazardous
waste management, water management in key rivers and lakes, development of the
environmental industry, etc.). In addition, sub-national governments prepare their own
FYEPs under the guidance of national FYEPs.
Environment plans have been integrated into the FYPs since the 8th FYP
(1991-1995), in which various provisions to strengthen environmental management
were issued. The 9th FYEP (1996-2000) acknowledged serious deterioration of the
environment and called for the establishment of environmental management and
legislative systems. It also called for stricter inspection of industrial pollution control.
The 10th FYEP (2001-2005) set new targets, and envisaged a number of institutional
and regulatory measures such as strengthening decision-making for integration of
environmental matters into economic development and promoting the use of
economic instruments. The implementation of the 10th FYEP was estimated to require
an investment of 1.3% of GDP (OECD, 2006); The 11th FYEP (2006-2010) was
guided by the philosophy of building a resource-efficient, environment-friendly and
sustainable society. Major environmental targets of the 11th FYEP include: a 20%
reduction of energy consumption per unit GDP and total emission of major pollutants
(i.e., COD and SO2) by 10% by 2010 compared with that of 2005. Estimated
investment should account for 1.35% of GDP of the same period (The State Council
27 The authors discuss the relation between plan and law in China. They state that plans are provided for by the
Constitution and have the power of the law in many cases, however, plans have no provision for enforcement by
those outside the government - citizens or NGOs, for example.
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of the P.R.C., 2008); The 12th FEYP (2011-2015) was published in December, 2011.
Key targets of the 12th FEYP include: an 8% reduction of COD and SO2 emissions, a
10% reduction of N-NH3 and NOx emissions and significant improvement in ambient
water and air quality (The State Council of the P.R.C., 2011). In addition, among the
seven priority industries to be developed in the 12th FYP period, three sectors align
with the theme of sustainable growth, i.e., energy savings and environmental
protection; new energy; and clean energy vehicles (KPMG China, 2011).
1.3.1.3 Instruments
A number of specific regulatory and economic instruments are provided by Chinese
environmental laws for industrial pollution control. Among various regulatory
instruments introduced by the EPL (1989), one can cite three most important ones: the
Discharge Permit System (DPS), the “Three Synchronizations” (“3S”) and the EIA;
Economic instruments are market-based instruments with the purpose of internalizing
pollution cost. Among the set of economic instruments applied in China, the most
relevant one is the comprehensive system of pollution levies.
Under the DPS, enterprises which discharge pollution have to register with local
Environmental Protection Bureaus (EPBs) and apply for a permit. Discharge permits
are regulatory documents that limit both the quantities and concentrations of
pollutants in an enterprise’s wastewater and waste gas emissions. Allocation and
enforcement of discharge permits are in the charge of EPBs. It is argued that local
EPBs have considerable flexibility in developing their own DPS (OECD, 2006); The
“3S”system requires that the design, construction, and operation of a new industrial
enterprise (or the expansion or renovation of an existing enterprise) be synchronized
with the design, construction, and operation of suitable pollution control facilities
(ADB, 2007). Once the construction of a project is completed, inspection and
approval by environmental administrations are required for the operation of the
project; The EIA is a process of identification, prediction and evaluation of a project’s
potential impact on the environment and is, essentially, an aid to the decision-makers
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responsible for planning (Hoyle et al., 1999). The Law on EIA promulgated in 2002
requires all construction projects in China be subject of EIA. The law also specifies
that the content of the assessment should include identification and analysis of
potential environmental impacts, possible measures to prevent or control the
identified impacts, and assessment of the feasibility and costs of the possible
measures. The 2002 EIA Law also requires public authorities to hold public hearings
involving parties that are potentially affected (OECD, 2006).
The pollution levy system (PLS) was introduced in China as early as 1979
(OECD, 2007) and was implemented in the nationwide in 1982 (Wang and Wheeler,
2005). The PLS has seen a series of modification during the last three decades: First
designed for above-standard emissions, this system was amended in the early 1990s
and expanded to cover both below-standard and above-standard emissions, with
higher levy rates being imposed on emissions that exceed the official standards (Wu,
2010); In 2003, the system was again amended. Since then, charges should be levied
on all substances included in the emissions. Unit rates were increased and charges
levied entered budgetary management; Finally, the latest modification occurred in
2008, when the amended version of the Law on the Prevention and Control of Water
Pollution (LPCWP) abolished above-standard levy on waste water and converted it to
administrative fines. Under the current PLS, levy rate is set by the central government,
while concentration standards are set jointly by central and local governments. It is
estimated that the current pollution levy system is relatively effective but some
problems still exist: in particular, the charges that polluting enterprises have to pay are
still significantly lower than the cost of pollution reduction (Wang and Wheeler, 2005).
Moreover, in many cases, the actual charge paid by a firm is a result of bargaining
with the administration (Wang et al., 2003). At last but not the least, the charge
collection rate is very low (OECD, 2006). Concerning other economic instruments,
one can cite user charges28, emission trading29, and deposit-refund systems30, etc.
28 User charges have been applied on household and industry use of environmental services and natural resources,
e.g., the wastewater treatment charge paid by all customers connected to a centralized water supply system and the
fee for municipal solid waste collection.
29 A number of pilot projects on emission trading were conducted in the 1990s. Pilot applications were organized
in seven provinces in 2002 to access the feasibility of a nationwide emission trading scheme.
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(OECD, 2007). The use of new economic instruments, such as environmental taxes,
environmental funds, and ecological compensation funds, is proposed in the11th FYEP.
Many of these new instruments are still under design (ADB, 2007).
1.3.1.4 Institutions
In China, environmental protection responsibilities are shared among different
agencies and different levels of government.
The highest legislative body for environmental protection in China is the
Environmental and Natural Resources Protection Committee (ERPC) under the NPC.
In 1993, the Environmental Protection Committee of the NPC was established; a year
later it was renamed the ERPC. The ERPC is primarily responsible for drafting,
reviewing and enacting laws on environmental and natural resources protection, and
overseeing their implementation. Similar committees exist at the provincial,
municipal, and county levels under the respective people’s congresses. These lower
level committees are permitted to make their own legislation at a lower order
provided it is consistent with the national legislative framework (ADB, 2007).
Policy implementation responsibilities are also divided between the center and
localities. At national level, the highest administrative body for environmental
protection is the MEP, under the State Council. In fact, the first administrative organ
for environmental management in China - The Environmental Protection Leading
Group of the State Council, was created by the government as early as 1974, in
response to the first world conference on the environment held in Stockholm in 1972.
After that, this organ has evolved from a department within a ministry in the 1980s, to
a sub-ministry in the 1990s, then to an agency of ministry status – the State
Environmental Protection Administration (SEPA) in 1998, and finally to the MEP in
2008 (ADB, 2007). According to some scholars, the stature increase of the MEP has
significant meanings because it allows the ministry to regulate formerly
30 In some provinces, monetary deposits are collected during the construction of enterprises to guarantee the
application of the “Three Synchronizations”. The deposit is returned to the investor if the construction satisfies the
requirements. Otherwise, the deposit is retained by the environmental administration as a fine.
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higher-ranking development ministries, provides long-term stability to the ministry,
and allocates a vote in State Council proceedings (Qiu and Li, 2009). In resume, this
stature evolution over three decades can be considered as reflect of the increasing
importance that the Chinese Government attaches to environment. The wide array of
responsibilities of the MEP can be summarized as follows (MEP, 2008):
� Implementing national policies and plans for environmental protection;
� Formulating environmental regulations, administrative rules, and standards;
� Organizing and supervising total emission control system and pollutant discharge
license system for major pollutants;
� Review of environmental fixed-assets investment projects and arrangement of
national financial budget;
� Conducting the EIA and other programs to prevent source pollution;
� Ecological conservation and nuclear safety guide and supervision;
� Environmental monitoring and information release;
� Organizing and promoting environmental R & D;
� Implementing international conventions, cooperation, and exchanges
� Promoting environmental publicity, communications work, environmental
education, public participation and NGOs.
Nevertheless, the primary responsibility for environmental policies
implementation is realized at the sub-national level, by more than 3000 EPBs with
approximately 45000 employees in these provincial, prefectural, and county level
administration bureaus.31 Supervised by the MEP, these EPBs enforce national and
provincial environmental protection laws and regulations. As the main executing
agencies for environmental protection policies in China, EPBs apply different
instruments and deal directly with polluters or polluting events. As a result, it is their
efforts which determine the effectiveness of environmental policies in China. The
main responsibilities of EPBs can be summarized as follows (ADB, 2007; OECD,
2006):
� Overseeing EIA and other procedures for new development projects, e.g., “Three
31 2009 data from China Environmental Yearbook (2010)
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Synchronizations;
� Monitoring pollution releases from industries;
� Assessing levies for pollution discharges;
� Initiating legal action against environmental violations, such as stopping and
imposing fines and penalties
� Dealing with public complaints, mediating pollution disputes, and investigating
pollution accidents
� Environmental reporting, education and awareness raising activities.
1.3.2 Ineffective local enforcement and de facto
environmental federalism
In spite of the comprehensive policy framework presented above, environmental laws
and legal enforcement have failed to meaningfully address pollution problems and
improve environmental quality in China. As discussed in General Introduction, poor
environment quality continues to make tremendous damages to national economy,
public health and eco-system.
The ineffectiveness of local enforcement is largely accepted to be the main reason
for environmental policy failures in China. A joint investigation by SEPA and
Ministry of Land and Resources in 2004 shows that only 30 to 40 percent of the
mining construction projects went through the procedure of the EIA as required, while
in some areas only 6 to 7 percent did so; Some scholars estimated that only 10% of
China’s environmental law is enforced in 2005.32 In fact, even though several types
of non-compliance sanctions are used by environmental authorities, a wide gap exists
between what EPBs are authorized to apply and what they actually do when
environmental rules are violated (OECD, 2007). Among different driving forces
behind the ineffectiveness of enforcement, two essential ones can be identified:
First, many if not all EPBs lack the resources to develop the scientific, technical,
32 Embassy of China, China Improves Enforcement of Environmental Laws.
http://www.chinese-embassy.org.uk/eng/zt/Features/t214565.htm. .
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and managerial capacity needed to effectively carry out their mission (Xue et al.,
2006). The lack can be either in human resources or in funding or in both. Concerning
human resources, even though the number of inspectors nationwide has been
multiplied during one decade (from 28039 in 1999 to 60896 in 2009),33 the staffing is
not likely to be sufficient to effectively compliance monitoring and enforcement
responsibilities (Golding, 2011; OECD, 2006). Moreover, EPBs’ staffs often have
little or no legal training (Lan et al., 2011). The municipal EPB of Shanghai, for
example, has only three attorneys in 1998. In contrast, New York State, which has
roughly the equivalent population of Shanghai, has ninety-eight state attorneys
dedicated to environmental protection in addition to thirty-seven environmental
attorneys in the attorney general’s office (Golding, 2011). The lack of sufficient
financial resources is also responsible for policy failures, e.g., through the lack of
quality monitoring equipment. It is argued that insufficient funding has created
perverse incentives with deleterious environmental impacts, in that many EPBs have
become dependent on the pollution levies they collect, which yield substantial
revenues and are used to cover their operating costs (Xue et al., 2006). This means
indirectly that EPBs have an incentive to allow industries to pollute so that they can
collect pollution fees. The lack of resource and enforcement capacity has given rise to
the so called “pragmatism”. Pragmatism is reflected in EPBs’ reliance on guanxi34
with regulated enterprises (OECD, 2007). Guided by the pragmatism, considerable
discretion is applied by EPBs in determining how to enforce environmental
requirements (e.g. how stringent and to which enterprises). For example, pragmatic
enforcement can lead EPBs to target big polluters and leave small and middle ones
unattended even if the aggregated pollution of the latter can be much larger (OECD,
2006). Besides, pragmatism can lead to enforcement failures when local EPB officials
want to maintain harmonious relations with regulated enterprises, especially if
pollution levies are used to cover EPB’s operating costs.
33 China environment Yearbook (1999, 2009)
34 The Chinese word guanxi is frequently translated as “social connections”. In general, guanxi is maintained by
trading favours over long periods. These exchanges are often viewed as creating a resource that can be used to “get
things done”.
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Another widely recognized driving force behind weak enforcement is the local
protectionism (Golding, 2011). Since EPBs are institutionally and financially
subordinated to local governments, the latter may interfere with local environmental
enforcement.35 The widespread local protectionism in China had a two-part cause: on
one hand, legislation in China is generally aspirational and vague, which gives great
enforcement discretion to local officials; on the other hand, local officials exercise
their enforcement discretion to protect local economic interests rather than
implementing environmental legislative purposes (Rooij et al., 2006). Local
governments sometimes collude with enterprises which provide tax revenue or
employment and help them to escape costly environmental requirements. For example,
Dasgupta et al. (1997) describe that communities are reluctant in imposing regulatory
costs on township-village enterprises in China
The policy failures mentioned above and their causes can be at least in part
related to the de facto environmental federalism in China. On one hand, de facto
environmental federalism creates strong incentives for Chinese local governments to
maintain weak enforcement efforts. First, classically, environmental federalism may
lead to a race-to-the-bottom in which jurisdictions compete for mobile capital by
offering lower environmental standards; secondly, trans-boundary pollution problems
may also conduct to ineffective enforcement effort due to pollution spillovers and
free-riding behaviors, when environmental policymaking is decentralized; at last but
not the least, because Chinese residents cannot move relatively freely between
jurisdictions due to the household registration (hukou) system,36 the classic merit of
decentralization – voting with their feet (Tiebout, 1956) - doesn’t hold in China, and
the competition for mobile capital must dominate. On the other hand, de facto
environmental federalism has provided Chinese localities with the possibility to apply
weak enforcement. First, localities participate in setting and can have their own
environmental standards; secondly, local EPBs have primary responsibilities and
considerable discretion in environmental regulation enforcement, as discussed
35 More details are given in Chapter 2.
36 Nevertheless, it is notable that, although marginally, migration between urban areas always exist in China.
Moreover, the Hukou system is becoming less constraining in local public good allocation.
Chapter 1 De facto federalism in China: relations with environmental policy failures
42
previously in the section; finally, de facto environmental federalism has definitely
facilitated the local protectionism.
Just as the fiscal decentralization which can create either a “helping hand” or
“grabbing hand” for market development depending on whether officials benefit from
their policy efforts (Jin et al., 2005). De facto environmental federalism can also
facilitate or slow environmental regulatory enforcement depending on whether
officials benefit from environmental gains. In effect, since the 1978 reforms and until
very recently, national development priority has always been given to economic
growth over environmental protection in China. Facing the structural conflict between
economic growth and environmental protection,37 the “pro-growth” incentives, and
different capacity constraints, it is not surprising that Chinese localities use the
autonomy endowed by the de facto environmental federalism to develop economy at
cost of environmental goals. It seems that given the skewed incentives, de facto
environmental federalism has created a “grabbing hand” in the sense that it has
become a tool to promote economic growth rather than environmental protection.
1.4Concluding remarks
In a country where economic, geographical and cultural heterogeneities across regions
are as great as China, it is impossible for a centrally applied uniform environmental
standard to be efficient everywhere. Even in discarding the assumption of uniform
standard, it must be unfeasible for the central government to obtain necessary and
accurate local information in order to provide locally-adapted environmental services.
As a result, the merits of decentralization seem particularly attractive and promising
for China. However, as argued by Fredriksson et al. (2006), environmental federalism
is not a panacea. Devolution of power from the center will tend to create or exacerbate
problems where local officials face skewed incentives (Lan et al., 2011). Effectively,
decentralization can generate either a “helping hand” or a “grabbing hand” for policy
goals, depending on what kind of incentive local officials confront.
37 That is to say, economic growth generally goes against environmental protection, and vice versa.
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In this chapter, in reviewing the de facto federalism in China, I show that the de
facto environmental federalism and the one-sided fiscal decentralization are likely to
work side by side in contributing to ineffective environmental regulatory enforcement
at the sub-national level in this country. Under such de facto federalism, sub-national
governments in China have not only the possibility but also strong economic
incentives to conduct weak environmental regulatory enforcement. Confronting the
extremely skewed pro-growth incentive, sub-national governments have probably
used their autonomy in environmental policy implementation to facilitate economic
growth rather than (or even in sacrificing) environmental protection.
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2.1Introduction
In order to study empirically the effects of the de facto environmental federalism in
China, I begin with one of the most cited shortcomings of environmental federalism,
i.e. the free riding behavior in case of trans-boundary pollution.
When pollution crosses jurisdictional borders, polluting jurisdictions don’t
experience the full benefits of pollution control (Sigman, 2002). As a result, under
environmental federalism, uncoordinated jurisdictions may engage in free-riding
behaviors, leading to an excess of trans-boundary pollution (Helland and Whitford,
2003; Kahn, 2004; Konisky and Woods, 2010; Sigman, 2005). Particularly, the
border-effect, i.e. an excess of pollution at jurisdictional borders, may arise. For
example, Kahn (2004) shows that, in the United States, cancer rates are substantially
higher in border counties than in interior ones, proving that people in border counties
suffer disproportionately from trans-boundary pollution.
As discussed in Chapter 1, China has a de facto environmental federalism: the
implementation of environmental policies is largely decentralized, and local EPBs
have considerable discretion in regulatory enforcement. It seems that, in this context,
free-riding behaviors and border effects are very likely to exist. In fact, since several
years, more and more frequent trans-boundary pollution problems have already
attracted great attention in China. The Huai River, which runs through four provinces
(Henan, Shandong, Anhui and Jiangsu), is very illustrative. As discussed in General
Introduction, on several occasions, downstream provinces accused upstream
provinces of dumping pollution into the river in order to evacuate it to other provinces.
In many cases, trans-boundary pollution has led to interregional conflicts which are
difficult to coordinate.38 Among different consequences of trans-boundary pollution,
a serious one is the border-effect. In order to be aware of this potential risk, the MEP
has in effect paid particular attention to river water quality supervision at
interprovincial borders.39
38 Six regional offices of the MEP have been created in part for the purpose of coordinating conflicts caused by
trans-boundary pollution.
39 A nationwide Surface Water Quality Automatic Monitoring System has been established since 1999. In 2009,
Chapter 2 Border-effect in trans-boundary pollution: A study of polluting firms' location choice in Hebei province
46
Although trans-boundary pollution has caused highlighted problems in China,
very few research studies have investigated its border-effect, probably because of data
unavailability. With the purpose of filling this gap in the literature, this chapter tests
for the border-effect of trans-boundary pollution in studying the location choice of
polluting firms between 2002 and 2008 in Hebei province. Precisely, using a unique
dataset and count-data models, this chapter tests whether polluting firms are more
likely to set up, ceteris paribus, in counties that share a border with another province
than in interior counties. The rest of the chapter is organized as follows. Following the
introduction, in Section 2, a brief literature is made to understand why, in the context
of China’s current decentralized policy, polluting firms would tend to agglomerate
near borders. Section 3 is devoted to the description of the study area and data.
Estimation strategy is presented in section 4 and results in section 5. Finally, I
conclude and discuss the empirical results obtained in the chapter.
2.2Literature review: why borders?
Like all plants, those which pollute do not choose their location randomly. Instead,
they decide to set up in a particular region to maximize their profit.40 Generally, firms
are attracted to regions with good market opportunities, and where labor is cheap and
skilled. In spite of these economic considerations, polluting firms are also likely to
take into account the stringency of environmental regulation. Several studies find that
China's environmental policy has significant influence on polluting firms. For
example, environmental controls significantly affect the environmental performance
of polluting industries in the city of Zhenjiang (Dasgupta et al., 2001); Other studies
find that the pollution levy system has a significant impact on the level of industrial
pollution (Wang and Wheeler, 2003) and on the waste water treatment expenditure
(Wang, 2002); Although state-owned enterprises have more bargaining power with
100 automatic stations report water quality along main rivers and lakes across China. Particularly, 37 stations are
set where rivers cross provincial borders, in order to supervise trans-boundary pollution (China Environment
Yearbook, 2010).
40 Several studies show that in China, the location choice of both foreign (He, 2003; Wu, 1999) and Chinese firms
(Wen, 2004) depends nowadays on "rational economic considerations".
Chapter 2 Border-effect in trans-boundary pollution: A study of polluting firms' location choice in Hebei province
47
local authorities in terms of levies (Wang, et al., 2003), environmental policy also has
a significant impact on them (Wang and Wheeler, 2005).
In the Chinese context, where the implementation of environmental policy is
decentralized, it is expected that border effect may also matter for polluting firms.
Under this assumption, border counties would constitute particularly attractive
destinations for polluting firms within a province. Precisely, two rationales could
explain why polluting firms set up near borders, i.e. "pollution havens" and
"free-riding" hypotheses.
2.2.1 Interprovincial stringency difference: "pollution
havens hypothesis"
As discussed in Chapters 1, in China, the stringency of environmental regulation is to
a great extent to the discretion of provinces and varies greatly from one province to
another (see Chapter 3 for more details). These regional differences would be at the
origin of a "pollution havens" phenomenon within the country,41 i.e., polluting firms
would be attracted to regions where environmental regulations are less strict (Dean et
al., 2009; He, 2006).
Effectively, it would be profitable for a firm to locate just at the border between
two provinces if there are discontinuities in environmental regulations at border, i.e.,
one can move suddenly from a stricter environmental regulation to a less restrictive
one by crossing the administrative boundary. In this case, crossing a border can
therefore be a way to escape from severe environmental regulations of the
neighboring province while continuing to benefit from its market access. Kahn (2004)
shows that, in low environmental regulation states of the U.S., dirty industries set up
more in counties that border high regulation states than in interior counties.
Nevertheless, this kind of border-effect could be limited in China because of a
41 The hypothesis of "pollution havens" is commonly considered at international level. According to this
hypothesis, in a world of free trade, the South, whose environmental regulations are less stringent, has a
comparative advantage in producing "dirty" goods and attracts polluting industries to migrate from the North.
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significant interprovincial protectionism. It is argued that under such protectionism,
domestic market is fragmented along provincial borders and inter-provincial trade
barriers are set to protect local industry (Poncet, 2003; Poncet, 2005; Young, 2000).
With intense interprovincial protectionism, it would be no more profitable for a firm
to locate in a border county because crossing the border means a loss of market
access.
2.2.2 Intra-provincial stringency difference: "free-riding
hypothesis"
Polluting firms would also be attracted to border counties due to intra-provincial
stringency difference. In effect, regional regulators may implement environmental
policy less strictly in border counties than in interior ones (Helland and Whitford,
2003). Several elements could encourage them to do so.
First of all, at borders, a region's expenditure on pollution control does not solely
benefit itself but also its neighbor regions due to pollution spillovers. Since regions
have limited financial resources, they would prefer spending them where they can
fully enjoy them, i.e., in interior counties. Thus the positive externality of expenditure
on environmental protection makes that it would be below the optimal level in border
counties.
Secondly, at borders, a firm's pollution can partly fall on the neighboring region.
Thus, in border counties, the region may enjoy the overall positive economic benefit
related to the presence of the firm (e.g. taxes) and suffer from only a part of its
pollution. On the contrary, in interior counties, the region has to bear much more, if
not all of the pollution. As a result, in the presence of pollution’s negative externality,
pollution discharged in border counties would be greater than the optimal level. This
free-riding phenomenon can explain why, in the U.S., plants whose pollution falls
partly on the population of neighboring states tend to pollute more (Gray and
Shadbegian, 2004).
In the Chinese context, given the severe fiscal pressure confronted by provinces, it
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is not surprising that provincial regulators would care more about interior counties
than border ones. Moreover, it is expected that social discontent related to polluting
firms would be higher in interior counties than in border ones. Given the increasing
public participation in environmental issues,42 a regulator concerned with his political
support would be more likely to guide polluting firms towards the border.
2.3Description of the study area and data
2.3.1 Hebei province
This study is carried out in Hebei Province for several reasons. First of all, since the
very beginning of China's industrialization in the early 1950s, Hebei has been
specialized in heavy industries. The long history of industrialization makes it one of
the most polluted provinces in the country. According to the list of the most polluting
firms published in 2010 by the MEP, Hebei is one of the provinces which have the
largest number of polluting firms. Among the 9833 top polluters in China, 744 are
located in Hebei, just behind Jiangsu (838) and Shandong (774). Then, Hebei shares
borders with seven other provinces including the centrally administrated
municipalities of Beijing and Tianjin (see Figure 2.1). Moreover, Hebei has already
been involved in several conflicts of trans-boundary pollution. For example, in
January 2008, residents of Wuqing district (Tianjin) complained that a cement plant of
the neighbor Xianghe county (Hebei) over-discharged soot pollution which crossed
the provincial border and damaged their soil and crop production;43 In August 2010,
residents of the city of Chifeng (Inner Mongolia), located downstream on the Xiluga
river, registered a complaint against a firm in the upstream county of Weichang
(Hebei). According to the inhabitants of Chifeng, the firm dumped untreated sewage
into the river which would have resulted in the death of their livestock.44 Finally,
Hebei is chosen because it is one of the few provinces whose data are available to
42 Discussed in more details in Chapter 4
43 Document No.3, 2008, EPB of Wuqing district, Tianjin city,
http://gk.tjwq.gov.cn/ConInfoParticular.jsp?id=1364.
44 China Environment News, November 23th 2010. http://www.022net.com/2010/11-23/495144333266320.html.
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carry out this study.
Regarding the environmental regulatory enforcement, in 2002, Hebei had an
average pollution levy charge of about 7300 yuan per polluting facility, which was
very similar to the national average level. In 2008, the average charge rose to about
30500 yuan per polluting facility. These data highlight that the environmental policy
has been tightened over the period.45
Figure 2.1: Hebei province: county level divisions
2.3.2 Dependent variable and construction of the sample
The dependent variable to be estimated is the number of polluting firms created by
county46 and by year over the period 2002-2008. This variable is constructed from the
lists published by the MEP and the EPB of Hebei. In fact, since 2007, the MEP and
45 Data calculated based on China Environment Yearbook (2002; 2008)
46 The province of Hebei counts 172 county level divisions including 36 districts, 22 county-level cities and 114
counties. Because disaggregated data for the districts of the 11 prefectural-level cities are not available, the
districts of a same prefectural-level city are aggregated. That's why the sample contains147 cross-sectional units.
In the list of polluting firms, there are public ones, private ones and collective ones. The FDIs are also included.
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provincial EPBs have annually published lists (Guojia zhongdian jiankong qiye
mingdan and Sheng zhongdian jiankong qiye mingdan) that identify the most
polluting firms in China (and in each province).47 These lists report the name of each
firm and the county in which it is located. However, information is neither provided
on the date of creation nor on emission level.
Although these lists provide necessary information to estimate a “model of stock”
in which the total number of firms in a county is regressed on a set of characteristics
of the county (see Ma (2010) for example), such a model is not reliable to the present
location choice study. Actually, what is needed here is a “flow model” in which the
number of firms created in a county in the year t is regressed on the characteristics of
this county in year t (or t-1). The reasons are as follows: first of all, the characteristics
of the county in year t cannot determine the location choice of firms before that year.
Then, some firms in the lists were created between 1953 and 1978. During that period
of time, unlike more recently, the setting up of a firm didn't depend on an economic
rationale (Wen, 2004). It would be therefore impossible to explain within the same
model the location of firms created before and after the 1980s. At last but not the least,
there was no environmental policy framework in China before 1979. As a result, in
order to test for the border-effect related to trans-boundary pollution, one has to take a
sample of recently created firms which are supposed to be sensitive to environmental
regulation.
In order to estimate a “flow model”, creation dates of polluting firms are
collected on the official website of the Industrial and Commercial Bureau of Hebei
province.48 Once the creation dates are obtained, firms created after 2002 are selected,
the year from which data for the explanatory variables are available. Because the last
list of polluting firms was published in 2010 and lists the most polluting firms in 2008,
the final sample covers the 147 counties of Hebei over the period 2002-2008.
47 These lists identify the most polluting firms at national and provincial level in terms of air, water and sewage
pollution. More precisely, the identified firms produce 65% of total industrial emissions of SO2, NOx, COD,
NH3-N and heavy metals in China. Note that there is a lag of two years between the census of firms in the list and
their pollution. Thus, the list of 2007 lists the firms that polluted the most in 2005.
http://www.mep.gov.cn/info/bgw/bbgtwj/ for National lists; http://www.hb12369.net for provincial lists of Hebei
48 http://www.222.223.188.6/wsgs/ywztcx/query.asp.
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2.3.3 Variables of interest
Three variables of interest are constructed to ensure the robustness. Firstly, in
following the literature (Helland and Whitford, 2003; Kahn, 2004; Konisky and
Woods, 2010), a dummy variable (Border_1) is created. Border_1 is equal to 1 if the
county shares a border with another province or the sea, and 0 otherwise.
However, as showed in Figure 2.1, among border counties, some share a very
small part of their border with another province while others share more than half of
the total length of their border with another province. One may expect that the border
effects would be stronger in the latter case than in the former case. To take into
account this variability among border counties, a second variable (Border_2) is
created: Border_2 is equal to the length of the common border between a county and
another province (or the sea) divided by the total length of this county’s border.
Nevertheless, both Border_1 and Border_2 have an important drawback in that
they do not take into account the variability between non-border counties. In fact,
among interior counties, some are located at the center of the province whereas others
are very close to the borders. Naturally, one may think that the border-effect may also
exist for the latter category, even if they don’t really touch the provincial border. That
is why, a third variable Distance is created, which is equal to the distance between the
county seat and the closest provincial border.
All three variables are constructed with the GIS data of the Chinese Academy of
Sciences49 using ArcGis 9.2. If the border-effect exists, coefficients associated with
variables Border 1 and Border 2 will be positive, while the coefficient associated with
Distance will be negative.
2.3.4 Some descriptive statistics
Tables 2.1 and 2.2 give some descriptive statistics on the polluting firms in Hebei
identified in the lists of the MEP and the EPB. Table 2.1 reports the stock of firms per
49 County border database, Thematic Database for Human-Earth System, the Chinese Academy of Sciences,
http://www.data.ac.cn/jieshao.asp
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100 km2 in 2002 and 2008. It is notable that non-border counties have a larger number
of polluting firms per km2 than border counties both in 2002 and in 2008. A priori,
this contradicts the border-effect hypothesis.
Table 2.1: Stock of polluting firms per km2 in 2002 and 2008
Number of counties Stock of firms per 100
km2 in 2002
Stock of firms per 100
km2 in 2002
All counties 147 0.85 1.15
Border counties 66 0.54 0.76
Non- border
counties
81 1.10 1.47
Table 2.2: Creation of polluting firms between 2002 and 2008
Number of
counties
Firms created
per county
Firms created per
100 km2
Firms created per
100 inhabitants
All counties 147 4.57 0.46 12.68
Border counties 66 7.15 0.51 22.32
Non- border
counties
81 2.47 0.41 4.82
However, according to Table 2.2, during the more recent period, more polluting
firms have been created in border counties than in interior ones. The difference
between Table 2.1 and Table 2.2 reflects an evolution of polluting firms' location
choice in Hebei. As stated previously, among the firms identified in the lists, some
were created before the 1980s. In that era, firms’ location decision did not depend on
an economic rationale but arose from a strategy which aimed at protecting industries
from potential destructive military conflicts. It is argued that three principles
determined the location of industrial firms from 1965 to 1978, i.e. "proximity to
mountains, dispersion and concealment" (Wen, 2004). As a result, industrial firms
were located far away from the coast. Moreover, before 1978, the environmental
policy framework wasn’t established in China thus couldn’t affect firms’ location
choice. Therefore, it is not surprising that the stock of the most polluting firms is not
higher in border counties than in non-border counties. In contrast, newly created
polluting firms choose their location according to economic criteria and are very
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likely to take into account the difference in environmental stringency (see Section 1).
Table 2.2 suggests that the border-effect of trans-boundary pollution is very likely to
exist in Hebei between 2002 and 2008.
2.3.5 Other determinants in polluting firms' choice of
location
Traditional determinants of firms’ location, i.e. regional characteristics that may affect
firms' profit, are introduced as control variables.
On one hand, a number of variables can affect firms' benefits. First of all, firms
are attracted to regions with agglomeration economies. Two indicators are constructed
to capture this effect, i.e. agglomeration economies in the industry sector and
agglomeration economies in the service sector (description and definition of variables
are given in Appendices 2.1 and 2.2). Then, firms are more likely to set up in regions
that offer significant market opportunities. As firms do not only consider the local
market but also the markets of neighboring regions (Head and Mayer, 2004), two
variables are used to capture the effects of local and external markets, respectively.
Moreover, an indicator of education level is introduced for each county because well
educated population is likely to attract firms. Furthermore, a dummy variable is also
created to control for the presence of Special Economic Zone (SEZ) in each county
because regions benefiting from SEZ status attract significantly more firms in China
(Cheng and Stough, 2006; Wu, 1999). Finally, GRP per capita and its squared term is
included to check the existence of the Environmental Kuznuts Curve (EKC).
On the other hand, firms are attracted by regions with cheap production factors.
As a result, the real wage rate in industry and the population density are introduced as
proxies for labor and land price. Note that polluting firms would also prefer areas with
low population density to minimize social discontent. In addition, dummies are
introduced to capture the nature of the administrative unit (county, district or city at
county level) and time fixed effects. All variables are constructed with data published
in Hebei Statistical Yearbook (2003-2009).
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2.4Estimation strategy
It is notable that the dependent variable in the present study, the number of polluting
firms created in each county, is composed of non-negative integers with high
frequency of zeros. This special nature leads to the adoption of a count-data model.50
The standard model in this case is the Poisson regression model. This model estimates
how much a 1% change in an explanatory variable x
i
affects the probability that a firm
sets up in the territory i. The probability, Prob(y
i
), of a territory i to receive y
i
firms is
based on a set of characteristics xi of this territory as formed in (2.1):
Pr ( ) ( )
i i
ob y f x= (2.1)
The most common way to model this probability function is to assume that the
variable y
i
follows a Poisson distribution. In this case, the probability for a region i to
receive y
i
firms is given by (2.2):
Pr ( | ) , 0,1, 2,...,
!
i i
λ y
i
i i
i
e λ
ob Y y x y n
y
−
= = = and 'ln( )
i i
λ β X= (2.2)
where the vector of coefficients
β
is estimated by the method of the maximum
likelihood. However, the Poisson model is restrictive because it assumes that
i
λ
is
both the conditional mean and variance of y
i
(hypothesis of equi-dispersion), as shown
in (2.3):
[ ] [ ]| |
i i i i i
Var y x E y x λ= = (2.3)
50 Most recent studies on firms' location choice prefer to use a count data model than a discrete choice model
(Arauzo‐Carod et al., 2010). First, the discrete choice model meets computational difficulties when the number
of potential locations is large, which is the case of this study. More importantly, the discrete choice model imposes
a very restrictive assumption of "Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives" (IIA), which is considered to be too
strong for this study.
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Unfortunately, the hypothesis of equi-dispersion is generally poorly respected with
data on firms' location choice as the conditional variance is often higher than the
conditional mean, which is called over-dispersion (Cameron and Trivedi, 1998). In
practice, several phenomena can lead to over-dispersion, in particular the clustering of
firms due to agglomeration effects and the presence of unobserved heterogeneity. In
case of over-dispersion, the Poisson model is no more appropriate because standard
deviations obtained are biased and therefore, statistical inferences are invalid. The
standard way to address over-dispersion is to assume that y
i
follows a negative
binomial distribution, which is more flexible than the Poisson distribution. The
negative binomial model (NBM) is obtained in (2.4), by introducing heterogeneity in
the Poisson parameter:
'ln( )
i i i
λ β X ε= + (2.4)
where
i
ε
follows a gamma distribution with mean 1 and variance
α
. In this model
mixed of Poisson and Gamma distributions, the probability Prob(y
i
) of a territory i to
receive a number y
i
of firms is given by (2.5):
Γ( )
Pr ( )
Γ( 1)Γ( ) ( )
i
i
y
θ
i i
i
y θ
i i
θ λ y θ
ob Y y
y θ λ θ
+
+
= =
+ +
(2.5)
where Γ is the gamma function and
1
θ
α
= , with α the over-dispersion parameter.
When 0α = , there is equi-dispersion and the NBM is equivalent to the Poisson
model. (The two models are nested.) The vector of the coefficients
β
is always
estimated by the method of the maximum likelihood. Note that in the NBM, the
variance can be different from the mean because it is linked to the mean by the
over-dispersion parameter
α
which has to be estimated in (2.6):
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Var y x E y x αE y x E y x= + > (2.6)
Poisson and negative binomial models can be estimated with panel data. Hausman
et al. (1984) propose estimators with fixed effects and random effects for Poisson and
negative binomial models. The Poisson (or negative binomial) model with random
effects is asymptotically more efficient than the fixed-effect model. However, in case
of correlation between explanatory variables and fixed effects, the random-effect
model is not consistent. As for linear panel, the lack of correlation between
explanatory variables and specific effects can be tested with the Hausman test.
One difficulty arises with the present panel dataset. In fact, the variables of
interest in the present study are geographical variables, thus constant over time. To
the knowledge of the author, it is impossible to estimate the coefficients associated
with time invariant variables using count data model with fixed-effects. Moreover, it
is impossible to interpret the Hausman test to check whether the random-effect model
is appropriate because the fixed-effect model does not converge. As a result, the
estimation of the random effects model may produce potentially biased estimates. In
order to test for the robustness of the random-effect model results, cross-sectional
estimate has been run in addition to the random-effect estimate. In this case, the total
number of polluting firms created in each county between 2002 and 2008 is regressed
against the average values of the explanatory variables of this period. The advantage
of panel estimation is that one can test for the evolution of the border effects over time.
In effect, the period of 2002-2008 has seen a series of changes, e.g. the tightening of
the environmental policy, the increasing number of public complaints, and the
creation of regional offices of the MEP. It is possible that these events have affected
behaviors of local governments and polluting firms during this period.
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2.5Estimation results and discussion
2.5.1 Poisson model or NBM?
The first step is to check if the Poisson model fits the dataset. To this end, the
hypothesis of equi-dispersion is tested in several ways. First of all, the standard
deviation of the dependent variable is more than two times its mean, which indicates
that there is probably over-dispersion (see Appendix 2.1). Secondly, the model is
estimated in assuming that the number of created enterprises follows a Poisson
distribution.51 The goodness-of-fit test statistic is always significant, suggesting that
the Poisson regression model is inappropriate. As a result, the model is estimated
assuming that the dependent variable follows a negative binomial distribution.
2.5.2 Border-effect of trans-boundary pollution?
Table 2.3 presents cross-sectional estimates (1), (2) and (3), with the three variables of
interest respectively. Tables 2.4 and 2.5 report panel estimates (4) to (9). Among the
panel estimates, first, the number of firms created in year t is regressed against values
of the explanatory variables in t: estimations (4), (5) and (6). Secondly, lagged
explanatory variables are used in order to rule out endogeneity: estimations (7), (8)
and (9).
In all nine cases, the coefficients associated with variables of interest have the
expected signs and are statistically significant. Counties that share a (larger part of
their) border with another province or with the sea have a higher probability to receive
polluting firms. In the same way, the farther the county seat is from the provincial
boundary, the lower its probability to receive polluting firms is. These results provide
evidence of border-effect related to trans-boundary pollution in China. If this has
already been demonstrated in the U.S. case, to the knowledge of the author, this is the
first study to demonstrate this phenomenon in China.
51 Results for cross-sectional Poisson regressions are reported in Appendix 2.3. Note that despite the unfitness of
the Poisson model, results regarding the variables of interest are always robust.
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Table 2.3: Cross-sectional estimates of the NBM
(1) (2) (3)
Border_1 0.570* (0.059)
Border_2 2.519*** (0.003)
Distance -0.331** (0.033)
Agglo. industry -0.322 (0.262) -0.341 (0.223) -0.367 (0.198)
Agglo. service 2.271** (0.011) 1.986** (0.015) 2.273*** (0.008)
Population density -2.155*** (0.005) -1.931** (0.010) -2.314*** (0.002)
Wage -3.210*** (0.009) -3.241*** (0.007) -3.406*** (0.007)
Education -0.659 (0.395) -0.431 (0.551) -0.471 (0.533)
Local market 1.502*** (0.004) 1.533*** (0.003) 1.599*** (0.002)
External market -0.556*** (0.000) -0.507*** (0.000) -0.529*** (0.000)
SEZ 0.128 (0.564) 0.0545 (0.800) 0.113 (0.622)
County 1.977 (0.141) 1.346 (0.270) 1.637 (0.187)
County level city 1.966 (0.134) 1.331 (0.256) 1.656 (0.173)
GRP per cap. 0.938** (0.028) 1.007** (0.019) 1.025** (0.013)
Sq. GRP per cap -0.0917 (0.811) -0.107 (0.771) -0.117 (0.760)
Constant 31.25*** (0.007) 31.80*** (0.004) 38.15*** (0.002)
Alpha 0.194 (0.260) 0.119 (0.495) 0.179 (0.299)
N 147 147 147
Note: P-values in parenthesis: * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
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Table 2.4: Random-effect estimates of the NBM
(with contemporaneous variables)
(4) (5) (6)
Border_1 0.550** (0.032)
Border_2 1.954*** (0.003)
Distance -0.205* (0.096)
Agglo. industry 0.103 (0.417) 0.100 (0.427) 0.094 (0.463)
Agglo. service 1.078** (0.019) 1.013** (0.026) 1.056** (0.021)
Population density -1.138** (0.013) -1.108** (0.014) -1.279*** (0.004)
Wage -0.834 (0.108) -0.887* (0.085) -0.874* (0.093)
Education 0.013 (0.970) 0.023 (0.946) 0.027 (0.937)
Local market 0.948*** (0.002) 0.967*** (0.001) 1.030*** (0.001)
External market -0.618*** (0.000) -0.581*** (0.000) -0.594*** (0.000)
SEZ -0.081 (0.620) -0.052 (0. 741) -0.057 (0.726)
County 1.529* (0.094) 1.425 (0.114) 1.408 (0.124)
County level city 1.308 (0.129) 1.202 (0.157) 1.161 (0.175)
GRP per cap. 0.419 (0.135) 0.438 (0.116) 0.480* (0.087)
Sq. GRP per cap -0.499*** (0.000) -0.504*** (0.000) -0.500*** (0.000)
Constant 9.227* (0.067) 9.535* (0.054) 12.660** (0.013)
a 1.310*** (0.000) 1.344*** (0.000) 1.291*** (0.000)
b 0.271 (0.181) 0.354* (0.092) 0.263 (0.191)
N 1029 1029 1029
Note: P-values in parenthesis: * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. In each regression, year dummies
are introduced.
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Table 2.5: Random-effect estimates of the NBM (with lagged explanatory variables)
(7) (8) (9)
Border_1 0.689** (0.017)
Border_2 2.643*** (0.000)
Distance -0.233* (0.083)
Agglo. industry 0.140 (0.318) 0.130 (0.345) 0.132 (0.348)
Agglo. service 0.275 (0.500) 0.230 (0.559) 0.287 (0.470)
Population density -0.374 (0.386) -0.365 (0.373) -0.611 (0.134)
Wage -1.088* (0.061) -1.149** (0.046) -1.144* (0.050)
Education -0.239 (0.523) -0.199 (0.587) -0.208 (0.578)
Local market 0.653** (0.040) 0.701** (0.023) 0.770** (0.015)
External market -0.610*** (0.000) -0.561*** (0.000) -0.579*** (0.000)
SEZ 0.145 (0.459) 0.150 (0.416) 0.181 (0.352)
County 1.030 (0.286) 0.856 (0.365) 0.907 (0.345)
County level city 0.979 (0.280) 0.821 (0.352) 0.808 (0.367)
GRP per cap. 0.470 (0.140) 0.467 (0.138) 0.524* (0.100)
Sq. GRP per cap -0.405** (0.010) -0.430*** (0.007) -0.417*** (0.009)
Constant 9.972* (0.077) 10.40* (0.060) 14.28** (0.013)
a 1.352*** (0.000) 1.422*** (0.000) 1.331*** (0.000)
b 0.125 (0.560) 0.234 (0.295) 0.104 (0.622)
N 882 882 882
Note: P-values in parenthesis: * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. In each regression, year dummies
are introduced.
Regarding the control variables, their signs and significance are coherent and
relatively robust. Counties with a more developed tertiary sector, a lower population
density, lower labor costs and a larger local market attract more polluting firms. These
results confirm that the location choice of Chinese firms does depend on economic
factors during the period of study.
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2.5.3 Has the border-effect increased over time?
In order to study whether polluting firms increasingly set up in border counties over
time, an interactive variable "variable of interest * year" is introduced into the model.
Table 2.6 reports the estimation results for the interactions. Complete results can be
found in Appendix 2.4. As in the last subsection, two types of panel estimates are
performed: in estimations (10), (11) and (12), the dependent and the explanatory
variables are contemporaneous, while lagged explanatory variables are used in
estimations (13), (14) and (15). Results of these estimations suggest that border
counties have become increasingly attractive destinations over the period of
2002-2008. In effect, while the variables of interest are either insignificant or not
robust during the first years of the sample, they become significant and their
coefficients increase over time.
Several elements can explain the increasing attractiveness of border counties: first
of all, environmental policy in China has been tightened during the study period,
which could have led to a perverse effect. With the tightening of environmental
regulations, it is expected that polluting firms are increasingly sensitive to
environmental regulations. Thus, it is possible that firms care more and more about
interprovincial or intra-provincial differences in environmental standard enforcement,
and as a result, are more and more attracted to border counties. Then, the Beijing
Olympics Games in 2008 had led to the relocation of a large number of polluting
firms. In fact, some polluting firms located in Beijing had been closed and re-opened
in the neighboring province of Hebei. The Olympic Games had also made the creation
of polluting firms in Beijing more difficult. It is possible that firms wishing to set up
in Beijing moved to Hebei and set up as close as possible to the capital (e.g. in the
counties sharing a border with it) for market access. Finally, the increasing public
participation (e.g. the number of citizen complaints) regarding pollution could have
induced local regulators to harden the environmental policy enforcement particularly
in interior counties and lead more pollution firms toward the borders.
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Table 2.6: Evolution of the border-effect over time
(10) (11) (12) (13) (14) (15)
with contemporaneous variables with lagged explanatory variables
Border_1 Border_2 Distance Border_1 Border_2 Distance
Var_interest*2002 0.0473 0.262 0.0196 0.160 0.144 0.332*
(0.890) (0.773) (0.916) (0.649) (0.880) (0.092)
Var_interest*2003 0.168 0.201 0.307 0.852** 2.594*** -0.260
(0.614) (0.826) (0.111) (0.033) (0.008) (0.184)
Var interest*2004 0.838** 2.648*** -0.301 0.294 2.068** -0.204
(0.027) (0.005) (0.116) (0.441) (0.039) (0.313)
Var_interest*2005 0.324 2.040** -0.214 1.151*** 4.589*** -0.498**
(0.377) (0.037) (0.276) (0.007) (0.000) (0.014)
Var_interest*2006 1.159*** 4.490*** -0.501*** 1.515*** 5.803*** -0.663***
(0.005) (0.000) (0.010) (0.004) (0.000) (0.002)
Var interest*2007 1.491*** 5.797*** -0.634*** 1.364*** 5.309*** -0.550***
(0.004) (0.000) (0.002) (0.005) (0.000) (0.009)
Var interest*2008 1.277*** 5.144*** -0.524**
(0.008) (0.000) (0.011)
N 1029 1029 1029 882 882 882
Note: P-values in parenthesis: * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01.
2.5.4 Robustness checks
2.5.4.1 Border-effect or access to international markets?
Following the literature, in above analysis, a county is considered as a border county
if it shares a common border either with another province or with the sea. However, if
polluting firms set up more in coastal counties in order to benefit from a good access
to international markets, the border-effect found above would not be due to
trans-boundary pollution. To check if the border-effect is due to trans-boundary
pollution or to international market access, the variables of interest (Border 1 and
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Border 2) are disaggregated into two variables: "terrestrial border county" for
counties that borders another province and "coastal county" for those bordering the
Yellow Sea. If polluting firms set up in border counties only to benefit from a good
access to international markets, the coefficient associated with the variable terrestrial
border should not be significantly different from zero. However, if the variable
terrestrial border remains significant, it confirms the trans-boundary pollution
hypothesis. The results of the estimations (16) - (21), reported in Tables 2.7 and 2.8,
validate the trans-boundary pollution hypothesis. In five of the six estimations, the
coefficients associated with the variable terrestrial border are positive and
statistically significant, i.e., counties that share a (larger part of their) border with
another province have a higher probability of receiving polluting firms.
2.5.4.2 "Zero inflation problem"
Count-data models allow for estimating models where the dependent variable takes
the value “zero” many times. However, sometimes the dependent variable y
i
takes the
value “zero” more times than what is assumed by the Poisson or the negative binomial
distribution. This is known as a "zero inflation problem". This problem arises when
two different phenomena lead the dependent variable to take the value “zero” (for a
formal presentation of the model see Greene (1994)). An excess of zeros may lead to
biased results. The appropriate model to address the "zero inflation problem" is a
zero-inflated model.
As shown in Table 2.9, in Hebei province from 2002 to 2008, 36 counties didn’t
see polluting firms set up, which represent about 25% of the sample. The frequency of
zeros is relatively low compared to studies estimating a zero-inflated model (List,
2001; Roberto, 2004).
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Table 2.7: Border effects or access to international markets (cross-section estimates)
(16) (17)
Border_1 Border_2
Terrestrial border county 0.565* (0.077) 2.628*** (0.006)
Coastal county 0.665 (0.157) 1.729 (0.312)
Agglo. industry -0.303 (0.278) -0.353 (0.205)
Agglo. service 2.133** (0.017) 2.014** (0.015)
Population density -1.984** (0.010) -1.952** (0.011)
Wage -3.056** (0.017) -3.400*** (0.009)
Education -0.720 (0.360) -0.501 (0.504)
Local market 1.496*** (0.003) 1.538*** (0.003)
External market -0.571*** (0.000) -0.496*** (0.000)
SEZ 0.086 (0.705) 0.035 (0.872)
County 1.954 (0.139) 1.301 (0.278)
County level city 1.814 (0.158) 1.281 (0.266)
GRP per cap. 0.929** (0.033) 1.069** (0.018)
Sq. GRP per cap -0.073 (0.855) -0.081 (0.826)
Constant 29.070** (0.011) 33.120*** (0.005)
Alpha 0.176 (0.324) 0.115 (0.510)
N 147 147
Note: P-values in parenthesis: * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01.
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Table 2.8: Border effects or access to international markets (panel estimates)
(18) (19) (20) (21)
With contemporaneous variables With lagged explanatory variables
Border_1 Border_2 Border_1 Border_2
Terrestrial border c. 0.544 (0.144) 1.667** (0.017) 0.877** (0.034) 2.396*** (0.002)
Coastal county 1.589** (0.020) 4.069** (0.020) 2.223*** (0.004) 4.786** (0.013)
Agglo. industry 0.105 (0.404) 0.107 (0.395) 0.150 (0.278) 0.139 (0.310)
Agglo. service 1.071** (0.021) 0.992** (0.030) 0.220 (0.582) 0.203 (0.605)
Population density -1.100** (0.017) -1.058** (0.019) -0.228 (0.596) -0.305 (0.458)
Wage -0.650 (0.213) -0.683 (0.194) -0.832 (0.156) -0.959 (0.105)
Education 0.057 (0.867) 0.0744 (0.826) -0.185 (0.623) -0.150 (0.687)
Local market 0.999*** (0.001) 1.001*** (0.001) 0.707** (0.025) 0.731** (0.018)
External market -0.654*** (0.000) -0.615*** (0.000) -0.661*** (0.000) -0.594*** (0.000)
SEZ -0.0614 (0.712) -0.0359 (0.822) 0.128 (0.516) 0.164 (0.376)
County 1.717* (0.061) 1.570* (0.085) 1.252 (0.195) 1.002 (0.293)
County level city 1.376 (0.110) 1.327 (0.123) 1.033 (0.248) 0.943 (0.288)
GRP per cap. 0.297 (0.312) 0.312 (0.290) 0.306 (0.353) 0.340 (0.306)
Sq. GRP per cap -0.488*** (0.000) -0.514*** (0.000) -0.392** (0.012) -0.439*** (0.006)
Constant 7.243 (0.157) 7.437 (0.147) 6.787 (0.240) 8.372 (0.146)
a 1.322*** (0.000) 1.348*** (0.000) 1.386*** (0.000) 1.432*** (0.000)
b 0.280 (0.171) 0.334 (0.112) 0.128 (0.533) 0.219 (0.329)
N 1029 1029 882 882
Note: P-values in parenthesis: * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. In each regression, year dummies
are introduced.
However, to be sure to obtain consistent estimates, the presence of zero inflation
is tested with the Vuong (1989) test. This test allows testing for whether the
zero-inflated negative binomial model (ZINBM) is more appropriate than the negative
binomial model (NBM). Table 2.10 gives the values obtained from the Vuong test.
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Table 2.9: Distribution of firm creations
Number of creations 0 1 2 3 4 5 >5
Frequency 36 43 24 12 8 3 21
Percentage 24.49 29.25 16.33 8.16 5.44 2.04 14.29
N.B.: The table gives the frequency and the percentage of counties with 0, 1, 2, … , >5 creations
of firms from 2002 to 2008.
Table 2.10: Vuong test statistics
Variable of interest Cross-section Panel
Contemporary
variables
Lagged explanatory
variables
Border1 No convergence -2.46 -2.02
Border2 No convergence -2.28 -1.47
Distance No convergence -2.61 -1.81
N.B.: The model estimated in the first step is a logit model
The Vuong test does not favor in any case the zero inflated model, in that the
value obtained is never higher than 1.96.52 The test clearly rejects the ZINBM in
favor of the NBM when the model is estimated in panel with contemporaneous
variables. However, it fails to conclude in favor of one or the other model when
estimating in panel with lagged explanatory variables. As a result, the estimation
results of the ZINBM model in panel with lagged explanatory variables ((22), (23),
and (24)) are presented in Table 2.11. According to Table 2.11, taking into account
the potential problem of zero-inflation does not change the previous results because
the coefficients associated with variables of interest still have expected sign and
significance.
52 Asymptotically, the Vuong test statistics have a standard normal distribution and hence, the test statistics
obtained have to be compared with the critical value of the normal distribution (1.96). A value above 1.96 (below
-1.96) rejects the NBM (ZINBM) in favor of the ZINBM model (NBM). For panel data, this test exists only in
pooling.
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Table 2.11: ZINBM with lagged explanatory variables
(22) (23) (24)
Border_1 0.664*** (0.005)
Border_2 2.896*** (0.000)
Distance -0.112** (0.016)
Agglo. industry -0.013 (0.909) -0.034 (0.764) -0.044 (0.742)
Agglo. service 1.136*** (0.003) 1.004** (0.011) 1.271*** (0.002)
Population density -1.209*** (0.001) -1.091*** (0.004) -1.470*** (0.000)
Wage -1.195* (0.077) -1.158* (0.076) -1.153 (0.123)
Education -0.197 (0.638) -0.087 (0.838) -0.141 (0.773)
Local market 0.737*** (0.010) 0.801*** (0.005) 0.862*** (0.005)
External market -0.433*** (0.000) -0.381*** (0.000) -0.426*** (0.000)
SEZ 0.278 (0.173) 0.256 (0.167) 0.349 (0.131)
County 1.527* (0.075) 1.126 (0.179) 1.675* (0.075)
County level city 1.728** (0.028) 1.379* (0.071) 1.949** (0.024)
GRP per cap. 0.063 (0.831) -0.013 (0.964) 0.016 (0.962)
Sq. GRP per cap -0.367 (0.114) -0.413* (0.090) -0.423 (0.103)
Constant 12.102* (0.057) 11.594* (0.062) 13.252* (0.061)
Alpha 1.083*** (0.000) 0.843*** (0.000) 1.005*** (0.000)
Tau -0.459** (0.028) -0.399** (0.045) -0.278 (0.106)
N 882 882 882
N.B.: P-values in parenthesis: * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. In each regression, year dummies
are introduced.
2.6Concluding discussions
Trans-boundary pollution problems are causing intense interregional conflicts in
China. In this Chapter, in taking the case of Hebei province, I study whether the
border-effect related to trans-boundary pollution exists. Precisely, I study the location
decisions of polluting firms in Hebei in estimating whether these firms are more likely
to set up in counties close to the provincial border. Estimation results with NBM
suggest that the closer a county is to the border, the higher is its probability to attract
polluting firms. Thus, there is a risk that people in border counties suffer
disproportionately from pollution. Moreover, trans-boundary pollution appears to be a
particularly important problem in China because the border-effect has strengthened
over time.
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If trans-boundary pollution problems are often put forward by opponents of
decentralization, the results found in this chapter do not imply that a centralized
policy would be optimal. Obviously, a decentralized policy offers compelling
advantages in a country as heterogeneous as China. It is unclear which of these two
types of policy would lead to higher social welfare. As suggested by Sigman (2005) in
the case of the United States, the optimal policy might be to provide targeted solutions
to trans-boundary pollution problems while staying within the framework of
decentralization. In practice, the EPA of the U.S. has issued the Clean Air Interstate
Rule (CAIR) in 2005 to address the National Ambient Air Quality Standards
(NAAQS) violation caused by interstate air pollution53. Trans-boundary pollution
concerns have also given rise to a range of regional environmental conventions in
Europe, e.g., the Protocol to the Convention on Long-range Trans-boundary Air
Pollution on the Financing of the Co-operative Program for Monitoring and
Evaluation of the Long-range Transmission of Air Pollutants in Europe (EMEP) was
entered into force in 198854. In China, the recent creation of the six regional offices of
the MEP could be a way to reduce these perverse effects. However, for the moment,
the creation of these offices is too recent and their power is still too limited to offer
any measurable effects. It would be interesting to study the location choices of firms
in the period to come to test for whether the creation of these intermediate poles
between central government and regional governments can be a solution to the
trans-boundary pollution problems.
In addition, it would also be interesting to analyze other aspects unsolved in this
study. For example, one could test for whether trans-boundary pollution problems are
due to a free-riding phenomenon and/or to a pollution haven phenomenon. One could
also make a more detailed analysis of firms' location choices according to their
53 However, this rule has gotten numerous critiques, and has been considered as wholly ineffective, as discussed in
Sangi (2011).
54 Thirty-four ECE countries and the European Community are currently Parties to this Protocol. It is an
instrument for international cost-sharing of a monitoring program which forms the backbone for review and
assessment of relevant air pollution in Europe in the light of agreements on emission reduction. EMEP has three
main components: collection of emission data for SO2, NOx, VOCs and other air pollutants; measurement of air
and precipitation quality; and modeling of atmospheric dispersion. At present, about 100 monitoring stations in 24
ECE countries participate in the program. http://www.unece.org/env/lrtap/emep_h1.html.
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characteristics, such as type of pollutant discharged or the ownership regime.
Although very interesting, the results obtained in this chapter should be
interpreted with caution. It is notable that the model with random effects which is
used in panel analysis of this study doesn’t allow controlling for the potential
correlation between fixed effects and the variables of interest. As a result, the
attractiveness of the border counties could come from other elements than (intra-and
inter-provincial) environmental regulations differences. On one hand, at borders, one
can encounter discontinuities not only in environmental regulations but also in other
regulations, e.g. labor regulation.55 On the other hand, as suggested by Holmes
(1998), borders sometimes also reflect geographical discontinuities. For example, it is
not unusual for a mountain range or a river to mark the border between two regions or
countries. In the case of Hebei, only the border with Shandong seems to be partly
"natural": the Canal Wei (Weiyunhe) and the New River of Zhangwei
(Zhangweixinhe) mark a part of the border between these two provinces. In this case,
it is possible that industrial firms would locate in the border counties along the river to
benefit from access to cheap water resource or convenient discharge. It would be
interesting to conduct robustness tests of the border-effect in taking into account other
types of discontinuity. A potential solution is to conduct the same location choice
analysis for all firms without distinguishing polluting ones from the others. If the
border-effect was due to other types of discontinuity, all firms and not only the most
polluting ones would be attracted to border counties. Unfortunately, the creation data
of all firms in Hebei are not available to conduct such a test. Finally, the FDIs count
only a very small proportion of the listed firms. As a result, the behavior of foreign
companies is not studied separately in this chapter.
55 For example, Holmes (1998) distinguishes in the U.S. "Pro-business" states, which have an accommodative
legislation concerning labor law, from "anti-business" states. In his case, crossing a border would mean escaping
from a labor regulation which is not conductive to economic activity. This situation may also exist among Chinese
provinces.
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Appendix 2.1: Definition of Variables
Variable Definition Unit
Creation of firms Number of creations of polluting firms between 2002 and 2008 Creation
Agglomeration in
industry
Number of employed persons in industry per km2
Persons per
km
2
Agglomeration in
services
Number of employed persons in services per km2
Persons per
km
2
Wage Average real wage in industry (2002 price) Yuan
Population density Population per km2
Persons per
km
2
Education Part of secondary students in the total population %
Local market Total population Person
External market
Population of neighbor cities weighted by distance between the
county and the cities
SEZ Number of Special Economic Zones SEZ
Border_1
Dummy equal to 1 if the county shares a border with the sea or
another province, 0 if not
Border_2
Length of the common border (with another province or the
sea) divided by the total length of the county's boundary
%
Distance
Distance between the county seat and the closest provincial
border (with another province or the sea)
Meters
GRP per capita Real GRP per capita (2002 price) Yuan
County Dummy equal to 1 if county, 0 if not
County city Dummy equal to 1 if city at county level, 0 if not
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Appendix 2.2: Descriptive Statistics
Observation Mean
Standard
Deviation
Minimum Maximum
Creation of firms 147 4.57 10.08 0.00 56.00
Agglomeration in
industry
147 29.19 94.58 0.15 573.37
Agglomeration in service 147 38.17 97.94 1.47 643.30
Wage 147 11634.60 2174.87 6903.57 20822.44
Population density 147 683.23 798.49 43.87 5212.67
Education 147 7.11 1.42 3.38 11.99
Local market 147 467946.40 324134.60 113000.00 2991172.00
External market 147 63.60 25.22 0.00 132.51
SEZ 147 0.30 0.62 0.00 4.86
Border_1 147 0.45 0.50 0.00 1.00
Border_2 147 14.36 20.59 0.00 74.28
Distance 147 40631.43 25710.47 354.40 110647.60
GRP per capita 147 12210.33 7337.96 3775.31 37620.39
County 147 0.78 0.42 0 1
County-level city 147 0.15 0.36 0 1
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Appendix 2.3: Poisson regression results (Cross-section estimates)
Border_1 Border_2 Distance
Border_1 0.570*
(0.059)
Border_2 2.519***
(0.003)
Distance -0.331**
(0.033)
Agglo. industry -0.322 -0.341 -0.367
(0.262) (0.223) (0.198)
Agglo. service 2.271** 1.986** 2.273***
(0.011) (0.015) (0.008)
Population density -2.155*** -1.931** -2.314***
(0.005) (0.010) (0.002)
Wage -3.210*** -3.241*** -3.406***
(0.009) (0.007) (0.007)
Education -0.659 -0.431 -0.471
(0.395) (0.551) (0.533)
Local market 1.502*** 1.533*** 1.599***
(0.004) (0.003) (0.002)
External market -0.556*** -0.507*** -0.529***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
SEZ 0.128 0.0545 0.113
(0.564) (0.800) (0.622)
County 1.977 1.346 1.637
(0.141) (0.270) (0.187)
County level city 1.966 1.331 1.656
(0.134) (0.256) (0.173)
GRP per cap. 0.938** 1.007** 1.025**
(0.028) (0.019) (0.013)
Sq. GRP per cap -0.0917 -0.107 -0.117
(0.811) (0.771) (0.760)
Constant 31.25*** 31.80*** 38.15***
(0.007) (0.004) (0.002)
Alpha 0.194 0.119 0.179
(0.260) (0.495) (0.299)
Goodness-of-fit test
(Prob > chi2)
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
N 147 147 147
Note: Heteroscedastic-consistent P-values in parenthesis: * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01.
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Appendix 2.4: Evolution of border effects over time (complete table)
(10) (11) (12) (13) (14) (15)
with contemporaneous variables with lagged explanatory variables
Border_1 Border_2 Distance Border_1 Border_2 Distance
Agglo. industry 0.127 0.107 0.144 0.149 0.118 0.139
(0.323) (0.401) (0.270) (0.287) (0.389) (0.326)
Agglo. service 1.249*** 1.091** 1.076** 0.411 0.192 0.213
(0.008) (0.017) (0.021) (0.356) (0.631) (0.653)
Population density -1.296*** -1.174*** -1.351*** -0.484 -0.312 -0.571
(0.006) (0.010) (0.003) (0.298) (0.461) (0.232)
Wage -0.967* -1.084** -0.990* -1.213** -1.319** -1.233**
-0.067 -0.034 -0.058 -0.038 -0.021 -0.035
Education 0.138 0.384 0.181 -0.14 0.0723 -0.109
-0.697 -0.288 -0.601 -0.71 -0.85 -0.77
Local market 0.972*** 0.968*** 1.040*** 0.674** 0.653** 0.732**
-0.002 -0.002 -0.001 -0.038 -0.039 -0.026
External market -0.576*** -0.566*** -0.574*** -0.570*** -0.535*** -0.546***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
SEZ -0.0864 0.00272 -0.0369 0.16 0.24 0.201
-0.6 -0.987 -0.824 -0.414 -0.211 -0.312
County 1.762* 1.497 1.559* 1.221 0.809 0.802
-0.059 -0.108 -0.096 -0.223 -0.405 -0.437
County level city 1.743* 1.534* 1.381 1.361 1.003 0.854
-0.051 -0.081 -0.117 -0.154 -0.267 -0.377
GRP per cap. 0.160 0.141 0.342 0.243 0.252 0.440
-0.598 -0.632 -0.244 -0.471 -0.438 -0.188
Sq. GRP per cap -0.374*** -0.241* -0.368*** -0.267* -0.126 -0.243
-0.008 -0.079 -0.009 -0.094 -0.431 -0.131
Var_interest*2002 0.0473 0.262 0.0196 0.160 0.144 0.332*
(0.890) (0.773) (0.916) (0.649) (0.880) (0.092)
Var_interest*2003 0.168 0.201 0.307 0.852** 2.594*** -0.260
(0.614) (0.826) (0.111) (0.033) (0.008) (0.184)
Var interest*2004 0.838** 2.648*** -0.301 0.294 2.068** -0.204
(0.027) (0.005) (0.116) (0.441) (0.039) (0.313)
Var_interest*2005 0.324 2.040** -0.214 1.151*** 4.589*** -0.498**
(0.377) (0.037) (0.276) (0.007) (0.000) (0.014)
Var_interest*2006 1.159*** 4.490*** -0.501*** 1.515*** 5.803*** -0.663***
(0.005) (0.000) (0.010) (0.004) (0.000) (0.002)
Var interest*2007 1.491*** 5.797*** -0.634*** 1.364*** 5.309*** -0.550***
(0.004) (0.000) (0.002) (0.005) (0.000) (0.009)
Var interest*2008 1.277*** 5.144*** -0.524**
(0.008) (0.000) (0.011)
Constant 11.04** 12.80** 11.96** 11.60** 13.25** 9.811*
-0.033 -0.011 -0.023 -0.043 -0.018 -0.09
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(End of Appendix2.4)
a 1.405*** 1.603*** 1.400*** 1.476*** 1.699*** 1.501***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
b 0.21 0.216 0.187 0.0708 0.0963 0.0135
-0.305 -0.286 -0.347 -0.743 -0.653 -0.948
N 1029 1029 1029 882 882 882
Note: P-values in parenthesis: * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. In each regression, year dummies
are introduced.
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3.1Introduction
The last chapter is devoted to one of the most cited critics of environmental
federalism – free riding problems in presence of trans-boundary pollution. In this
chapter, I continue to test for another important critic - strategic interaction in
environmental policymaking among jurisdictions in the Chinese context.
Critical to the efficiency of decentralization, strategic interaction among
governments is a major focus of theoretical and empirical work in public economics.
Brueckner (2003) classifies strategic interaction models into two branches, namely
spillover models and resource-flow models. Although these models were initially
developed to explain fiscal or public finance policymaking, they are also widely
employed in environmental federalism studies. Strategic interaction in environmental
policymaking can arise due to several reasons, such as capital-competition, pollution
spillovers, and yardstick-competition. According to Fredriksson and Millimet (2002b),
fears of a destructive competition and excessive pollution were a significant factor
leading to the formation of the EPA in 1968 and the regulatory harmonization policy
across the European Union.
Although China doesn’t have exactly the same environmental federalism as that
of the U.S. or that of the E.U., it consists of an interesting field to conduct strategic
interaction researches. First of all, environmental policy implementation system is
strongly decentralized in China; Chinese provincial governments have de facto power
over environmental stringency enforcement.56 In this context, testing for strategic
interaction in environmental policymaking will allow understanding the efficiency of
this decentralized system. Then, Chinese provinces are very likely to engage in capital
competition. On one hand, as discussed in Chapter 1, the one-sided fiscal
decentralization has exercised strong fiscal pressure on provincial governments. In
order to increase their revenue resources, they would predictably engage in capital
competition. On the other hand, several studies show that after the 1978 reforms,
Chinese central government has created a yardstick competition among local officials
56 Discussed in Chapter 1 and further discussed in Chapter 5.
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and evaluates them on the basis of economic performance (Li and Zhou, 2005;
Maskin et al., 2000; Qian and Xu, 1993). This economic-performance based
competition can also give local governments strong incentives to engage in capital
competition at the cost of environment. Moreover, as discussed in General
Introduction and Chapter 2, in nowadays China, trans-boundary pollution problems
have become highlighted issues and free-riding behaviors do exist.57 As a result, it
seems that strategic interaction due to pollution spillovers may also take place.
Unfortunately, very few studies have investigated strategic interaction in
environmental policymaking in China. Moreover, although the models proposed by
Brueckner (2003) are based on different assumptions, they conduct to the same
reaction function for empirical analysis. As a result, most existing studies on the U.S.
states don’t have a lot to say about the exact reason behind their strategic interaction
evidences, except one interesting tentative (Chupp, 2009). In this chapter, I try to
contribute to this part of literature in studying the potential strategic interaction in
environmental policymaking among Chinese provinces. More importantly, with
different identification strategies, I distinguish different assumptions and test for both
capital-competition driven and pollution-spillover driven strategic interactions. First I
investigate the question of whether Chinese provinces set strategically their
environmental stringency vis-à-vis their competitors for mobile capital. I also
examine whether the capital-competition driven strategic interaction follows the
asymmetric pattern suggested by the race to the bottom theory, and I furthermore
study whether this strategic interaction is conditional on fiscal decentralization.
Secondly, in order to capture the pollution-spillover driven strategic interaction, I
investigate the question of whether SO2 emissions of receptor provinces are
responsive to those of their source provinces. The rest of the chapter is organized as
follows: in section 2, a brief literature review is made on theoretical and empirical
studies of environmental regulatory strategic interaction. Estimation strategy and
identification issues are presented in section 3. In section 4 empirical results are
reported. And in the last section I conclude and discuss the empirical evidence found
57 For example, inter-jurisdictional environmental conflicts in the Huai River Basin and the Tai Lake Basin.
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in this chapter.
3.2Literature review
3.2.1 Different theoretical explanations behind strategic
interaction
A large and well established body of researches has studied both theoretically and
empirically strategic interaction in fiscal and public finance policymaking among
local governments. According to Revelli (2005), local governments can be thought of
as interacting with one another along three main channels: preferences, constraints
and expectations, which correspond respectively to the spillover, resource-flow and
yardstick-competition models discussed in Brueckner (2003). Although these models
were originally created to explain fiscal and public finance policymaking, they can be
and have been already borrowed by a lot of environmental federalism researches.
The preferences interaction (or spillover) models assume that a local
government’s policymaking (e.g. public services provision) enters the welfare
function of its neighboring jurisdictions and affects directly the preferences of the
latter. In the domain of public finance, Case et al. (1993), Murdock et al. (1993) and
Revelli (2003) evaluate the interaction among neighboring jurisdictions' expenditures.
In the domain of environmental policymaking, spillover models assume that one
jurisdiction’s policy making will depend on that of its neighbors due to pollution
spillovers, i.e., the pollution suffered by one jurisdiction’s population is determined
not only by its own emissions but also by those of its neighbors if the pollutant is
trans-boundary. Murdoch et al. (1997) and Fredriksson and Millimet (2002b) model
strategic interaction based on pollution spillovers. The former examine the interaction
in adherence behaviors among European countries to sulphur and nitrogen oxide
emission reduction protocols; the latter are interested in whether U.S. states
incorporate their neighboring states’ regulatory stringency (abatement cost) into their
own decision making.
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Capital-competition models can be classified into the branch of constraints
interaction (or resource-flow) models. These models are originally presented by tax
competition theory (Oates, 1972). Tax competition theory assumes that jurisdictions
compete with each other using tax rates for a fixed amount of mobile resource in
order to maximize local welfare (Brueckner and Saavedra, 2001; Buettner, 2001;
Wilson, 1986). In the field of environmental regulations, competition can take place
among jurisdictions if they compete with each other with environmental stringency to
attract a fixed amount of mobile capital. A great number of theoretical studies address
this subject and establish the framework to analyze welfare implication of
inter-jurisdictional environmental regulatory competition (Dijkstra, 2003; Glazer,
1999; Kunce, 2004; Kunce and Shogren, 2002, 2005, 2007; Levinson, 1997;
Markusen et al., 1995; Oates and Schwab, 1988; Roelfsema, 2007; Wellisch, 1995).
Particularly, many of them are interested in the “race to the bottom” hypothesis, under
which destructive competition leads to excessively weak environmental stringency. In
the U.S. context, critics of decentralization often argue that states are primarily
concerned with economic development and will relax their environmental regulations
in order to gain an advantage over other states (Konisky, 2007).
The expectations interaction (yardstick-competition) models are originally
developed to explain incumbents’ behavior in tax setting (Besley and Case, 1995).
Yardstick competition arises because imperfectly informed voters in a local
jurisdiction use other governments' performance as a yardstick to evaluate their own
government. Because yardstick competition models involve information spillovers
across jurisdictions, Brueckner (2003) classifies them in the branch of spillover
models. In environmental policymaking, yardstick competition can also matter if a
local government uses its neighbors’ environmental performance as a benchmark and
try not to get too far out of line. For example, Fredriksson and Millimet (2002a)
model interstate yardstick competition in setting pollution abatement expenditures in
the U.S.
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3.2.2 Empirical evidences of environmental regulatory
strategic interaction
Numerous studies have found empirical evidences of environmental regulatory
strategic interaction. For example, Fredriksson and Millimet (2002b) measure the
regulatory stringency by the environmental abatement costs and find that U.S. states
do incorporate asymmetrically their neighboring states’ regulatory stringency into
their own decision making, i.e., a state is incited to apply higher abatement costs if its
neighbors with relatively stringent regulations increase theirs. Using two panels of
data on states' regulatory stringency, Levinson (2003) examines whether regulatory
competition becomes more severe during the Reagan administration, when state
control of environmental policy is greater. He finds that “states behave strategically,
reacting to other states' environmental standard stringency when setting their own,”
but he doesn’t find convincing evidence that competition steepened during the Reagan
administration. Woods (2006) conducts an analysis of state surface-mining regulation
to determine if the enforcement gap between a state and its competitors affects the
stringency of the former. He finds evidence of a race to the bottom in that states adjust
their enforcement in response to their competitors when their enforcement stringency
exceeds that of their competitors. Konisky (2007) compiles data on state enforcement
of three U.S. federal pollution control programs: the CAA, the CWA, and the
RCRA.58 He constructs two measures of annual state enforcement effort: the annual
number of sampling inspections and the unweighted sum of informal and formal
punitive actions. Using spatial panels, he finds robust evidence of strategic regulatory
behaviors across the U.S. states. However, his evidence does not support the
asymmetric pattern of strategic interaction predicted by the race to the bottom theory.
Among the empirical studies mentioned above, several test for strategic
interaction by estimating reaction functions59 with spatial data and estimators.
58 Abbreviations of three federal pollution control programs: the Clean Air Act (CAA), the Clean Water Act
(CWA), and the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA).
59 A reaction function shows how a jurisdiction responds to the choices of neighboring jurisdictions in setting the
level of its own decision variable.
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Although very interesting, these methods do not allow discriminating among different
theoretical explanations behind the observed spatial autocorrelation (Revelli, 2005).
Since both the spillover models and the resource-flow models generate similar
reduced form inter-jurisdictional reaction functions (Brueckner, 2003), strategic
interaction found in this way may be actually a mixed result of different effects.60 An
interesting tentative to overcome this problem is made by Chupp (2009), who tries to
distinguish spillover effects from capital-competition effects by adopting two
weighting matrix: a state-to-state pollution transport matrix and an industrial
similarity matrix. In this chapter, I follow his strategy and try to distinguish different
assumptions behind environmental strategic interaction among Chinese provinces.
3.3Estimation strategy
This section presents the strategy used in the empirical analysis and different issues to
be considered in estimation.
3.3.1 Spatial econometric issues
The standard way to test empirically for strategic interaction is to use a spatial-lag
econometric model (Brueckner, 2003). This model is typically considered as the
formal specification for the equilibrium outcome of a spatial or social interaction
process, in which the value of the dependent variable for one agent is jointly
determined with that of the neighboring agents (Elhorst, 2010). In a spatial-lag model,
the pattern of interaction among jurisdictions is modeled by specifying a particular
weighting matrix. The standard spatial-lag panel model can be written in (3.1):
60 Revelli (2005) proposes three approaches for identifying the structural model generating the observed spatial
pattern. The first one is based upon estimation of auxiliary equations that are directly derived from the theory. The
second approach explores the role of exogenous policy shocks in a sort of “natural experiment.” The third
approach exploits the presence of particular institutional arrangements that generate both horizontal and vertical
fiscal interactions.
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it jt i t it
j i
Y δ Y μ d ε
≠
= + + + +∑ ijtW kitβX
<1,δ 1,..., ,i N= 1,..., ,k K= 1, ...,t T= (3.1)
where index i is for the cross-sectional dimension (provinces in my sample), t is for
the time dimension,
it
Y
is the dependent variable, ijtW is an N
2 ordered spatial
weighting matrix describing the importance assigned to jurisdiction j by jurisdiction i
at time t,
jt
j i
Y
≠
∑ ijtW is the spatially lagged dependant variable, kitX is an (N,K)
vector of independent variables, β is a (K,1) vector of fixed but unknown parameters,
δ is the spatial autoregressive coefficient,
i
μ
denotes a spatial specific effect which
controls for all space-specific time-invariant variables whose omission could bias the
estimates in a typical cross-sectional study, d
t
is a time specific effect which controls
for all unobservable time-specific space-invariant omitted variables, and
it
ε
is an
independently and identically distributed error term with zero mean and variance 2
σ
.
In (3.1),
jt
j i
Y
≠
∑ ijtW is endogenous because of simultaneous causality with regard
to
it
Y
. In order to address this problem, two estimators have been developed. One is a
maximum likelihood (ML) estimator proposed by Anselin (1988), and the other is a
two-stage least squared instrumental variable (2SLS-IV) estimator proposed by
Kelejian and Prucha (1998). According to Anselin (1988), spatial autocorrelation
across data can emerge in two ways: first, spatial-lag autocorrelation emerges when
it
Y
and
jt
j i
Y
≠
∑ ijtW are simultaneously determined by each other; secondly
spatial-error autocorrelation emerges if error terms are spatially auto-correlated with
each other. Before using the ML estimator, a choice between spatial-lag and
spatial-error models must be made, otherwise estimation of (3.1) would provide false
evidence of strategic interaction (Brueckner, 2003). For this purpose, Anselin et al.
Chapter 3 Strategic interactions in environmental policymaking: evidence from Chinese provinces
84
(1996) propose the Lagrange Multiplier (LM) test and its robust version. However,
the LM test as well as the ML estimator requires a normal distribution of error terms,
otherwise test statistics would be biased (Elhorst, 2010).
Unfortunately, in the present study, condition of normally distributed errors can’t
be satisfied.61 That’s why I turn to the alternative 2SLS-IV model. The 2SLS-IV
approach has been used in numerous strategic government interaction studies (Figlio
et al., 1999; Fredriksson and Millimet, 2002b; Levinson, 2003). This IV method has
the virtue of not depending on normal distribution hypothesis. Moreover, Kelejian and
Prucha (1998) show that their method generates a consistent estimate even in the
presence of spatial-error dependence. The standard application of the 2SLS-IV
approach is to instrument for Y
jt
with a subset of the weighted characteristics of
neighbors:
j i≠
∑ ijtW kjtX . The first stage of the 2SLS takes the form of (3.2):
,
jt it
j i j i
Y a η
≠ ≠
= + +∑ ∑ijt ijtW W sjtb X 1,..., ,i N= 1,..., ,s S= 1,...,t T= (3.2)
where
j i≠
∑ ijtW sjtX is a subset of weighted average of competitors’ characteristics
j i≠
∑ ijtW kjtX , which satisfies the instrument exclusion restrictions.
3.3.2 Identification issues
Two major issues arise when one tries to identify potential strategic interaction among
jurisdictions. One is to identify neighbors against non-neighbors; the other is to assign
appropriate relative importance to each designated neighbor. Both of these issues have
to be addressed in constructing weighting matrices which reflect interaction patters
among jurisdictions.
First, it is reasonable to assume that the decision making of a Chinese province
may be affected by only a certain number of other provinces (defined as its neighbors),
and not by all other provinces. In the literature, different neighbor definitions have
61 Jacque-Bera statistics reported in Table 3.1.
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been adopted. The simplest and commonly used one is a geographical contiguous
definition. This definition assumes that jurisdictions interact with each other if they
share common borders. The corresponding weighting matrix for contiguous neighbors
is a contiguity matrix.62 A second way to define neighbors is based on geographical
distance: jurisdictions are considered as neighbors if the geographical distance
between them is inferior to a certain critical value. A third way to identify neighbors
is based on similarity criteria. This definition assumes that jurisdictions interact with
each other not because they share the same border but because they share a set of
similarities, e.g. the same region, similar industrial structure, similar income level,
similar racial composition, etc. In the U.S. context, two regional classifications are
frequently used, namely the BEA (Bureau of Economic Analysis) classification and
the classification proposed by Crone (1998/1999). Finally, a fourth way to identify
neighbors is based on trans-boundary pollution transfers matrix. This method is
particularly interesting for spillover-model estimation. Since the 1980s’,
meteorological and geographical data have been used to model air pollution transfer
scenarios in the U.S. and in Europe.63 Interesting products of these models are
source-receptor matrices, which have been used to analyze strategic interactions
among the U.S. states (Chupp, 2009) or among European countries (Mäler and De
Zeeuw, 1998; Murdoch et al., 2003)
Secondly, it is also important to assign relative importance to different neighbors.
Implicit in the choice of weights is the assumption that states may be more responsive
to environmental policy in neighboring states responsible for greater generation of
trans-boundary pollution or greater competition for capital. Different weighting
schemes have been adopted in the literature. For example, Fredriksson et al. (2004)
and Fredriksson and Millimet (2002b) each use three different schemes, namely equal
weights, population weights, and income weights. Konisky (2007) uses population
weights and argues that results are not sensitive to weighting choice. In a distance
62 In a contiguity matrix, “one” is given to two cities sharing common border and “zero” in the opposite case.
63 The Ambient Source Trajectory Regional Air Pollution (ASTRAP) model in the Tracking and Analysis
Framework (TAF) in the U.S. (Bloyd et al., 1996) and the Regional Acidification Information Simulation (RAINS)
model developed for the EMEP in Europe (Eliassen and Saltbones, 1983; Sandnes, 1993)
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matrix, neighbors are weighted by the inverse of geographical distance (Madariaga
and Poncet, 2007). In an income similarity matrix, neighbors are weighted by the
inverse of absolute value of income per capita difference (Case et al., 1993). In a
source-receptor matrix, neighbors are weighted according to air pollution transfers
degree, i.e., each receptor jurisdiction assigns a weight to a source neighbor based on
the percentage of its damages caused by that source neighbor (Chupp, 2009).
Identification of interaction pattern is an important issue. As argued in Revelli
(2005), although spatial econometric methods allow testing for existence of strategic
interaction, they do not allow discriminating among different theoretical explanations
behind the observed spatial autocorrelation. In this chapter, I try to distinguish
capital-competition driven and pollution-spillover driven strategic interaction among
Chinese provinces. For this purpose, different weighting matrices are adopted. First of
all, classical contiguity matrices with equal, population and income weights are used
to test for the overall effect. It is notable that strategic interaction found in assuming
these geographically based patterns may be a mix of different effects (e.g. pollution
spillovers and capital competition.) As a result, in order to test more specifically for
capital-competition driven interaction, an industrial structure similarity matrix (WIijt)
is constructed with annual sectorial data of each province. This matrix weights a
province’s neighbor by an index of industrial structure similarity between them.64 The
implicit assumption is that competition for capital is more likely to take place between
provinces with similar industrial structures (Chupp, 2009). Meanwhile, in order to test
for the strategic interaction driven by pollution spillover effects, a
province-to-province SO2 transport matrix (WSij) in terms of sulfur deposition has
been constructed with data compiled from the RAINS-ASIA model. W
Sij
allows
calculating, for each downwind receptor province, the weighted average SO2
emission of its upwind provinces. Since the spatial relative distribution of emissions is
constructed with 1990-1995 meteorological data, it is invariant over time and
64 Different indices have been proposed in the literature to estimate structure similarity between economies
(Brixiova et al., 2010; Krugman, 1991; Landesmann and Szekely, 1995; UNIDO, 1979). In this paper, the index
proposed by UNIDO (1979) is used. More details on the construction of this index can be found in Appendix 3.1.
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considered exogenous to the strategic interaction model65.
3.3.3 Some issues to be considered in capital-competition
model
3.3.3.1 Asymmetric effects model
A specific asymmetric pattern is suggested by the race to the bottom theory,
according to which a province responds to its competitors only if its own regulatory
situation is at a disadvantage vis-à-vis its competitors.66 Following Fredriksson and
Millimet (2002b) and Konisky (2007), I consider an alternative model where
provinces’ responsiveness is asymmetric:
0 1(1 )it it jt it jt i t it
j i j i
Y δ I Y δ I Y μ d ε
≠ ≠
= + − + + + +∑ ∑ijt ijtW W kitβX
1,..., ,i N= 1,..., ,k K= 1,...,t T= (3.3)
where I
it
= 1, if ;
it jt
j i
Y Y
≠
>∑ ijtW
I
it
= 0, otherwise.
In (3.3), I
it
= 1 if province i’s own environmental stringency is above that of its
competitors, i.e., i is at a disadvantage for attracting mobile capital relative to its
competitors. On the contrary, I
it
= 0 if province i’s own environmental stringency is
below that of its competitors, i.e., i is at an advantage for attracting mobile capital
relative to its competitors. The race to the bottom theory suggests that 0 0δ > , and
that 1δ should not be statistically different from zero.
65 More details on RAINS-ASIA model and construction of province-to-province source-receptor matrix can be
found in Appendix 3.2.
66 The race to the bottom theory suggests also another asymmetric pattern: a jurisdiction responds only if the
weighted average of its competitors' environmental enforcement efforts drop from the previous year (Konisky,
2007). We haven’t tested for this model because quasi total observations in the present sample have decreasing
pollution levy over the period 2004-2009.
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3.3.3.2 Nonlinear effects model
It is possible that strategic interaction among provinces is not linear and is conditional
on certain provincial characteristics, e.g. fiscal arrangements. As discussed in Chapter
1, under China’s one-sided fiscal decentralization, sub-national governments suffer
from significant fiscal imbalance and have excessively heavy expenditure
responsibilities which are mismatched with their revenue assignments. Environment
can thus be victim of this situation: given the severe budgetary pressures, local
governments may use lax environmental stringency as a tool for attracting mobile
capital and creating taxable resources. If this is the case, fiscal imbalance will
strengthen capital-competition driven strategic interaction. Moreover, fiscal
imbalance is distributed in an unequal way. As a result, it is reasonable to assume that
provinces with greater fiscal imbalance would be likely to react more strategically
when enforcing their environmental regulations. In order to control for this nonlinear
effect, I introduce an interaction term
jt it
Y IMB∗ijtW , where IMBit is an indicator of
fiscal imbalance of province i in year t. The nonlinear effects model to estimate is
specified in (3.4):
it jt it jt it i t it
j i j i
Y δ Y φ IMB Y π IMB μ d ε
≠ ≠
= + ∗ + + + + +∑ ∑ijt ijtW W  kitβX
1,..., ,i N= 1,..., ,k K= 1,...,t T= (3.4)
3.4Empirical analysis of interprovincial strategic
interactions
3.4.1 Data and variables
The present study uses a panel dataset of 30 Chinese provinces (Tibet, Hongkong and
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Macao excluded) over the period of 2004-2009. The main sources of data are China
Statistical Yearbook (2005-2010), China Environment Yearbook (2005-2010) and
China Industrial Economic Statistical Yearbook (2005-2010). 2004 is chosen as the
beginning year of the study because it is the year when China Industrial Economic
Statistical Yearbook starts to publish consistent data of sectorial added values by
province. Before that year, data of several sectors, e.g. textile garments, shoes and
caps products, and special equipment manufacturing industry, were not reported.
Since consistent sectorial data are indispensible to construct the industrial similarity
weighting matrix, I decide to conduct the empirical analysis on the period post-2004.
The dependent variable (Y) of the capital-competition model is provincial
pollution levy per industrial added value. This indicator is used as a proxy of
environmental stringency. Provincial levy per industrial added value can be a proxy of
the environmental stringency for several reasons: first, In China, concentration
standards for levy collection are set jointly at the national and provincial levels thus
vary across provinces and reflect provincial enforcement level (Dean et al., 2009).
Secondly, pollution levy is an economic regulatory instrument implemented at local
level. Several studies show that levy affects significantly polluters’ behaviors
(Dasgupta et al., 2001; Wang and Wheeler, 2003). As a result, one may expect that
levy matters for attracting polluting capital. Finally, different from other studies
which use levy per volume of pollution (e.g., Dean et al. (2009)), this study uses levy
per industrial added value because only aggregated levy data (without details by
pollutant) have been reported during the period 2004-2009. As a result, levy per
industrial added value is a proxy of the overall environmental stringency.
In order to test for nonlinear effects, provincial fiscal imbalance (IMB) is
introduced in equation (3.4). IMB is a vertical imbalance indicator defined by (3.5):
,it
it
it
Transfers
IMB
Expenditures
= 1,..., ,t T= 1,...,i I= (3.5)
where i denotes the province, t denotes the year, Transfers
it
denotes the total fiscal
transfers that province i receives from the central government in year t, and
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Expenditures
it
denotes the consolidated budgetary expenditures spent by province i in
year t. The construction of IMB is inspired by IMF’s Government Finance Statistics
(GFS), where vertical imbalance of a country is measured by transfers to sub-national
governments as a share of sub-national government expenditures. In this chapter, IMB
measures the degree to which province i relies on transfers from central government
to fulfill its expenditure responsibilities.67
Other independent variables are introduced to control for provincial
characteristics. First of all, one may argue that levy per industrial added value of a
province is not only determined by its environmental stringency but also by the
pollution intensity of its industrial production. It is true that a province with weak
environmental standards may collect high levy per industrial added value if more
pollution is associated with each unit of its industrial production. In order to control
for this endogeneity, I introduce intensities of two major industrial pollutants– sulfur
dioxide and chemical oxygen demand per industrial added value (SO2intensity and
CODintensity). Then, in following the EKC hypothesis, I include gross regional
product per capita (GRP) as a proxy of income per capita, its squared term (GRP2)
and its cubed term (GRP3). Income per capita reflects economic development level of
a province and is considered to affect the environmental performance through scale,
composition and technique effects (Brock and Taylor, 2005). After that, population
density (Density) is also included. Population density can affect environmental
performance through scale effects. Governments may also make more efforts to abate
pollution where it’s more densely populated. In addition, Wang et al. (2003) show that
state-owned enterprises have more bargaining power with local environmental
authorities when negotiating the enforcement of pollution levy. As a result, I suppose
that the importance of state-owned sector in a province’s industry may have an effect
on its environmental stringency. To capture this effect, the proportion of industrial
added value realized by state-owned enterprises (State) is introduced. Moreover, two
openness variables – trade opening (Trade) and FDI (FDI) are also included. Trade
67 Following the GFS indicator, IMB doesn’t distinguish conditional transfers versus general purpose transfers,
due to data unavailability.
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opening may affect a province’s industrial structure and furthermore affect its
environmental stringency though the “composition” effect68 (Cole and Elliott, 2003).
FDI is introduced because environmental levy enforcement is shown to have effect on
FDI localization among provinces (Dean et al., 2009; He, 2006). Provinces with
different levels of FDI may have different incentives to attract foreign capital with
pollution levy. Furthermore, public pressure can also affect the enforcement of
environmental levy (Wang and Di, 2002; Wang and Wheeler, 2003). Two variables
are introduced to control for this effect: citizen complaint letters regarding
environmental issues (Letters) and percentage of population with high-education
(Edu). Finally, provincial specific effects and year dummies are introduced to control
for non-observed provincial or time specific effects. Variable definitions and
descriptive statistics are reported in Appendix 3.3 and 3.4.
Unfortunately, pollution levy is not an ideal dependent variable for
spillover-effect model. In effect, the source-receptor matrix used for this purpose
considers only one pollutant - SO2 (and not other pollutants) - transfers among
provinces, while the levy data are aggregated. Default of a direct measure of
environmental stringency regarding SO2 emission, SO2 emission per capita (SO2) is
chosen as dependent variable to test for the spillover-effect model. In other words, I
examine whether the SO2 emission behavior in sources provinces affect that in
receptor provinces. Although SO2 emission per capita is not a direct regulation
measure, there is little doubt that it is the result of environmental policy. In the
spillover-effect model, all control variables presented above are included except the
two pollution intensities (SO2 and COD).
3.4.2 Estimation Results
3.4.2.1 Results for capital-competition driven strategic interaction
In order to test for capital-competition driven strategic interaction, estimations are
68 The “composition” effect refers to the way that trade liberalization changes the mix of a country’s production
towards those products where it has a comparative advantage.
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made first using classical contiguity matrices with different weighting schedules, and
then using industrial structure similarity matrix with linear, asymmetric and nonlinear
effects.
3.4.2.1.1 Results with contiguity matrices
Table 3.1 presents estimation results of equation (3.1) with contiguity matrices. Equal
weights, population weights, and income weights are used respectively. Jacque-Bera
test statistics show strongly abnormal residuals, which leads to a preference for IV
estimator to ML estimator. Hausman test statistics allow rejecting its null hypothesis
in none of the specifications. So efficient models with random effects are preferred
and adopted. Column 1 presents results with equally weighting contiguity matrix.
Column 2 presents results with population weighting contiguity matrix, and column 3
with income weighting contiguity matrix. A subset of ijtW kjtX is used as instruments
in all regressions.69 Kleibergen-Paap rk LM statistics indicate that the null hypothesis
of under-identified instruments can be rejected for all 2SLS regressions; the null
hypothesis of exogenous
ijt
j i
Y
≠
∑ ijtW is strongly rejected for equal and income
weights and cannot be rejected at 5% level for population weights; Hansen statistics
show that the null hypothesis of orthogonal instruments cannot be rejected at the
confidence level of 5%.
Results show that for equal and income weights, everything else being equal,
geographical contiguous provinces do interact strategically with each other and in the
same direction in setting their environmental enforcement stringency. However, the
strategic interaction found in these two cases is weak in level (with elasticity inferior
to 0.1) and in significance (the null hypothesis of zero strategic interaction cannot be
rejected at the confidence level of 5 %.) Regarding population weights, the absence of
strategic interaction cannot be rejected at 10% level. These results suggest that
strategic interaction among contiguous provinces is weak and positive, if there is any.
69 Note that the contiguity matrix with equal weights is not time-variant.
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Nevertheless, one should be skeptical facing these results because as stated previously,
contiguity is a very simplified interaction pattern: on one hand, provinces may interact
with each other even if they don’t share common borders; on the other hand, given
different theoretical explanations behind strategic interaction, the weak evidence may
simply be due to a mix of different driving effects.
Table 3.1: Results of (3.1) with different weighting contiguity matrices
Y=Levy
Equally weighting
contiguity matrix
Population weighting
contiguity matrix
Income weighting
contiguity matrix
ijt
j i
Y
≠
∑ ijtW 0.069* (0.056) 0.079 (0.131)) 0.090* (0.057))
GRP3 -0.231*** (0.001) -0.233*** (0.001) -0.223*** (0.001)
GRP2 5.357*** (0.001) 5.406*** (0.001) 5.165*** (0.001)
GRP -40.845*** (0.001) -41.160*** (0.001) -39.405*** (0.001)
SO2intensity 0.562*** (0.000) 0.565*** (0.000) 0.583*** (0.000)
CODintensity 0.070 (0.543) 0.071 (0.564) 0.064 (0.589)
Density 0.144** (0.045) 0.161** (0.021) 0.162** (0.015)
State -0.179 (0.606) 0.415 (0.562) 0.527 (0.453)
Trade -0.327 (0.214 ) -0.323 (0.241) -0.307 (0.244)
FDI -3.323 (0.110) -3.485 (0.108) -3.271 (0.117)
Letters -0.085*** (0.001) -0.084*** (0.002) -0.082*** (0.002)
Edu -0.367 (0.838) -0.155 (0.932) -0.184 (0.916)
Dum2005 0.081 (0.210) 0.076 (0.270) 0.075 (0.272)
Dum2006 0.076 (0.293) 0.069 (0.356) 0.072 (0.328)
Dum2007 -0.045 (0.671) -0.042 (0.710) -0.030 (0.781)
Dum2008 0.045 (0.777) 0.056 (0.746) 0.072 (0.664)
Dum2009 -0.037 (0.853) -0.013 (0.954) 0.010 (0.964)
Constant 97.672*** (0.003) 98.082*** (0.002) 93.876*** (0.003)
Number of obs 180 180 180
Number of groups 6 6 6
Centered R2 0.520 0.511 0.521
Uncentered R2 0.986 0.985 0.987
Jacque-Bera test
Prob>chi2
(0.000)
Hausman test
Prob>chi2
(0.645) (0.612) (0.940)
Kleibergen-Paap rk
LM statistic
Prob>chi2
(0.000) (0.000) (0.005)
Anderson-Rubin
Wald test Prob>chi2
(0.021) (0.154) (0.005)
Hansen J statistic
Prob>chi2
(0.146) (0.458) (0.225)
Note: Heteroscedastic-consistent p-value in parentheses, with ***, ** and * denoting significance
at 1, 5 and 10 percent level, respectively
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3.4.2.1.2 Strategic interaction with industrial structure similarity matrix
Estimation results with industrial structure similarity matrix are presented in Table 3.2.
The first column reports results for linear strategic interaction specified in equation
(3.1); the second column reports results for asymmetric strategic interaction specified
in equation (3.3); and the third column reports results for nonlinear strategic
interaction specified in equation (3.4). For all 2SLS regressions, models with random
effects are preferred. Test statistics show that the null hypothesis of under-identified
instruments and the null hypothesis of the absence of endogeneity are rejected at 5%;
the null hypothesis of over-identified instruments cannot be rejected at 5%.
Results suggest that strategic interaction among provinces with similar industrial
structure is much stronger and more significant than what was found among
contiguous neighbors. When linear effect is considered, estimation results of equation
(3.1) show that, ceteris paribus, a province would decrease (increase) its own
environmental levy per industrial added value by 1.947% if its weighted competitors
decrease (increase) theirs by 1%. The null hypothesis of zero strategic interaction can
be rejected at the confidence level of 5%. These results indicate that environmental
regulation stringencies of industrial competitors are effectively strategically
determined.
When equation (3.3) is estimated, results reported in the second column don’t
show evidence of asymmetric responsiveness. According to the race to the bottom
theory, only the coefficient of
it jt
j i
I Y
≠
∑ ijtW should be positive and significant.
However, we find that the coefficients of
it jt
j i
I Y
≠
∑ ijtW and (1 )it jt
j i
I Y
≠
− ∑ ijtW are both
positive and weakly significant. This finding suggests that, no matter whether a
province’s environmental stringency is stricter or not than its competitors, strategic
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interaction is not asymmetrically differential as predicted by the race to the bottom
theory.70
Table 3.2: Strategic interaction with industrial structure similarity matrix
Y=Levy Results of (3.1) Results of (3.3) Results of (3.4)
it ijt
j i
IMB Y
≠
∗∑ ijtW 2.106** (0.032)
it ijt
j i
I Y
≠
∑ ijtW 1.461* (0.071)
(1 )
it ijt
j i
I Y
≠
− ∑ ijtW 1.519* (0.061)
ijt
j i
Y
≠
∑ ijtW 1.947** (0.050) 1.869** (0.049)
GRP3 -0.240*** (0.002) -0.221*** (0.003) -0.310*** (0.000)
GRP2 5.664*** (0.001) 5.168*** (0.003) 7.151*** (0.000)
GRP -44.020*** (0.001) -39.891*** (0.002) -54.721*** (0.000)
SO2intensity 0.438*** (0.001) 0.398*** (0.000) 0.449*** (0.000)
CODintensity 0.141 (0.230) 0.100 (0.273) 0.151 (0.178)
Density 0.144* (0.057) 0.153*** (0.007) 0.128* (0.094)
State -0.509 (0.226) -0.191 (0.580) -0.543 (0.214)
Trade -0.211 (0.486) -0.145 (0.584) -0.099 (0.739)
FDI -2.668 (0.189) -2.472 (0.146) -2.290 (0.265)
Letters -0.094*** (0.000) -0.073*** (0.002) -0.097*** (0.000)
Edu -0.028 (0.988) -0.149 (0.922) 1.136 (0.567)
IMB 13.143** (0.042)
Dum2005 -0.041 (0.688) -0.042 (0.638) -0.123 (0.287)
Dum2006 0.049 (0.547) 0.012 (0.875) 0.031 (0.706)
Dum2007 0.044 (0.712) -0.037 (0.710) 0.131 (0.265)
Dum2008 0.554* (0.067) 0.323 (0.202) 0.931*** (0.005)
Dum2009 0.676 (0.102) 0.390 (0.270) 1.231*** (0.008)
Constant 120.567*** (0.000) 105.775*** (0.001) 146.316*** (0.000)
Number of obs 180 180 180
Number of groups 6 6 6
Centered R2 0.472 0.636 0.463
Uncentered R2 0.985 0.993 0.988
Hausman test Prob>chi2 (0.338) (0.076) (0.783)
Kleibergen-Paap rk LM
statistic Prob>chi2
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Anderson-Rubin Wald test
Prob>chi2
(0.013) (0.000) (0.037)
Hansen J statistic Prob>chi2 (0.110) (0.056) (0.216)
Note: Heteroscedastic-consistent p-value in parentheses, with ***, ** and * denoting respectively
significance at 1, 5 and 10 percent level
70 In the U.S. context, Fredriksson and Millimet (2002b) and Konisky (2007) haven’t found asymmetric effects
suggested by the race to bottom theory neither.
Chapter 3 Strategic interactions in environmental policymaking: evidence from Chinese provinces
96
Finally, estimation results of the nonlinear effects model (3.4) are reported in the
last column. Consistent with the prediction in section 3, the interaction
term
jt it
Y IMB∗ijtW has a positive and significant coefficient of 2.106, which suggests
that strategic interaction among provinces is conditional on provincial fiscal
imbalance. The more a province is fiscally dependent on central government’s
transfers for expenditures, the more strategically it will set its environmental
stringency vis-à-vis its competitors. These results are helpful to understand the
potential inefficiency of China’s actual fiscal decentralization system for public good
provision, especially in the environmental protection domain. Marginal effects of
competitors’ environmental stringency conditional on fiscal imbalance are presented
in Appendix 3.4. Over the period 2004-2009, the province which has the strongest
strategic interaction would be Qinghai, with a mean marginal effect of 3.688; the
province which has the weakest strategic interaction would be Beijing, with a mean
marginal effect of 2.233. In other words, ceteris paribus, a decrease (an increase) of
1% in environmental stringency of their competitors would induce Qinghai and
Beijing to decrease (increase) their own environmental stringency by 3.688% and
2.233%, respectively.
Concerning control variables, GRP per capita, its squared and cubed terms have
significant coefficients in all regressions. Population density has always a positive and
significant coefficient, suggesting that everything else being equal, environmental
stringency is stricter where it is more populated. In addition, complaint letter number
has always a negative and significant coefficient, suggesting that public pressure
weakens environmental stringency. This seems against intuition but is not surprising:
public pressure of a province and its environmental stringency are high likely to be
simultaneously affected. It is normal that stricter environmental stringency leads to
fewer complaints. Since complaint letter number is only a control variable, its
endogeneity is not addressed in this chapter.
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3.4.2.2 Results for pollution-spillover driven strategic interaction
Table 3.3 presents estimation results of equation (3.1) with SO2 per capita emission
and different contiguity matrices. A subset of ijtW kjtX is used as instruments in all
regressions. Hausman test statistics allow a preference for models with random effects;
Kleibergen-Paap rk LM statistics indicate that the null hypothesis of under-identified
instruments can be rejected in all 2SLS regressions; the null hypothesis of exogenous
ijt
j i
Y
≠
∑ ijtW is strongly rejected for equal weights and cannot be rejected at 5% level
for income and population weights; Hansen statistics show that the null hypothesis
that the instruments satisfy the orthogonality conditions cannot be rejected at the
confidence level of 5%.
Consistent with results when pollution levy is independent variable,
geographically contiguous provinces do interact strategically with each other and in
the same direction in discharging SO2 pollution, with elasticities around 0.33.
Moreover, these interactions are very significant (the null hypothesis of zero strategic
interaction cannot be rejected at the confidence level of 1 %). Nevertheless, as stated
previously, contiguity is a very simplified interaction pattern and these positive
interactions may simply be due to a mix of different driving effects. As a result, in
order to test more specifically for the pollution-spillover model, the SO2 transport
matrix reflecting source-receptor relations is used in the following analysis.
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Table 3.3: Results of (3.1) with different weighting contiguity matrices
Y=SO2 per capita Equally weighting
contiguity matrix
Population weighting
contiguity matrix
Income weighting
contiguity matrix
ijt
j i
Y
≠
∑ CijtW 0.336*** (0.000) 0.347*** (0.000) 0.322*** (0.000)
GRP3 -0.074*** (0.000) -0.076*** (0.000) -0.069*** (0.002)
GRP2 1.659*** (0.000) 1.680*** (0.001) 1.538*** (0.003)
GRP -12.256*** (0.000) -12.279*** (0.001) -11.294*** (0.003)
Density -0.033 (0.781) -0.068 (0.586) -0.060 (0.627)
State 1.552* (0.051) -0.146 (0.292) -0.193 (0.167)
Trade -0.279* (0.055) -0.307** (0.030) -0.306** (0.034)
FDI -0.637 (0.561) -0.963 (0.397) -1.100 (0.353)
Letters 0.003 (0.667) 0.002 (0.721) 0.003 (0.627)
Edu 0.755 (0.397) 0.876 (0.329) 0.753 (0.395)
Dum2005 0.102*** (0.003) 0.093*** (0.004) 0.094*** (0.003)
Dum2006 0.117** (0.020) 0.090** (0.050) 0.094** (0.035)
Dum2007 0.083 (0.273) 0.056 (0.438) 0.062 (0.371)
Dum2008 0.027 (0.801) -0.004 (0.972) -0.001 (0.989)
Dum2009 -0.017 (0.890) -0.056 (0.644) -0.058 (0.621)
Constant 33.423*** (0.000) 33.583*** (0.000) 31.450*** (0.001)
Number of obs 180 180 180
Number of groups 6 6 6
Centered R2 0.637 0.631 0.632
Uncentered R2 0.962 0.959 0.959
Jacque-Bera test
Prob>chi2
(0.000)
Hausman test
Prob>chi2
(0.840) (0.842) (0.858)
Kleibergen-Paap rk
LM statistic
(0.036) (0.096) (0.004)
Anderson-Rubin
Wald test Prob>chi2
(0.085) (0.364) (0.003)
Hansen J statistic
Prob>chi2
(0.170) (0.537) (0.191)
Note: Heteroscedastic-consistent p-value in parentheses, with ***, ** and * denoting significance
at 1, 5 and 10 percent level, respectively
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Table 3.4: Pollution-spillover driven and capital-competition driven strategic
interactions
Y = SO2 per capita SO2 transport matrix
Industrial structure
similarity matrix
SO2 transport matrix +
Industrial structure similarity
matrix
ijt
j i
Y
≠
∑ TijW -0.960* (0.075) -0.938** (0.049)
ijt
j i
Y
≠
∑ IijtW 1.831*** (0.006) 2.056** (0.013)
GRP3 -0.102*** (0.000) -0.102*** (0.000) -0.115*** (0.000)
GRP2 2.244*** (0.000) 2.325*** (0.000) 2.585*** (0.000)
GRP -16.286*** (0.000) -17.580*** (0.000) -19.285*** (0.000)
Density -0.111 (0.388) -0.046 (0.726) -0.078 (0.517)
State 1.127 (0.240) 1.425 (0.123) 1.344 (0.197)
Open -0.327** (0.038) -0.336** (0.034) -0.380** (0.027)
FDI -1.413 (0.213) -1.336 (0.227) -1.688 (0.162)
Letters 0.000 (0.991) 0.004 (0.544) 0.003 (0.675)
Edu 1.367 (0.196) 1.070 (0.262) 1.664 (0.137)
Dum2005 0.242*** (0.001) -0.123 (0.215) -0.059 (0.586)
Dum2006 0.241*** (0.003) -0.108 (0.338) -0.059 (0.617)
Dum2007 0.114 (0.240) -0.063 (0.533) -0.074 (0.487)
Dum2008 -0.045 (0.757) -0.002 (0.988) -0.076 (0.546)
Dum2009 -0.166 (0.365) 0.022 (0.857) -0.101 (0.517)
Constant 49.550*** (0.000) 39.998*** (0.000) 47.400*** (0.000)
Number of obs 180 180 180
Number of groups 6 6 6
Centered R2 0.549 0.575 0.522
Uncentered R2 0.941 0.936 0.941
Jacque-Bera test
Prob>chi2
(0.000)
Hausman test
Prob>chi2
(1.000) (0.999) chi2<0
Kleibergen-Paap rk
LM statistic
Prob>chi2
(0.002) (0.000) (0.007)
Anderson-Rubin
Wald test Prob>chi2
(0.037) (0.001) (0.001)
Hansen J statistic
Prob>chi2
(0.610) (0.554) (0.597)
Note: Heteroscedastic-consistent p-value in parentheses, with ***, ** and * denoting respectively
significance at 1, 5 and 10 percent level
The first column of Table 3.4 presents estimation results when the SO2 transport
matrix is solely used. Obviously, ceteris paribus, receptor provinces respond
negatively to SO2 emission changes in source provinces: a 1% increase (decrease) of
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SO2 emission in weighted source provinces would lead a receptor province to
decrease (increase) its own SO2 emission by 0.96%. This result is consistent with
intuition because an increase of SO2 emission in “upwind” source provinces will
increase the deposition of this pollutant in “downwind” receptor provinces through
the spillover effect. As a result, more damages will be caused to receptor provinces’
physical assets or public health by trans-boundary SO2. The governments of receptor
provinces, with either economic or welfare concern, would reduce their own SO2
emission in order to compensate the perverse effect of the increased trans-boundary
pollution. On the contrary, if source provinces reduce their SO2 emission, it is
possible that growth-seeking receptor provinces would take the liberty to increase
their own without generating greater damage to economy or public health. However,
it is notable that this negative strategic interaction is not very significant (with a
p-value of 7.5%).
One possible reason may explain the weak significance of pollution-spillover
driven strategic interaction: although the weighting matrix used here is a
province-to-province source-receptor matrix which traces SO2 transport, it is likely to
be correlated to other patterns of interaction, e.g. the industrial structure similarity
matrix. In fact, in spite of the long distance that SO2 can travel, the spillover-effect is
decreasing with distance, i.e., in general, spillover is stronger among provinces which
are geographically closer to each other.71 Meanwhile, it is not uncommon that
provinces geographically closer to each other have similar industrial structure, either
due to market integration or similar resource endowments. Consequently, if the
transport matrix and the industrial structure similarity matrix are correlated to each
other, the sole use of the former may produce biased results for pollution-spillover
driven strategic interaction.
In order to overcome this problem, two other regressions are made: one
regression with the industrial structure similarity matrix only and the other with the
transport matrix and the industrial structure similarity matrix jointly. The second
71 Nevertheless, it is notable that the relation between spillovers and distance is not linear due to meteorological
interference.
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column of Table 3.4 reports results with only the industrial structure similarity matrix.
The positive and strongly significant coefficient associated with the spatially lagged
dependent variable suggests that the capital-competition driven strategic interaction is
always present and significant, with an elasticity of 1.831. Given that the dependent
variable - SO2 emission per capita- is a result of environmental enforcement, the
positive interaction found in this case can be seen as a consequence of capital
competition. The third column of Table 3.4 reports results with jointly the industrial
structure similarity matrix and the transport matrix. One can note that everything else
being equal, capital-competition driven and pollution-spillover driven strategic
interactions coexist when provinces decide their SO2 emission level. While a change
in “upwind” source provinces affect negatively and significantly the pollution level of
“downwind” receptor provinces (with an elasticity of -0.938), capital-attracting
competitors respond positively to each other’s pollution level change. The null
hypothesis of zero strategic interaction can be rejected at the confidence level of 5%
in both cases. It is also interesting to observe that the elasticity of capital-competition
driven strategic interaction has risen from 1.831 to 2.056 once the pollution-spillover
effects are taken into account; although a stronger pollution-spillover driven strategic
interaction hasn’t been observed after integrating the capital-competition effects, it
does become more significant. These interesting findings suggest that the two
matrices are indeed correlated to each other.
3.5Concluding remarks
Critics of decentralization often argue that, either due to capital competition or
pollution spillovers, strategic interaction among jurisdictions in environmental
policymaking may lead to inefficient environmental regulation stringency. Although
this subject has been extensively studied in the U.S. context, very little attention has
been given to the case of China. This chapter contributes thus to the environmental
federalism literature in addressing the question of whether Chinese provinces engage
in strategic environmental policymaking.
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More specifically, two theoretical assumptions, the capital-competition driven
strategic interaction and the pollution-spillover driven strategic interaction, are
examined. It seems that both of these assumptions are high likely to hold in China.
First, using Chinese provincial data and spatial panel econometric methods, I find
that Chinese provinces do engage in strategic interaction when they set their pollution
levy. Moreover, this strategic interaction is positive and particularly strong among
provinces with similar industrial structure (i.e., potential competitors for attracting
mobile capital). Furthermore, evidence of asymmetric responsiveness suggested by
the race to the bottom theory hasn’t been found. Provinces respond strategically no
matter whether they are at an advantage or a disadvantage in the capital competition.
Finally, the one-sided fiscal decentralization arrangements may strengthen this
capital-competition driven strategic interaction.
Secondly, using a SO2 transport matrix, I find that Chinese provinces also engage
in pollution-spillover driven strategic interaction when they pollute. Particularly, the
change of SO2 emission level in “upwind” source provinces affect negatively and
significantly the pollution level of “downwind” receptor provinces. Moreover, the
pollution-spillover driven strategic interaction and the capital-competition driven
strategic interaction are likely to coexist when provinces decide their SO2 emission
level.
Together with what has been found in Chapter 2, results found in this chapter call
for once again a skeptical attitude on the decentralization of environment policy
implementation in China. The strategic interaction among provinces driven either by
capital competition or by pollution spillovers could be one of the reasons for China’s
inefficient environmental governance. Moreover, the current one-sided fiscal
decentralization is likely to strengthen this phenomenon. As a result, it would be of
great importance to develop more appropriate institutions for environmental
protection and resource allocation in this county, where special attention should be
paid to both vertical and horizontal inter-jurisdictional relations.
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Appendix 3.1: Industrial structure similarity index (UNIDO, 1979)
In order to construct the industrial structure similarity matrix, the industrial structure
similarity index proposed by UNIDO (1979) is used. This index can be calculated as
follows:
1
2 2
1 1
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n
ikt jkt
k
ijt
n n
ikt jkt
k k
X X
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X X
=
= =
=
∑
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1,..., ,i N= ,j i≠ 1,...,t T=
where i and j denote provinces, t denotes the year, S
ijt
is the industrial structure
similarity index between province i and province j, k denotes the industry, X
ikt
and X
jkt
denote the employment number (or added value) in (created by) industry k in
provinces i and j, respectively. S
ijt
has a value between zero and one and increases
with the similarity level between province i and province j. S
ijt
takes the value “one”
when province i and province j have exactly the same industrial structure. In this
study, default of sectorial added value data in several years, we calculte S
ijt
with
employment data of 27 industrial sectors published in China Industrial Economic
Statistical Yearbook (2005-2010). These 27 sectors are: production and supply of
electric power and heat power, manufacture of electrical machinery and equipment,
manufacture of textile wearing apparel, foot ware and caps, manufacture of textile,
mining and processing of nonmetal ores, manufacture of nonmetallic mineral products,
mining and processing of ferrous metal ores, smelting and pressing of ferrous metals,
manufacture of chemical fibers, manufacture of raw chemical materials and chemical
products, manufacture of transport equipment, manufacture of metal products, mining
and washing of coal, processing of food from agricultural products, processing of
petroleum, coking, processing of nuclear fuel, manufacture of foods, manufacture of
beverages, manufacture of communication equipment, computers and other electronic
equipment, manufacture of general purpose machinery, manufacture of tobacco,
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manufacture of medicines, manufacture of measuring instruments and machinery for
cultural activity and office work, mining and processing of non-ferrous metal ores,
smelting and pressing of non-ferrous metals, manufacture of paper and paper products,
and manufacture of special purpose machinery.
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Appendix 3.2: SO2 transport matrix
The SO2 transport matrix used in this chapter is a province-to-province
source-receptor matrix. In this (30 30)× matrix, each column denotes a source
province while each row denotes a receptor province. The value w
ij
taken by the
interception of column j and row i is calculated as follows:
( )
( )
,x j i
ij
x j i
j i
SO
w
SO
→
→
≠
=
∑
1,..., ,i N= 1,...,t T=
where ( )x j iSO → is the sulfur deposition in receptor province i caused by transported
SO2 emission discharged by source province j. The rows of matrix are normalized.
Thus, w
ij
measures the share of province j in the total sulfur deposition in province i
which is caused by trans-boundary SO2. The greater w
ij
is, the more effects province
j’s emission will have on the sulfur deposition in province i. As a result, this transport
matrix allows calculating, for each downwind receptor province, the weighted average
SO2 emission of its upwind provinces.
Data used to construct this transport matrix are abstracted from the Regional Air
Pollution Information and Simulation (RAINS-ASIA) model (7.52).72 The
RAINS-ASIA 7.52 model is a tool developed by the International Institute for Applied
Systems Analysis (IIASA) to analyze cost-effective strategies for reducing
environmental impacts of SO2 emissions in Asia. In order to calculate acid deposition
fields across Asia, this model employs interesting transfer matrices which can be used
to simulate source-to-receptor SO2 dispersion scenarios. These (linear) transfer
matrices are constructed from results of the long-range atmospheric transport model,
providing information of the dispersion of pollutants from the various sources to
about 2.5 thousand land-based grid cells of the modeling domain using the 1 degree
72 More information on RAINS-ASIA can be found on the following website:
http://www.iiasa.ac.at/~heyes/docs/rains.asia.html.
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longitude * 1 degree latitude grid. Transfer matrices are calculated for the
meteorological conditions of 6 years (1990-1995).
In fact, using these matrices and emission data of large point sources of emission
of different years, the model allows simulating the sulfur deposition scenarios, i.e.,
spatial dispersion of SO2 contributed by individual sources can be identified in terms
of deposition. For the purpose of this chapter, dispersion scenarios are simulated for
each province with 2005 emission data73 and transfer matrices based on average
meteorological conditions of 6 years (1990-1995).74
In the case of China, sources can be identified at provincial level; however, the
model doesn’t allow identifying the deposition by province, because the spatial
distribution in terms of deposition is only reported by 1 degree longitude * 1 degree
latitude grid cell. In other words, the model gives only province-to-grid transfer
information. As a result, in order to construct the province-to-province SO2 transport
matrix, grid cells have to be identified and aggregated into provinces. Fortunately, the
model provides matching information between grids and provinces; unfortunately,
provinces have irregular boundaries thus many grids are divided by several (2, 3 or 4)
provinces. In this case, the grid cell is assumed to be equally shared by provinces and
the deposition is divided by the number of provinces which share the grid cell.
Certainly, this treatment of shared grid cells is a simplistic one. It can be further
improved using GIS data.
For illustrative purpose, the contribution of different provinces to the sulfur
deposition in Beijing is presented in the following table.
73 In fact, the model allows simulation with emission data of different years (1990, 1995, 2000, 2005, 2010, etc.).
2005 data are selected because this year is during the study period of this chapter and is considered to better fit the
pollution transport over this period.
74 It is notable that the use of “source to grid” transfer matrices implicitly assumes that the spatial relative
distribution of emissions within a country will not dramatically change in future. Analysis undertaken at IIASA
indicates that the error in computed deposition introduced by this simplification lies within the general range of
model uncertainties when considering long-range transport.
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Receptor (downwind) province: Beijing
Source (upwind) provinces: Contributions:
Hebei 56.59%
Shanxi 16.30%
Tianjin 10.45%
Shandong 4.84%
InnerMongolia 4.21%
Shaanxi 2.53%
Henan 2.43%
Gansu 0.93%
Ningxia 0.51%
Liaoning 0.36%
Jiangsu 0.26%
Sichuan 0.23%
Qinghai 0.10%
Anhui 0.10%
Xinjiang 0.09%
Hubei 0.05%
Chongqing 0.02%
Shanghai 0.01%
Jilin 0.01%
Heilongjiang 0.00%
Guizhou 0.00%
Zhejiang 0.00%
Beijing 0.00%
Fujian 0.00%
Guangdong 0.00%
Guangxi 0.00%
Hainan 0.00%
Hunan 0.00%
Jiangxi 0.00%
Yunnan 0.00%
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Appendix 3.3: Variable names and significations
Variable names significations
Y
1
Pollution levy per industrial added value (in log)
Y
2
SO2 emission per capita (tons per 10000 persons, in log)
wY
1
Spatially lagged Pollution levy per industrial added value (in log)
wY
2
Spatially lagged SO2 emission per capita (ton, in log)
GRP Gross regional product per capita(USD at 2005 price, in log)
SO2intensity
SO2 emission per industrial added value (tons per 10000 USD at 2005
price, in log)
CODintensity
Chemical oxygen demand per industrial added value (tons per 10000
USD at 2005 price, in log)
Density Population density (persons per km2, in log)
State Proportion of industrial added value created by state-owned enterprises
Open Ratio between the total trade and gross regional product
FDI
Ratio between actually used foreign direct investments and gross
regional product
Letters Number of complaint letters regarding environmental issues (in log)
Edu Percentage of population with high education
IMB Vertical fiscal imbalance indicator
Dum2005 1 if the year of 2005, 0 otherwise
Dum2006 1 if the year of 2006, 0 otherwise
Dum2007 1 if the year of 2007, 0 otherwise
Dum2008 1 if the year of 2008, 0 otherwise
Dum2009 1 if the year of 2009, 0 otherwise
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Appendix 3.4: Summary Statistics
Variable Obs. Mean Standard Deviation Minimum Maximum
Y
1
180 0.002 0.001 0.000 0.009
Y
2
180 210.667 127.326 25.463 649.562
GRP 180 2861.228 2075.915 511.462 11961.220
SO2intensity 180 0.233 0.215 0.017 1.150
CODintensity 180 0.058 0.072 0.001 0.547
Density 180 403.948 527.151 7.486 3029.969
State 180 0.451 0.191 0.059 0.834
Open 180 0.358 0.411 0.045 1.668
FDI 180 0.027 0.020 0.001 0.082
Letters 180 18231.950 19796.200 50.000 105942.000
Edu 180 0.072 0.050 0.025 0.289
IMB 180 0.520 0.185 0.141 0.930
Dum2005 180 0.167 0.374 0.000 1.000
Dum2006 180 0.167 0.374 0.000 1.000
Dum2007 180 0.167 0.374 0.000 1.000
Dum2008 180 0.167 0.374 0.000 1.000
Dum2009 180 0.167 0.374 0.000 1.000
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Appendix 3.4: Nonlinear Marginal effects conditional on IMB
Overall 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009
Mean 2.964 3.029 2.950 2.948 2.969 2.937 2.952
Minimum 2.165 2.300 2.262 2.241 2.187 2.165 2.203
Lower quartile 2.626 2.668 2.621 2.571 2.530 2.540 2.631
Median 3.078 3.129 3.063 3.067 3.111 3.078 3.045
Upper quartile 3.214 3.290 3.143 3.161 3.205 3.219 3.222
Maximum 3.827 3.827 3.759 3.637 3.623 3.674 3.605
S.D. 0.390 0.378 0.379 0 .378 0 .421 0.416 0.393
Observation number 180 180 180 180 180 180 180
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4.1Introduction
In the environmental federalism literature, the third opponent argument against
decentralization of environmental policy is related to “public choice” rationales.
In effect, until very recently, China’s local EPBs have been subordinated to local
governments, both organizationally and financially. Evaluated on the base of
economic-performance, local governments’ main concern has primarily been for
economic growth. Given the structural conflict between economic growth and
environment, local protectionism in favor of polluting but wealth creating enterprises
has spread across the country. It seems that until very recently, the Chinese vertical
bureaucratic system had created on a local political market great political incentive for
local officials to develop economy at the cost of environment. Fortunately, things
have begun to change little by little. Since 2006, the central government has attached
priority to environmental protection in the national development strategy. New
“pro-environment” political targets were about to be integrated in the bureaucratic
system.
In this Chapter, following these related rationales, I study whether the Chinese
bureaucratic system has contributed to ineffective environmental regulatory
enforcement at sub-national level. I also examine whether recent changes on the
Chinese political market have effectively modified the political incentive at provincial
level. The rest of Chapter 4 is organized as follows. Section 2 is devoted to the
description of the institutional context of Chinese political economy of environment. I
present the bureaucratic system, its potential contributions to environmental policy
failures, and some recent changes within this system since 2006; in section 3, some
literature on political economy of environment is reviewed; in section 4, I present the
estimation strategy to test for the effect of political incentive on Chinese provincial
environment performance. Estimation results are reported in section 5 and in section 6
I conclude this chapter.
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4.2Institutional context of Chinese political economy of
environment
In spite of the de facto federalism, Chinese central government’s bureaucratic control
over local politics has remained strong (Landry, 2008). The effectiveness of this
bureaucratic control is fundamentally due to the centralized cadre system in China,
where local officials are formally appointed by the central government. As a result,
even if Chinese local officials enjoy formal autonomy, they may still be primarily
responsive to central mandates (Lan et al., 2011). Because local officials have been
evaluated on an economic-performance base, the bureaucratic system is considered to
have provided local governments with strong political incentives to facilitate
pro-market reforms and promote economy growth since 1978 (Li and Zhou, 2005).
However, this system has also been criticized to make environmental protection suffer
at local level (Wang, 2006/2007). It seems that local governments’ environmental
protection behaviors can be greatly affected by the bureaucratic system and the
political incentives created by it.
4.2.1 Vertical personnel control system
China’s political system is broadly composed of six layers of state administration: the
center, provinces, prefectures, counties, townships and villages. The CCP has
unopposed political power in China. It acts as the headquarters of the Chinese
political system, which ultimately controls the mobility of government officials within
the system. This highly centralized structure of personnel control remains intact even
to this day (Li and Zhou, 2005).
The vertical personnel control is exercised by the CCP through its cadre system.
It is well known that the CCP has a streamlined vertical hierarchy from county-level
officials to the General Secretary.75 The cadre system uses this existing vertical
75 Constitution of the CCP art. 10(1) (2007), available at
http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/200710/25/content_6944738.htm.
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hierarchy to connect central and local governments through a responsibility and
incentive system. Using this formal system, superiors within the Party evaluate
lower-level officials’ performance in political goals’ achievement (Golding, 2011).
Strict reward and punishment liability is attached to political officials for positive or
negative results: Establishment of goals is often rewarded with promotions, bonuses,
and public praise, while failure to meet goals leads to demotions, salary reductions,
and public censure (Whiting, 2004). In effect, the cadre system is used by the CCP to
incentivize a variety of political goals and to control the actions of state employees. It
is considered that this system provides market signals within China’s centralized
political system (Qiu and Li, 2009).
This system has been used by the CCP since the creation of the P.R.C.76 and has
seen a great evolution during the last 62 years, especially in the evaluation criteria (Li
and Zhou, 2005). Although numerical goals can be integrated into the system at the
same time, there has always been one with the highest priority. Before the 1978
reforms, promotion of a local official depended largely on ideological conformity and
military merit. As reformers came to dominate in the 1980s, targets increasingly
focused on economic performance (Zhang, 2006). Although political loyalty remains
important, local economic performance became the most important criterion for
higher-level officials assessing lower-level officials (Li and Zhou, 2005).
There can be little doubt that, during the post-reform era, this
economic-performance based vertical control system has given local governments
strong incentives to promote economic growth. Facing the extremely pro-growth
skewed incentive, it is predictable that local governments will naturally choose to put
priority on economic growth rather than environmental protection. And it is not
surprising that local governments intend to protect polluting but wealth creating
enterprises. In short, since the 1978 reforms, the vertical personnel control system
hasn’t created effective and clear incentives for sub-national actors to insistently
pursue environmental protection (Lan et al., 2011). On the contrary, due to the
structural growth-environment conflict, local governments have been rather
76 In fact, evaluation and responsibility systems already existed in imperial China (Golding, 2011).
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incentivized to sacrifice environment for economic growth.
4.2.2 M-form organizational structure
If the vertical personnel control system has provided local officials with incentives to
compromise environment goals, the organizational structure of Chinese government
has provided them with the autonomy to do so. Some scholars characterize the
Chinese political system as a multidivisional-form (M-form) organizational structure77
(Qian and Xu, 1993). Precisely, they describe the Chinese government as a multilayer,
multiregional organization, with multilayer structure along vertical lines and
multiregional structure along horizontal lines. Obviously, the multilayer structure is
strictly coordinated to the vertical personnel control system, while the multiregional
structure is closely linked to the de facto federalism. In this system, as argued by Qian
et al. (2006), “self-contained units” (local governments) have the autonomy of
implementing policy within a defined space.
In terms of environmental policy, this M-form structure has endowed local
governments with decisive influence to interfere with local environmental protection
affairs. As stated in Chapter 1, EPBs have primary responsibility for implementing
environmental policy at sub-national level. In spite of the vertical hierarchy within the
MEP and EPBs, EPBs are part of the people’s government at the same level and
accountable to the latter. The sub-national institutional structure for environmental
policy implementation in China is illustrated in Figure 4.1, where vertical hierarchical
division and accountability relations are illustrated by beelines. Note that divisions of
the same horizontal level have the same ranking position. According to Ma and
Ortolano (2000), under decentralization, local governments have gained a greater
control over local EPBs than the MEP. In practice, EPBs rely on local governments
for virtually all their support, including their budgets, career advancement, number of
personnel, and resources such as cars, office buildings, and employee housing. Given
this substantial subordination of EPBs, local governments and non-environmental
77 Qian et al. (2006) compare this “M-form” bureaucracy to more unitary bureaucracies, such as Russia’s.
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officials exert great influence on local environmental affairs. Consequently, local
protectionism is widespread and pollution laws are too frequently ignored (Lan et al.,
2011).
Meanwhile, the so called M-form structure is indispensable for the vertical
control system to work in China. The reason is that the M-form government structure
makes each local leader’s performance individually distinguishable and comparable
and thereby, allows for a sensible link between performance and bureaucratic
advancement (Li and Zhou, 2005). Under these conditions, it seems that the vertical
political control and the M-form organizational structure have operated side-by-side
in China and made up together a political framework in which local enforcement of
environmental regulations has suffered so far.
Figure 4.1: Sub-national institutional structure for environmental policy
implementation in China
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4.2.3 New “pro-environment” changes in China’s political
framework
Fortunately, things have begun to change since 2006. It seems that Chinese central
government has gained increasing awareness of the environmental damage severity in
the country and the necessity to improve the environmental governance.
“We must be fully aware of the severity and complexity of our
country's environmental situation and the importance and
urgency of increasing environmental protection … and
environmental protection should be given a higher priority in
the drive for national modernization.”
Premier Wen Jia-bao,
Address to the 6th National Conference on
Environmental Protection, April 17, 2006
The year of 2006 has been a milestone. In this year, the CCP and the Chinese
central government proclaimed an essential shift in state development policy priority,
i.e., from quantity growth to quality growth with the purpose of building a
harmonious, resource-efficient, and environment-friendly society (ADB, 2007). In the
framework of this national development strategy, environmental protection has been
placed at the top of the Government agenda.
In particular, the vertical personnel control system has seen new evolution. A
State Council directive of December 2005 (The State Council of China, 2006)
provided that environmental performance of local officials should be integrated into
the personnel evaluation and control system during the period of the 11th FYP in order
to reflect scientific thinking on development. The 11th FYEP explicitly states that
China will “implement environmental target responsibility system and set up an
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examination mechanism on environmental management performance”, that the
system “will identify scientific assessment indicators and integrate them into the
comprehensive evaluation system for the performance of party and government
officials”, and that an “environmental protection accountability and awarding &
punishment system” will also be established. In practice, since 2005, experiments
have been launched in several selected provinces in adding environmental
performance into their local official evaluation schedules.78 These new initiatives
have been further confirmed by the amendments in 2008 to the Law on the Prevention
and Control of Water Pollution (LPCWP),79 where Article 5 of the LPCWP (2008)
outlines that “the fulfillment of water environmental protection targets constitutes to
be a part of the performance evaluation of local people’s governments or their
responsible persons”.
Other illustrations of institutional changes after 2006 consist of the efforts made
at the administrative level in order to address the conflicts between the vertical and
horizontal lines in environmental governance. In 2008, the SEPA has been elevated to
the MEP, with the purpose of strengthening the vertical control of the central
government. Moreover, by December 2008, six regional supervision centers80 had
been established so as to ensure the implementation of central governmental standards,
free of local interference and protectionism (OECD, 2006). The creation of the MEP
and its regional offices reflects the willingness of the government to coordinate and
align the disparate interests around environmental objectives at different levels.
78 Three provinces are selected: Zhejiang, Shanxi and Hubei.
http://www.yfzs.gov.cn/gb/info/FZGL/LDLS/2005-10/18/1733431052.html.
79http://www.lawinfochina.com/display.aspx?id=6722&lib=law&SearchKeyword=&SearchCKeyword=%CB%AE
%CE%DB%C8%BE%B7%C0%D6%CE%B7%A8.
80 Center of South China (Hubei, Hunan, Guangdong, Guangxi and Hainan), Center of Southwest China
(Chongqing, Sichuan, Guizhou, Yunnan and Tibet), Center of Northeast China (Liaoning Jilin and Heilongjiang),
Center of Northwest China (Shaanxi, Ningxia, Gansu, Qinghai and Xinjiang) and Center of North China (Beijing,
Tianjin, Hebei, Shanxi, Inner Mongolia and Henan). and of the East (Shanghai, Jiangsu, Zhejiang, Fujian, Anhui,
Jiangxi and Shandong)
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4.3Literature review of political economy of environment:
public choice of environmental policy
A large body of literature on political economy of environment tries to understand
what determines the environmental policymaking in a specific political setting (Oates
and Portney, 2003). This positive approach is primarily based on the public choice
theory developed by Buchanan and Tullock (1962), which assumes that politicians are
self-interested and seek to maximize their utility.
In the public choice literature, there is some consensus that election has an impact
on “frontline" policy issues such as the level of government spending or the degree of
income and wealth redistribution. However, skepticism exists on whether secondary
policy issues, such as environmental policy, are influenced by electoral incentives
(List and Sturm, 2006). Guided by this skepticism, lobby models have been widely
used to understand the political economy of environment (Heyes and Dijkstra, 2001;
Oates and Portney, 2003). These models focus on the strategic interaction between the
incumbent and various interest groups and don’t explicitly model the election (List
and Sturm, 2006). In a lobby model, lobbying groups offer contributions, and the
government determines policy so as to maximize an objective function that includes
as arguments both the general welfare of the electorate and the contributions from the
interest groups (Oates and Portney, 2003). Aidt (1998), Fredriksson and Gaston (1999)
and Damania and Fredriksson (2003) are interesting examples of lobby models in
environmental policymaking.
Several other models consider the election more explicitly. For example, the
median voter model, one of the most solidly established models in public choice, has
been the most popular approach to the political economy of secondary issues (List and
Sturm, 2006). Based on majority decision making, the median voter theorem states
that, under certain assumptions, a politician will promote a certain policy
corresponding to median voter’s demand in order to maximize his probability of being
elected. As a result, the political outcomes are determined by the preference of the
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median voter. As demonstrated in Congleton (2002), the “strong form” median voter
theorem81 allows environmental policymaking to be modeled as a straightforward
application of the rational choice model developed in microeconomics, where the
median voter's preferred level of environmental regulation is obtained by maximizing
his utility function. In this case, the environmental policymaking outcome predicted
by the median voter theorem will be the one which equalizes the marginal cost of
environmental regulation and the marginal benefit from more stringent environmental
regulation for the median voter. McAusland (2003) also uses the median voter
theorem to model the effects of openness and income inequality on individual and
aggregate demand for pollution policy. Apart from the median voter model, some
other election-incentive models, such as the partisan model (pioneered by Hibbs
(1977)) and the political agency model (originated with Barro (1973)), assume that
politicians will not always comply with the median voter’s preference in their
environmental policymaking. The partisan hypothesis assumes that parties competing
for votes promise to implement programs that best serve the groups they represent
(Bräuninger, 2005). While some earlier studies argue that the partisan hypothesis is
not applicable to environmental policymaking in the U.S. (Buttel and Flinn, 1976;
Ogden, 1971), more recent ones show that partisan differences do exist on
environmental politics in the U.S., in that the Democratic Party is likely to be more
"pro-environment" than its Republican counterpart (Dunlap and Allen, 1976;
Gershtenson et al., 2006; Lester, 1980). Political agency models focus on the division
of interest between the public and the offices holders (Barro, 1973). In these models
where voters are imperfectly informed about government behavior, the role of several
elements such as the electoral process, the turnover and the media, etc. is analyzed to
explain the government’s responsiveness and accountability (Besley and Burgess,
2002). List and Sturm (2006) construct a political agency model to explain that
environmental policymaking across the U.S. states is determined by electoral
incentives. They argue that, despite its secondary policy nature, environmental policy
81 This strong form median voter theorem assumes that the preference of the median voter will be satisfied.
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affects substantially a group of “single-issue voters”.82 As a result, politicians may
distort their policy choices in such secondary areas to attract additional “single-issue
voters”. Their empirical results suggest that this manipulation of environmental policy
depends on the term limit and the political competition degree. They find that the
effort to attract additional “single-issue voters” decreases substantially when the
governor is a lame duck, or when he has overwhelming support. Fredriksson et al.
(2011) are also interested in the effect of term limits on environmental policy.
Through a study on the differences in U.S. states’ environmental spending across both
re-electable and lame duck governors from the two main political parties, they find
that while re-electable governors do not set significantly different policies across
parties, lame duck governors do. These results suggest that state politicians'
environmental policy choices are primarily guided by holding office concerns and that
re-election incentives matter.
4.4A Chinese model of public choice of environmental policy
As reviewed above, most of existing literature on political economy of environment is
more or less limited to the experience of countries with elected governments (Oates
and Portney, 2003). The objective of this chapter is to examine how the political
incentive created by the Chinese central government matters for environmental
outcomes of Chinese provinces. For this purpose, I consider a political market within
China’s centralized political system where the central government takes the place of
the constituency and provincial leaders are submit to the vertical control system
instead of the election. Before 2006，only economic performance was demanded by
the central government and supplied by provincial leaders on this political market.
Since 2006, both economic and environmental performances have been demanded.
Following the public choice model, provincial leaders are considered to be
self-interested and maximize their utility. Instead of the election incentives, the
82 “Single-issue voters” are those who are substantially affected by a particular secondary policy. Their
preferences over this policy are strong enough to induce them to vote for the politician considered most likely to
implement their preferred policy on this particular issue (List and Sturm, 2006).
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Chinese central government creates a political incentive of bureaucratic advancement
and evaluates the performance of local leaders. This vertical control system provides
market signals in that it incentivizes the tradeoff between economic and
environmental performance according to the political targets of the central
government.
Based on such a political market of provincial leaders, I study the effect of
political incentive on environmental performance of Chinese provinces. Political
incentive is difficult to quantify. Inspired by the reelection incentives and term limits
models (Fredriksson et al., 2011; List and Sturm, 2006), I examine indirectly this
effect by studying how political competition degree and term limit affect provincial
leaders’ environmental performance. The basic idea behind this approach is simple.
List and Strum (2006) show that concerns with environmental policy (as a secondary
policy) decreases when the governor has overwhelming support; Both List and Strum
(2006) and Fredriksson et al. (2011) find that reelection incentives decrease when the
governor face term limit. Similarly, in the Chinese context, if political incentives did
encourage environment-sacrificing growth, one should observe a differential
responsiveness of leaders according to their political competitiveness; in particular, a
less competitive leader would be more likely to conduct environmental-sacrificing
behaviors, thus have a worse environmental performance than a more competitive one.
Meanwhile, leaders facing term limit would be less responsive and redundant to
conduct such environment-sacrificing growth. Moreover, recent changes in evaluation
criteria of the bureaucratic system since 2006 consist of an ideal natural experiment to
test for the change in political incentive effects. Following these ideas, three questions
are investigated. First, does political competitiveness matter for a provincial leader’s
environmental performance? Secondly, are lame duck leaders redundant facing
environment-sacrificing political incentives? And finally, have recent changes in
evaluation criteria of the bureaucratic system mitigated these incentives since 2006?
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4.5Empirical analysis
4.5.1 Data and Variables
A panel dataset of 30 Chinese provinces (Tibet, Hongkong and Macao excluded) over
the period 1998-2010 is constructed for the present study. Data for tall variables are
collected from China Statistical Yearbooks (NBSC, various volumes).
First of all, annual emission of SO2 is selected as indicator of the dependent
variable- the environmental performance. China Statistical Yearbook publishes since
1998 annual emission level of SO2 for each province. SO2 is a main air pollutant in
China. It is also the main cause of the acid rain, one of the essential control targets of
the MEP. More importantly, SO2 reduction is one of targets of the 11th FYP
(2006-2011), during which changes in bureaucratic evaluation criteria have occurred.
As a result, SO2 is a good indicator to reflect the potential repercussion of political
incentive changes since 2006.
There are two variables of interest in the present model, i.e., the political
competitiveness and the term limit.
Li and Zhou (2005) show that the promotion of Chinese provincial leaders
dependent essentially on their average economic performance during their term in
office. As a result, one may expect that a provincial leader with a higher ex-ante
average economic performance have greater political competitiveness, i.e. more
probability to get bureaucratic advancement, vice versa. Following this idea, the
ex-ante average economic growth rate during a leader’s years in office
(AVGROWTH
t-1
) is calculated to measure his political competitiveness.
The binding term limit is not explicitly defined for provincial leaders in China; it
is thus difficult to impose term limit constraint in this study as what is done in the U.S.
context. In practice, although the official term of office is 5 years in China,83 the
83 The Chinese central government issued an official provision in 2006 which defined the office term limits for
political leader. According to this provision, the official term of office is 5 years; a political leader cannot hold the
same office for more than 2 terms; a political leader cannot hold offices of the same ranking for more than 3 terms.
http://rjs.mca.gov.cn/article/rsgz/zcwj/gbrm/200804/20080400013722.shtml.
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turnovers of provincial leaders are to the discretion of the central government.
Depending on the decision of the central government, a provincial leader may move
up to a higher ranking position, or be transferred to another equal ranking position, or
terminate his office before the end of his official term84. Nevertheless, the mandatory
retirement rule at the age of 65 was installed in China in 1982, which requires
provincial leaders retire at the age of 65 if they are not promoted to higher positions in
the central government. It is notable that although this rule is becoming more stringent,
it is not always strictly enforced. Still considerable, if less and less, 65 year-old or
older leaders occupy provincial offices. For illustration, about 25% of provincial
leaders in Li and Zhou’s (1979-1995) sample are 65 or older, compared to only 5% in
my sample. After all, it seems that the age of 65 affects significantly a provincial
leader’s turnover probability (Li and Zhou, 2005). As a result, in this study, the age of
65 is used as a proxy of the term limit. One may expect that the political incentive
created by the central government is less strong for provincial leaders of 65 years old
or older, due to their quasi null probability to get bureaucratic advancement.
In order to construct the dummy variable AGE65, ages of provincial party
secretaries (PPS) are collected. The dummy variable Age65 is equal to “1” if the PPS
is 65 or older, and “0” otherwise. Age information of all PPSs is collected from their
C.V. published on the official website of News of the Communist Party of China.85
Ages of the PPSs rather than those of provincial governors are used because the PPS
is often considered as the most powerful person and de facto ruler of Chinese
provinces. They are entrusted with the supervision of the provincial governments, and
preside over huge provincial resources and economic development (Tan, 2004). In my
sample, it is not uncommon that turnovers of PPSs take place in the course of the year.
In this case, the month of the turnover is collected and the weighted age is calculated
with the ages of the two PPSs before and after the turnover.
As control variables, GRP per capita, its squared and cubed terms are introduced.
84 In the sample of the present study, about one third of provincial leaders don’t finish their 5-year-official term
(those who are retired due to the 65-age rule and those who are expelled from offices due to criminal penalty are
not included.)
85 http://cpc.people.com.cn/GB/64162/123659/7398342.html.
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In order to rule out omitted variable bias, one year lagged provincial characteristic
variables are also introduced because they may be correlated to both SO2 and
AVGROWTH
t-1
. These lagged variables include FDI, trade openness, population
density, urbanization, importance of industrial sector, education, unemployment rate
and fixed capital store density. GRP per capita are deflated and converted to USD at
constant price of 2005. In addition, provincial and time specific effects are included.
Definitions and descriptive statistics of variables are presented in Appendices 4.1 and
4.2.
4.5.2 Estimation strategy: EKC revisited
The effect of political incentive on environmental performance of Chinese provinces
is examined by revisiting the EKC hypothesis. The EKC is proposed by the
path-breaking work of Grossman and Krueger (1991), which postulates the existence
of an inverse U-shape relationship between per capita GDP and measures of
environmental degradation in studying the potential environmental impacts of the
North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA). Since then, the EKC hypothesis
has been largely tested for, using different environmental indicators, different samples,
different time series and different econometric methods, and has seen rather mixed
results (Copeland and Taylor, 2004; Dinda, 2004; Stern, 2004). According to this
EKC literature, relationship between per capita GDP and environmental variables
may be determined by a series of concurring supply and demand side factors.
Question 1: Does political competitiveness matter for a provincial leader’s
environmental performance?
In order to investigate Question 1, the variable AVGROWTH
t-1
is included into the
reduced form of the EKC, as specified in (4.1)
3 2
1 2 3 4 -12 ,it it it it t k kit i t itSO β GRP β GRP β GRP β AVGROWTH δ X μ d ε= + + + + + + +
1,..., ,t T= 1,..., ,i I= 1,...,k K= (4.1)
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where i denotes the province, t denotes the year, SO2 is the per capita sulfur dioxide
emission level, GRP denotes GRP per capita, AVGROWTH
t-1
is the age of the political
leader of the province, Density is the population density, β and
k
δ
are two vectors
of fixed but unknown parameters, X
kit
is a vector of other control variables,
i
μ
is a
cross-sectional specific effect which controls for all provincial time-invariant
variables, d
t
is a time specific effect which controls for all unobservable
province-invariant omitted variables, and
it
ε
is an independently and identically
distributed error term. Under this specification, the political incentive hypothesis will
be proved if 4β is negative and significant, i.e., everything else being equal, a
provincial leader will have a worse environmental performance if the average growth
rate is lower during his previous years in office, and vice versa.
Question 2: are lame duck leaders reluctant facing environmental-sacrificing
political incentives?
The investigation of Question 2 requires the introduction of the term limit dummy
variable- AGE65. In (4.2), (4.1) is augmented with AGE65 and its interactive with the
political competiveness variable AVGROWTH
t-1
.
3 2
1 2 3 4 -1
5 -1 6
2
65 65 ,
it it it it t
t k kit i t it
SO β GRP β GRP β GRP β AVGROWTH
β AVGROWTH AGE β AGE δ X μ d ε
= + + + +
∗ + + + + +
1,..., ,t T= 1,..., ,i I= 1,...,k K= (4.2)
Under the specification of (4.2), the term limit hypothesis will be proved if 4β is
negative and significant, and 5β is positive and significant, i.e., everything else
being equal, due to the quasi null career prospect, a provincial leader with lower
ex-ante economic performance score will be less environmental sacrificing (with a
marginal effect of 4 5β + β ) than his younger counterparts (with a marginal effect of
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4β ).
Question 3: Have recent changes in evaluation criteria of the bureaucratic system
mitigated these incentives since 2006?
Question 3 addresses the natural experiment within Chinese bureaucratic system.
If the political incentives have actually changed since 2006, one should observe a
structural break at the year 2006, which can be tested for with the Chow test (Chow,
1960). Differential effects of political incentives can be compared by regressing with
the two sub-samples (pre and post 2006).
Another issue to be considered in this EKC analysis is the potential endogeneity
of GRP
t
and AVGROWTH
t-1
. As discussed in Stern (2004), endogeneity problem
arises in EKC analysis if the environmental variable and per capita income are
determined simultaneously, or if there are omitted variables that affect both the
environmental variable and per capita income. In addition, although the lagged
variable AVGROWTH
t-1
doesn’t suffer from simultaneity bias, there may be omitted
variables which are correlate to both SO2 and AVGROWTH
t-1
. In order to test for the
potential endogeneity of these variables, Hausman test is performed with proper
instruments (GRP
t-1
GRP
t-2
and AVGROWTH
t-2
). Tests results reported in Table 4.1
and Table 4.2 suggest that these instruments are valid where the exogeneity of GRP
t
and AVGROWTH
t-1
cannot be rejected at the 10% confidence level. As a result, panel
estimators without IV are adopted in this analysis.
4.5.3 Estimation results
4.5.3.1 Political competitiveness
Estimation results of (4.1) for Question 1 are presented in the first column of Table
4.1. Hausman test statistic allows a preference for the model with fixed effects. The
coefficient associated with AVGROWTH
t-1
is negative and strongly significant
(-0.631), suggesting that, ceteris paribus, a 1% decrease of ex-ante average growth
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rate (a worse economic performance) would lead to an increase of 0.631% in per
capita SO2 emission, vice versa. This finding supports the political competitiveness
hypothesis, according to which a less competitive political leader (with worse
economic performance, in the Chinese context) would allow more pollution is his
province, probably due to the environment-sacrificing political incentive.
Concerning control variables, it is notable that all the three terms of GRP per
capita are statistically significant. The EKC takes an inverse “N” form instead of an
inverse “U”.
4.5.3.2 Term limit
In order to further investigate the repercussion of political incentive on provincial
environment, term limit effects are considered in Question 2 and estimated in (4.2).
The model with fixed effects is preferred and results are reported in the second
column of Table 4.1. Results obtained in this regression correspond exactly to what is
predicted by the term limit hypothesis. In effect, the coefficient associated with the
interaction AVGROWTH
t-1
*AGE65
t
is negative and significant, and the coefficient
associated with AVGROWTH
t-1
is positive and significant. These results suggest that,
ceteris paribus, the marginal effect of AVGROWTH
t-1
on SO2 is negative (with a slope
of -0.631 and significance at 1% level) for provincial leaders below 65; however, the
marginal effect of AVGROWTH
t-1
on SO2 becomes positive (with a slope of
3.828-0.631=3.197, significant at 5% level) when the provincial leader is 65 or older.
Since 65 is the official retirement age, leaders over 65 have quasi null political career
prospect. It seems that the political competitiveness disadvantage would not conduct a
lame duck leader to be more environment-sacrificing, while it does incentivizes this
kind of behavior among younger leaders. Moreover, the lame duck leader is likely to
be more environmentally friendly when his ex-ante economic performance score is
lower, for which the reason deserves further investigation.
Concerning control variables, the three terms of GRP per capita are statistically
significant and have similar coefficients as in the former regression.
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Table 4.1: Political competitiveness and term limit
Political competitiveness Term limit
GRP -0.102*** (0.010) -0.104*** (0.007)
GRP2 2.256** (0.012) 2.297*** (0.009)
GRP3 -16.619** (0.015) -16.952** (0.011)
AVGROWTH
t-1
-0.631*** (0.000) -0.631*** (0.000)
AVGROWTH
t-1
*AGE65 3.828** (0.019)
AGE65 -0.545** (0.018)
L_FDI 1.898 (0.314) 1.795 (0.323)
L_OPENNESS -0.078 (0.683) -0.083 (0.633)
L_DENSITY 0.364 (0.557) 0.441 (0.469)
L_EDU -1.342 (0.427) -0.876 (0.598)
L_IND 0.738 (0.354) 0.802 (0.318)
L_URBAN -0.947 (0.233) -0.958 (0.218)
L_K/L -0.021 (0.526) -0.018 (0.602)
L_UNEMPLOY 0.838 (0.802) 0.698 (0.834)
D1999 -0.467 (0.359) -0.576 (0.264)
D2000 -0.424 (0.393) -0.532 (0.293)
D2001 -0.432 (0.368) -0.547 (0.262)
D2002 -0.433 (0.341) -0.542 (0.242)
D2003 -0.245 (0.563) -0.348 (0.416)
D2004 -0.150 (0.677) -0.243 (0.507)
D2005 -0.003 (0.992) -0.082 (0.792)
D2006 0.034 (0.898) -0.037 (0.891)
D2007 0.023 (0.912) -0.033 (0.876)
D2008 -0.001 (0.992) -0.039 (0.755)
D2009 -0.033 (0.678) -0.055 (0.455)
Constant 44.238*** (0.009) 44.943*** (0.006)
Hausman test of
endogeneity (prob>chi2)
(0.758) (0.445)
Kleibergen-Paap rk LM
(prob>chi2)
(0.003) (0.000)
Hansen J test (prob>chi2) (0.227) (0.137)
Hausman test
of fixed effects (prob>chi2)
(0.000) (0.000)
R2 (within) 0.593 0.602
308
30
N. of obs. 308
N. of groups 30
Note: Heteroscedastic-consistent p-value in parentheses, * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01.
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4.5.3.3 Structural break at 2006
The Chow test is performed in order to investigate incentives change assumed in
Question 3. The test statistic allows strongly rejecting the null hypothesis of constant
or homogeneous estimation parameters before and after 2006, which suggests that the
year 2006 does consist of a structural break point in the time series, probably due to
the institutional changes discussed in Introduction.
With the purpose of comparing political incentive effects before and after 2006,
two regressions are launched with the two subsamples respectively. Estimation results
are reported in Table 4.2. Fixed effects models are always preferred. It is notable that
over the period pre-2006, the variable AVGROWTH
t-1
has a positive and significant
coefficient, which is consistent with the political competitiveness hypothesis. Before
2006, provincial leaders with lower ex-ante average growth scores would be more
environmental detrimental, i.e., allow more per capita SO2 emission. However, it
seems that this political competitiveness effect has vanished since 2006: everything
else being equal, the marginal effect of AVGROWTH
t-1
on SO2 emission is not
significantly different from zero in the period post-2006. This obvious contrast
between the two periods separated by 2006 is a strong evidence of the political
incentive change in that year. Since environmental performance has been integrated
into the bureaucratic vertical evaluation criteria in 2006, political leaders have no
longer interest to compensate their mediocre economic performance by compromising
environment.
Concerning control variables, GRP terms have always significant effects on SO2
emission before 2006, and turn to be insignificant after 2006. Over the period
pre-2006, the two turning points of GRP per capita occur at 619 USD and 1839 USD,
i.e., pollution decreases with GRP per capita when the latter is below 619 USD (in
16% of observations before 2006), then increases with it until 1839 USD per capita
(in 67% of observations before 2006), and finally decreases with it again above that
level (in 17% of observations before 2006).
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Table 4.2: Structural break at 2006
1998-2005 2006-2010
GRP -0.195** (0.016) -0.048 (0.374)
GRP2 4.088** (0.021) 1.076 (0.382)
GRP3 -28.328** (0.027) -7.975 (0.395)
AVGROWTH -0.306*** (0.001) 0.116 (0.859)
L_FDI 2.584* (0.077) -2.981* (0.066)
L_OPENNESS 0.232 (0.211) 0.153 (0.310)
L_DENSITY 1.006* (0.063) -0.268 (0.831)
L_EDU -2.131 (0.227) -3.074*** (0.001)
L_IND -0.613 (0.409) 0.257 (0.473)
L_URBAN 0.112 (0.898) -2.067** (0.025)
L_K/L 0.004 (0.961) 0.044 (0.130)
L_UNEMPLOY 1.875 (0.551) -6.127 (0.118)
D2000 0.039 (0.280)
D2001 -0.007 (0.907)
D2002 -0.031 (0.689)
D2003 0.132 (0.257)
D2004 0.189 (0.320)
D2005 0.319 (0.210)
D2006 0.196 (0.310)
D2007 0.154 (0.298)
D2008 0.055 (0.515)
D2009 -0.002 (0.960)
Constant 64.794** (0.034) 26.896 (0.178)
Chow test (Prob > F) 0.000
Hausman test of
endogeneity (prob>chi2)
(0.551) (0.505)
Kleibergen-Paap rk LM
(prob>chi2)
(0.014) (0.001)
Hansen J test (prob>chi2) (0.119) (0.825)
Hausman test
of fixed effects (prob>chi2)
(0.000) (0.000)
R2 (within) 0.585 0.827
120
30
N. of obs. 188
N. of groups 30
Note: Heteroscedastic-consistent p-value in parentheses, * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01.
4.6Concluding remarks
It is argued that the economic-performance based personnel evaluation and the
political incentive created by it has contributed to the large policy failure in
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environmental protection at sub-national level in China. In this chapter, inspired by
the literature on political economy of environment, I study empirically effects of the
bureaucratic system on environmental outcomes in this country. Precisely, three
questions are investigated: (1) does political competitiveness matter for a provincial
leader’s environmental performance? (2) are lame duck leaders redundant facing
environment-sacrificing political incentives? And (3) have recent changes in
evaluation criteria of the bureaucratic system mitigated these incentives since 2006?
By revisiting the EKC hypothesis, first, I find that everything else being equal, a
provincial leader will have a worse environmental performance if the average growth
rate is lower during his previous years in office, and vice versa. These results suggest
that political competitiveness of the PPS affects significantly his environmental
performance. The less the PPS is competitive, the more he would compromise
environment. Secondly, I find that this political competitiveness effect is significantly
conditional on term limit. While a PPS younger than 65 would conduct such
environment-sacrificing behaviors if he has less competitive economic performance
score, a PPS of 65 or older would not do so because he has quasi null political career
prospect. Finally, the structural break in 2006 is tested. It seems that recent changes in
criteria of the personnel evaluation system since 2006 have effectively mitigated the
former political incentive effects. In fact, because the central government has attached
more importance to environmental performance, it is no longer as profitable as before
for less competitive leaders to promote economic growth at the cost of environment.
That’s why the political competitiveness effect is only significant before 2006 and
turns to be insignificant during the period post-2006.
Results found in this chapter suggest that provincial political leaders in China are
also office motivated in the area of environmental policy, which is consistent with
what have been found in the U.S. states (Fredriksson et al., 2011; List and Sturm,
2006). Given the economic-performance based bureaucratic evaluation criteria in the
pre-2006 period, public choice rationales did incentive leaders to perform differently
on environment according on their political competitiveness (the ex-ante growth
scores in the Chinese context).
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Appendix 4.1: Name and description of variables
Variable Definition
SO2 SO2 emission per capita (tons per 10000 persons, in log)
GRP Gross regional product per capita(USD at 2005 price, in log)
AVGROWTH Average growth rate of a PPS’s office years (no term accumulation)
Age65 1 if the PPS is 65 years old or older, 0 if not
L_FDI One year lagged Foreign direct investments / Gross regional product
L_OPENNESS
One year lagged (Exportation + Importation) / Gross regional product
L_DENSITY One year lagged population density (persons per km2, in log)
L_EDU One year lagged population ratio with high education
L_IND One year lagged industrial sector importance in total GRP
L_URBAN
One year lagged non-agricultural population/total population
L_K/L One year lagged capital stock density (capital stock / total employment),
constant price
L_UNEMPLOY One year lagged Unemployment rate
D1999 1 if the year of 1999, 0 otherwise
D2000 1 if the year of 2000, 0 otherwise
D2001 1 if the year of 2001, 0 otherwise
D2002 1 if the year of 2002, 0 otherwise
D2003 1 if the year of 2003, 0 otherwise
D2004 1 if the year of 2004, 0 otherwise
D2005 1 if the year of 2005, 0 otherwise
D2006 1 if the year of 2006, 0 otherwise
D2007 1 if the year of 2007, 0 otherwise
D2008 1 if the year of 2008, 0 otherwise
D2009 1 if the year of 2009, 0 otherwise
D2010 1 if the year of 2010, 0 otherwise
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Appendix 4.2: Summary statistics of variables
Variable Obs Mean Std.dev Min Max
SO2
390 191.821 118.506 25.077 649.562
GRP
390 2262.026 2043.365 319.632 11862.610
AVGROWTH
328 0.113 0.049 0.051 0.900
Age65
390 0.049 0.216 0.000 1.000
L_FDI
390 0.029 0.028 0.001 0.169
L_OPENNESS
390 0.307 0.368 0.040 1.668
L_DENSITY
390 387.497 488.039 6.889 3029.969
L_EDU
390 0.056 0.044 0.008 0.289
L_IND
390 0.385 0.083 0.120 0.592
L_URBAN
360 0.336 0.159 0.143 0.883
L_K/L
360 1.887 2.286 0.109 11.843
L_UNEMPLOY
390 0.036 0.009 0.000 0.074
Dum1999
390 0.077 0.267 0.000 1.000
Dum2000
390 0.077 0.267 0.000 1.000
Dum2001
390 0.077 0.267 0.000 1.000
Dum2002
390 0.077 0.267 0.000 1.000
Dum2003
390 0.077 0.267 0.000 1.000
Dum2004
390 0.077 0.267 0.000 1.000
Dum2005
390 0.077 0.267 0.000 1.000
Dum2006
390 0.077 0.267 0.000 1.000
Dum2007
390 0.077 0.267 0.000 1.000
Dum2008
390 0.077 0.267 0.000 1.000
Dum2009
390 0.077 0.267 0.000 1.000
Dum2010
390 0.077 0.267 0.000 1.000
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5.1Introduction
As discussed in Chapter 1, the de facto environmental federalism and the one-sided
fiscal decentralization in China have worked side by side in providing sub-national
governments with the possibility and economic incentives to conduct ineffective
enforcement of environmental policy. In Chapters 2, 3 and 4, I’ve tested empirically
for hypotheses of free-riding, strategic interaction behavior and political incentive
rationales. Results valid all of them and provide strong evidence of the inefficiency of
the de facto environmental federalism in China. Moreover, results obtained in Chapter
3 suggest that the capital-competition driven strategic interaction would be reinforced
by provincial fiscal imbalance. In this chapter, I’ll further study the effects of the
one-sided fiscal decentralization on environmental policy outcome in China, in terms
of environmental efficiency.
The Tax Sharing System (TSS) reform on 1994 has recognized the dominant role
of the central government in the intergovernmental fiscal system and recentralized
fiscal revenues. However, expenditure responsibilities have been unrevised and
remained largely decentralized. In 2009, 80% of national expenditures were spent by
sub-national governments.86 Decentralization is even more remarkable in
environmental expenditures. In 2007, more than 95% of national expenditures on
environmental protection were spent by sub-national governments, of which more
than a half was realized at sub-provincial level.87 In fact, the one-sided expenditure
decentralization without revenue-side counterpart has created huge fiscal imbalance at
the sub-national level in China. Local governments have excessively heavy
expenditure responsibilities which are not met by their revenue assignments (World
Bank, 2002). These governments depend largely on intergovernmental transfers,
which are not always transparent or adequate. In 2009, 46.6% of sub-national
expenditures come from central government’s fiscal transfers. In the same year, the
gap between revenues and expenditures accounts for 46.8% of the latter at
86 Author’s calculation based on China Statistical Yearbook, 2010.
87 Author’s calculation based on China Statistical Yearbook, 2008.
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sub-provincial level.88 The current one-sided fiscal decentralization may create strong
constraints and disincentives for environmental protection. It is considered that with
such important fiscal gap, localities, especially poor ones, would under-provide
environmental service or conduct ineffective enforcement either due to fiscal
incapacity, the unwillingness to compromise economic growth or the corruption (see
more discussion in Chapter 1).
The actual effect of fiscal decentralization on environment is an empirical
question with important political implications. However, very few studies have
investigated this question empirically in the Chinese context with only two exceptions:
Jiang (2006) explores with a case study why post-reform decentralization in China has
failed to bring about environmental sustainability; Cui and Liu (2010) show that the
increase of the disposable financial resources of local governments helps to control
pollution sources with small externalities. This chapter tries to contribute to this part
of literature in another approach, in estimating the effect of the one-sided fiscal
decentralization on environmental efficiency of provincial gross product. It is straight
forward to consider that, if the one-sided decentralization in China has effects on local
environmental services provision and local environmental stringency, it is high likely
to affect localities’ environmental performance by modifying their pollution
abatement efforts and polluting behaviors.89
Precisely, I estimate the environmental efficiency (EE) scores of the gross
regional product (GRP) of Chinese provinces and examine whether provinces with
larger fiscal imbalance have higher (or lower) EE scores. As defined later in the
chapter, EE is the efficiency of environmentally detrimental variables in a production
process. EE is chosen as the environmental performance indicator because it allows
measuring environmental performance conditional on the levels of the output and
other inputs.
The rest of this chapter is organized as follows. A brief literature review on EE
88 Author’s calculation based on China Statistical Yearbook for Regional Economy (2010) and Finance yearbook
of China (2010).
89 Several studies show that environmental stringency in China has an important effect on polluting firms’
behavior (Dasgupta et al., 2001; Wang and Wheeler, 2005) and on local industrial pollution level (Wang and
Wheeler, 2003).
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models is made in section 2. A two-stage EE model is presented in Section 3. Section
4 is devoted to empirical analysis of the two-stage EE model. Conditional EE are
calculated in section 5. Conclusions and political implications are formulated in
Section 6.
5.2Literature Review
5.2.1 Environmental efficiency models
To investigate the effects of fiscal decentralization on environment, a comprehensive
environmental performance index must be developed and computed appropriately. In
incorporating environmental variables into a traditional production function,
environmental efficiency calculates have been proposed by a variety of studies. Based
on adjustments of conventional measures of technical efficiency (TE), EE estimation
methods can be classified according to two criteria. The first criterion distinguishes
deterministic models from stochastic models, and the second criterion differentiates
non-parametric models from parametric models. In the literature, two families of
methods are widely employed, i.e. Stochastic Frontier Analysis (SFA) (Aigner et al.,
1977; Meeusen and Broeck, 1977) and Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA) (Charnes
et al., 1978). SFA is a parametric stochastic model based on economic theories, while
DEA is a nonparametric deterministic model dispensable of specification forms. Each
of these two approaches has its advantages and shortcomings (Hjalmarsson et al.,
1996). The present study will choose the SFA approach because industrial production
is a specifiable process and more importantly, SFA is able to distinguish statistical
noise from inefficiency and allows for a formal statistical testing of hypotheses.
Moreover, to the knowledge of the author, most existing studies on Chinese EE have
adopted the DEA approach (Zhang et al., 2008; Yuan and Cheng, 2011; Zhang, 2009;
Yang and Pollitt, 2009) except one (Wu, 2010). The present study will thus allow a
comparison with their results.
Jointly produced with conventional desirable outputs, environmentally
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detrimental variables are particular because of their undesirable nature. In other words,
in order to be efficient, a producer must maximize his conventional desirable outputs
and minimize his environmentally detrimental factors as well as his conventional
inputs. Given this particularity, two groups of technologies have been proposed to
introduce environmentally detrimental variables into the production function. The first
group treats them as undesirable outputs, while the second group considers them as
inputs. Since DEA allows treating multiple output models, it is widely used in the first
group of technologies.90 Interesting attempts with SFA in the first group are realized
by Cuesta et al. (2009) and Wu (2010), both of which rely on distance function
models. The second group of technologies can be found in both DEA91 and SFA
studies. In the SFA approach, Reinhard et al. (1999; 2000) treat the environmentally
detrimental variables as inputs to estimate the EE of Dutch dairy farms. Their method
has been later adopted in numerous agricultural EE studies (Mkhabela, 2011;
Reinhard et al., 2002; Zhang and Xue, 2005).
5.2.2 Models of environmental efficiency determinants
Determinants of TE can be consistently estimated by the one-stage model proposed by
Battese and Coelli (1995). However, this model isn’t applicable to estimate the
determinants of EE because EE is an adjusted measure of TE. To overcome this
problem, a two-stage model is proposed by Reinhard et al. (2002) to analyze the
sources of environmental efficiency variation. In the first stage, they use SFA to
estimate EE scores of producers. In the second stage, they use again SFA to regress
EE scores obtained in the first stage against a set of underground variables. According
to the authors, a frontier approach in the second stage offers both economic and
statistical advantages over an OLS or a TOBIT approach. The reason is as follows.
First, conditional estimates of environmental efficiency scores can be derived from
the one-sided error of the second stage SFA; secondly, while neither OLS nor TOBIT
90 A comprehensive survey of such studies is made by Zhou et al. (2008).
91 For example, (Hailu and Veeman, 2001) consider pollution as production input to study the efficiency of
Canadian Pulp and Paper Industry. Yang and Pollitt (2009) consider SO2 emission as input to estimate the
efficiency of the Chinese coal-fired power sector.
Chapter 5 Effects of one-sided fiscal decentralization on environmental efficiency of Chinese provinces
140
allows estimating conditional EE scores, they are also biased and inconsistent if the
conditional inefficiency exists.92
5.3Two-stage SFAModel
The two-stage model of Reinhard et al. (2002) is chosen as the benchmark model for
the following empirical analysis. In this section, first I illustrate the definition of EE.
Secondly, EE estimation is developed in the framework of SFA. Finally, I present the
second-stage model to estimate EE determinants and conditional EE.
5.3.1 Definition of EE
As defined in Reinhard et al. (2000), EE is the ratio of minimum feasible to observed
use of environmentally detrimental inputs, conditional on observed levels of output
and the conventional inputs. This definition is formulated in (5.1)
{ }min : ( , )R R R
k l
EE θ F X θ Z Y= ≥ (5.1)
where R
k
X and R
Y
are observed vectors of conventional inputs and output. k is the
number of conventional inputs. R
l
Z is the vector of observed environmentally
detrimental inputs. l is the number of environmentally detrimental inputs. ( )F  is
the best practice production frontier. The EE measure θ is calculated as a radial
contraction of the R
l
Z
, conditional on ( )F  , R
k
X
and R
Y
.
5.3.2 Estimation of EE with SFA
EE defined in (5.1) can be estimated with a stochastic production frontier (5.2):
92 If the conditional inefficiency exists, disturbance term is skewed with non-zero mean.
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( , , , , ) exp( ),
it kit lit it it
Y f X Z β γ ζ V U= − 1,..., ,t T= 1,...,i I= (5.2)
where for all producers indexed with a subscript i and for all years indexed with a
subscript t，
it
Y
is the output level;
kit
X
is a vector of conventional inputs;
lit
Z
is a vector of environmentally detrimental inputs;
β
,
γ
 and ζ are parameters to be estimated;
it
V
is a symmetric random error term, independently and identically distributed as
2(0, )
v
N σ , intended to capture the influence of exogenous events beyond the control of
the industrial sector;
it
U
is a non-negative random error term, independently and identically distributed as
2(0, )
u
N σ , intended to capture time-variant technical inefficiency in production.93
A functional form has to be defined for the production function. In order to avoid
excessive misspecification, the commonly employed flexible translog function94
developed by Christensen et al. (1971) is used. Writing (5.2) in translog form gives
(for convenience subscripts i and t are suppressed in (5.3), (5.4) and (5.5)):
0
1
ln ln ln ln ln
2
1
ln ln ln ln
2
j j k k jl j l
j k j l
km k m jk j k
k m j k
Y β β X γ Z β X X
γ Z Z ζ X Z V U
= + + +
+ + + −
∑ ∑ ∑ ∑
∑ ∑ ∑ ∑
(5.3)
93 In this chapter, TE is measured with an output orientation.
94 Compared to a Cobb-Douglas function whose output elasticities and RTS of inputs are constant, the translog
function allows variable elasticities and RTS of inputs, which depend on input levels. Another reason to prefer a
translog function to a Gobb-Douglas one is explained by Reinhard et al. (1999). In fact, if output elasticities of
inputs are constant (as in a Cobb-Douglas function), a ranking by environmental efficiency scores would add no
information to the technical efficiency measure because the two rankings would be identical. The two rankings can
differ, and the environmental efficiency measure can add independent information of its own, only if output
elasticities are variable (e.g. in a translog function).
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where
jl lj
β β= ;
jl lj
γ γ= . The logarithm of the output of a technically efficient
producer is obtained by setting U
it
= 0 in (5.3). Since the environmental efficiency
implies technical efficiency (Reinhard et al., 1999), the logarithm of the output of an
environmentally efficient producer is obtained by replacing Z with EE ·Z and setting U
= 0 in (5.3), which gives (5.4):
0
1
ln ln ln( ) ln ln
2
1
ln( ) ln( ) ln ln( )
2
j j k k jl j l
j k j l
km k m jk j k
k m j k
Y β β X γ EE Z β X X
γ EE Z EE Z ζ X EE Z V
= + + +
+ + +
∑ ∑ ∑ ∑
∑ ∑ ∑ ∑
 
   
(5.4)
Setting (5.3) and (5.4) equal permits the isolation of lnEE in (5.5):
2 1/2ln ( 2 ) /
km km
k m k m
EE b b U γ γ
⎡ ⎤= − ± −⎣ ⎦∑ ∑ ∑ ∑ (5.5)
where b is equal to the sum of the output elasticities with respect to the
environmentally detrimental inputs. The b term is positive if the monotonicity
conditions are fulfilled. In this function, the “+√” is applied because if U = 0, only
when the “+√” is used, the lnEE is equal to “0”. U can be calculated from (5.6), the
stochastic version of the output-oriented TE:
0 exp( ) 1,
( , , , , ) exp( )
it
it it
it it it
Y
TE U
f X Z β γ ζ V
≤ = = − ≤
1,..., ,t T= 1,...,i I= (5.6)
TE can be calculated using the Battese and Coelli (1988) estimator (5.7):
Chapter 5 Effects of one-sided fiscal decentralization on environmental efficiency of Chinese provinces
143
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σ μ σ
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）
）
1,..., ,t T= 1,...,i I= (5.7)
where Φ  （）is the standard normal distribution function, 2 2 1/2* / ( )u v u vσ σ σ σ σ= + , and
2 2 2 2
* -( ) + / ( )it it it u v u vμ V U σ μσ σ σ⎡ ⎤= − +⎣ ⎦ . Parameters
2 2( , , , )
u v
β σ σ μ are estimated using
maximum likelihood techniques.
5.3.3 Estimate EE determinants and conditional EE
In order to examine effects of fiscal decentralization on EE, the second-stage SFA
model proposed by Reinhard et al. (2002) has to be estimated. SFA is preferred here
because it allows calculating environmental inefficiency with the one-sided error term,
even after accounting for the underground variables (Greene, 1999). Conditional EE
scores can thus be calculated. The second-stage frontier regression model can be
expressed in the following general form:95
{ }* *( ) exp ,
it it it it
EE G W δ V U= −  1,..., ,t T= 1,...,i I= (5.8)
where W
it
is a vector of observed explanatory variables expected to influence EE
it
,
δ
is a vector of parameters to be estimated, *
* 2(0, )
it
it
V
V N σ and ** * 2( , )
it
it
U
U N μ σ
+ .
In (5.8), the EE
it
is assumed to be determined by three sources: (i) inefficiency
explained by the observed underground variables captured by ( )
it
G W δ ; (ii) statistical
noise reflected in *
it
V ; and (iii) an unexplained environmental inefficiency reflected
in *
it
U . Thus, as defined in (5.9), the conditional environmental efficiency CEE
it
can
be defined as TE
it
*, the technical efficiency of (5.8), once effects of underground
95 A Cobb-Douglas function is used in this stage.
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variables are taken into account.96
( ) { } { }* * */ ; exp exp 1,
it it it it it it
CEE TE EE G W δ V U
⎡ ⎤= = ⋅ = − ≤⎣ ⎦
1,..., ,t T= 1,...,i I= (5.9)
5.4Empirical analysis
5.4.1 Data and variables
Using data published in China Statistical Yearbook (2006-2011), China Statistical
Yearbook for Regional Economy (2006-2010), Finance yearbook of China
(2006-2010) and China Population Statistical Yearbook (2006-2010), the present
study is based on a panel dataset of 30 Chinese provinces (and centrally administrated
municipalities, Hongkong, Macao and Tibet excluded). China conducted a
comprehensive national economic survey in 2004 and subsequently revised the
country’s GDP and GRP figures. As a result, the year 2004 marks a break in the time
series of Chinese data. In order to avoid the bias caused by this break in EE estimation,
the first-stage estimation (of EE scores) is based on the period of 2005-2010. The
second-stage estimation (of decentralization effect) is base on the period 2005-2009,
due to the data unavailability of several explicative variables in 2010.97
The output (Y) of the first-stage SFA model is the GRP of each province at
constant price. The choice of this added value indicator as output indicator is
conventional in macroeconomic efficiency such as total factor productivity (TFP)
studies. Provincial capital stock (K) in constant prices,98 total employment in each
province (L) and the time trend (T) are three conventional inputs. T aims to capture
96 Consider two producers with the same unadjusted EE scores. Assume that one produces under a more favorable
external background than the other and that the background has an effect on both producers’ performance. Then it
is reasonable to think that the real EE score of the former would be inferior to that of the latter if external
background variables are controlled. The same reasoning can be found in background variable models in the DEA
framework (Fried et al., 2002; William W. Cooper et al., 2006)
97 When the first draft of this paper was completed, 2010 statistics of several indicators (e.g. sub-provincial
budgetary expenditures) in the 2nd-stage estimation were not yet published.
98 Calculated by author following Zhang (2004).
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technological progress. The environmentally detrimental input introduced in the
model is the total energy consumption of each province. Energy consumption rather
than other pollutants (e.g. CO2, SO2 or chemical oxygen demand) is chosen because,
first of all, emission data of CO2 (the major greenhouse gas, which contributes to
global warming) are not published in China. Although SO2 and chemical oxygen
demand are relevant pollution in waste gas and wastewater, their statistics published
in China Statistical Yearbook suffer from inaccuracies. In fact, China publishes a
combination of survey data for all key industrial enterprises and estimation data for
non-key enterprises,99 both of which can be easily biased. Energy is an indispensable
input of production. Due to the lack of better data, I use energy consumption as a
proxy for air pollution. This treatment is common in environmental studies, for
example, in Eskeland and Harrison (2003) and Dean et al. (2009). It is often believed
that energy intensity of businesses is a major determinant of CO2 pollution, which is
especially true in China where power generation still depends primarily on coal.100
Finally, energy consumption data published in China Statistical Yearbook come from
the energy balance sheets; Total energy consumption covers the energy consumption
of the whole society, including that of village industries. These sheets are elaborated
based on the law of conservation of energy, thus more reliable than pollution data.
In the second-stage model, EE scores obtained in the first stage are regressed
against transfer’s rate (TR) and fiscal gap (FG) respectively, as well as a set of control
variables. The indicator TR is calculated as follows in equation (5.10):
,it
it
it
Transfers
TR
Expenditures
= 1,..., ,t T= 1,...,i I= (5.10)
where i denotes the province, t denotes the year, Transfers
it
denotes the total fiscal
transfers that province i receives from the central government in year t, and
Expenditures
it
denotes the consolidated budgetary expenditures spent by province i in
year t. The construction of TR is inspired by cross-country decentralization indicators
99 China Statistical Yearbook (2011)
100 In 2010, more than 70% of energy consumed in China was from coal (China Statistical Yearbook, 2011).
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proposed by IMF’s Government Finance Statistics (GFS), where vertical imbalance of
a country is measured as transfers to sub-national governments as a share of
sub-national government expenditures. In this chapter, TR indicates the degree to
which a province relies on transfers to support its expenditures.101 The indicator of
FG is measured as follows in equation (5.11):
1 1
1
Re
,
j j
ijt ijt
it
j
ijt
Expenditures venues
FG
Expenditures
−
=
∑ ∑
∑
1,..., ,t T= 1,..., ,j J= 1,...,i I= (5.11)
where i denotes the province, t denotes the year, j denotes prefectures in province i,
Expenditures
ijt
denotes consolidated budgetary expenditures spent by prefecture j of
province i in year t. Revenues
ijt
denotes consolidated budgetary revenues raised by
prefecture j of province i in year t. Default of transfers data at sub-provincial level,
FG can also be considered as a proxy of vertical imbalance within a province, because
prefectures need transfers to meet the gap between their expenditures and revenues.
Besides fiscal imbalance, a set of control variables which are likely to affect EE is
also introduced into the 2nd-stage SFA. These variables include income per capita
(Dev), population density (Density), trade openness (Open), foreign direct investment
(FDI), education (Edu), urbanization (Urban), unemployment rate (Unemployment),
state-owned sector importance (State), coast dummy (Coast) and year dummies
(D2006, D2007, D2008 and D2009). These variables are selected because, first, they
are commonly used in micro, sectoral or macro studies as TFP determinants (Isaksson,
2007; Li and Hu, 2002; Beeson and Husted, 1989; Söderbom and Teal, 2004);
Moreover, some of these variables, e.g. income per capita, population density, trade
openness, foreign direct investment and education, are also frequently used as control
variables in Environmental Kuznets Curve (EKC) studies (Gangadharan and
101 Following the GFS indicator, VI doesn’t distinguish conditional transfers versus general purpose transfers, due
to data unavailability.
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Valenzuela, 2001). If these variables may affect either productivity or environment,
they are very likely to affect EE. Definitions and descriptive statistics of all variables
are presented in Appendices 5.1 and 5.2.
5.4.2 Technical efficiency and non-adjusted environmental
efficiency scores
TE scores necessary for EE calculation are maximum likelihood estimates computed
with the software package Frontier 4.1 developed by (Coelli, 1996). First, the
time-variant translog stochastic production frontier with a normal-truncated normal
error distribution was estimated. Tests of hypothesis for parameters are presented in
Table 5.1. According to likelihood ration (LR) tests, the null hypothesis of absence of
technical inefficiency 2 2 2/ ( ) 0
u u v
γ σ σ σ= + = is strongly rejected. Nevertheless, the
null hypothesis of half-normal distribution 0μ = and the null hypothesis of
time-invariance cannot be rejected. Thus, the specification of time-invariant
half-normal stochastic frontier is adopted to estimate the 1st-stage model.
Table 5.1: Tests of hypothesis for parameters
Specification
Null
hypothesis
Tested
against
Log
likelihood
Likelihood
ratio
2
Prob χ> Decision
1. Truncated-normal
stochastic
313.671
2. Absence of U
it
0γ = 1 -2.215 631.771 0.000 rejected
3. Half-normal 0μ = 1 323.305 0.732 0.694 accepted
4. Time-invariant 0, 0μ η= = 3 312.035 2.540 0.111 accepted
All estimated parameters are reported in Table 5.2, which are used in the
following to generate the TE and non-adjusted EE scores.
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Table 5.2: Parameter estimates
Parameter
coefficient
estimate
standard error Parameter
coefficient
estimate
standard error
0β 24.469 8.528 ltβ -0.013 0.009
k
β 0.998 0.575
ee
γ 0.089 0.040
l
β -0.229 0.737
ke
ζ -0.049 0.035
t
β 0.312 0.188
le
ζ 0.029 0.052
e
γ -2.211 1.078
te
ζ -0.011 0.012
kk
β 0.003 0.015 2
σ
0.402 0.113
ll
β -0.011 0.029 2 2/
u
σ σ 0.999 0.000
tt
β 0.002 0.001 μ 0
kl
β -0.004 0.030 η 0
kt
β 0.004 0.005
Note: The subscripts k, l, t and e refer to capital, labor, time trend, and energy consumption,
respectively.
Table 5.3 reports elasticities of output with respect to each input. The sum of the
mean output elasticities of four inputs indicates the presence of increasing returns to
scale. The monotonicity assumption is violated for none of the inputs.
Table 5.3: Output elasticities
Capital Labor Time Energy Total
Mean 0.123 0.079 0.051 0.856 1.108
Minimum 0.064 0.034 0.024 0.486 0.879
Lower quartile 0.096 0.065 0.038 0.786 1.064
Median 0.122 0.079 0.048 0.870 1.119
Upper quartile 0.143 0.094 0.059 0.947 1.161
Maximum 0.234 0.121 0.092 1.036 1.231
S.D. 0.034 0.020 0.016 0.115 0.071
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Estimated TE and EE are summarized in Tables 5.4 and 5.5. TE scores vary from
27.4% to 98.8%, with a mean of 63.4%, in line with the findings of Zhang (2009). All
in west China, Ningxia (27.4%), Guizhou (31.8%) and Qinghai (31.8%) have the
lowest TE scores. Meanwhile, three of the most economically developed regions
Guangdong (98.8%), Beijing (98.1%) and Shanghai (97.6%) have the highest TE
scores. EE scores vary from 3.6% to 98.8%, with an overall mean of 57.3%. Over the
period of 2005-2010, Ningxia (7.3%), Qinghai (7.4%) and Gansu (21.1%) have the
lowest mean EE scores, while Guangdong (98.8%), Beijing (97.4%) and Shanghai
(97.0%) have the highest mean EE scores. Nevertheless, these EE scores will be
further adjusted.
Table 5.4: Estimates of TE and non-adjusted EE
Technical efficiency Environmental efficiency
Overall mean 63.4% 57.3%
Overall minimum 27.4% 3.6%
Overall lower quartile 45.1% 41.0%
Overall median 61.2% 56.3%
Overall upper quartile 81.2% 76.4%
Overall maximum 98.8% 98.8%
Overall Standard Deviation (S.D.). 0.213 0.254
Overall observation number 180 177
Note: Three EEs cannot be solved.
Table 5.5: Estimates of non-adjusted EE by year
2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010
Mean 57.2% 57.5% 56.4% 57.5% 57.1% 58.2%
Minimum 3.6% 4.9% 5.0% 8.9% 7.4% 8.5%
Lower quartile 47.6% 48.1% 40.1% 41.0% 40.5% 50.1%
Median 55.5% 55.9% 56.0% 56.9% 56.7% 57.7%
Upper quartile 75.3% 75.6% 76.0% 76.7% 76.4% 76.6%
Maximum 98.7% 98.7% 98.8% 98.8% 98.8% 98.8%
S.D. 0.255 0.253 0.263 0.256 0.259 0.258
Observation number 29 29 30 30 30 29
Dropped province Qinghai Qinghai Na Na Na Xinjiang
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5.4.3 Effects of fiscal imbalance
Based on the 2nd-stage model presented in section 5.3.3, EE scores are regressed
against TR and FG. Among the set of control variables, income per capita (Dev) and
population density (Density) are put in logarithm. In order to be in line with EKC
studies, cubed and squared income per capita (Dev3 and Dev2) are included.
5.4.3.1 Linear effects of TR and FG
First, linear effects of TR and FG are tested for. I start with a time-variant model
where the distribution of the one-sided error is normal-truncated. Specification tests
statistics are summarized in Table 5.6. According to the LR tests, for both TR and FG,
the null hypothesis of 0γ = is strongly rejected, indicating the presence of stochastic
errors and the necessary to use the SFA model. The null hypothesis 0μ = can’t be
rejected at 5% level of significance. The null hypothesis of 0η = is strongly rejected.
As a result, the time-variant model with half-normal distribution is adopted for the
2nd-stage SFA.
Table 5.6: Specification tests for the 2nd-stage linear effect model
Indicator Specification Null
hypothesis
Tested
against
Log
likelihood
Likelihood
ratio
2
Prob χ> Decision
TR 1. Truncated-normal
stochastic
456.362
TR 2. Absence of U
it
0γ = 1 94.290 724.144 0.000 rejected
TR 3. Half-normal 0μ = 1 456.006 0.712 0.399 accepted
TR 4. Time-invariant 0, 0μ η= = 3 450.870 10.271 0.001 rejected
FG 5. Truncated-normal
stochastic
456.970
FG 6. Absence of U
it
0γ = 5 91.816 730.307 0.000 rejected
FG 7. Half-normal 0μ = 5 456.621 0.698 0.403 accepted
FG 8. Time-invariant 0, 0μ η= = 7 451.012 11.218 0.001 rejected
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Table 5.7: Estimation with linear TR and FG effects
With TR With FG
Constant
1.377* (1.758) 1.407* (1.797)
TR
0.006 (0.259)
FG
0.019 (1.151)
Dev
3 -0.004** (-2.356) -0.004** (-2.359)
Dev
2 0.088** (2.268) 0.090** (2.292)
Dev
-0.610** (-1.990) -0.626** (-2.034)
Open
0.021** (2.336) 0.019** (2.171)
FDI
-0.194** (-2.237) -0.173** (-1.966)
Edu
-0.113* (-1.818) -0.115* (-1.938)
Unemployment
-0.165 (-0.595) -0.164 (-0.622)
Urban
-0.056 (-0.925) -0.062 (-1.035)
State
-0.097 (-1.441) -0.098 (-1.489)
Density
0.127*** (5.850) 0.131*** (6.078)
Coast
0.127*** (11.114) 0.133*** (10.871)
D2006
-0.010*** (-4.384) -0.010*** (-4.627)
D2007
-0.018*** (-4.355) -0.018*** (-4.771)
D2008
-0.024*** (-3.464) -0.025*** (-3.839)
D2009
-0.036*** (-4.246) -0.038*** (-4.701)
2
σ
0.084*** (3.899) 0.085*** (4.052)
γ 1.000*** (13148.850) 1.000*** (13592.846)
μ 0 0
η 0.006*** (3.126) 0.006*** (3.249)
Log likelihood function 456.006 456.621
Note: t-student statistics between parentheses, *** significance at 1% level, ** significance at 5% level,
* significance at 10% level.
Estimation results are presented in Tables 5.7. (Results with a truncated normal
distribution can be found in Appendix 5.3.) Both TR and FG have positive and
non-significant coefficients. These results suggest that fiscal imbalance would have
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no significant effects on EE, which goes against the prediction. However,
insignificant linear effects of TR and FG are not surprising because fiscal imbalance
may have different effects on EE in different circumstances. For example, poor
localities may be more vulnerable facing fiscal pressures and sacrifice more easily
environment. As a result, in the following, nonlinear effects of TR and FG on EE will
be considered.
Concerning control variables, most of they have expected signs, among which
squared income per capita, trade openness, population density and Coast dummy have
positive and significant coefficients, while income per capita, cubed income per capita,
FDI, illiterate rate and year dummies have negative and significant coefficients.
5.4.3.2 Nonlinear effects of TR and FG
In order to examine potential nonlinear effects of TR and FG, interactions between
fiscal imbalance indicators and income per capita are created, namely
TR Dev∗
and
FG Dev∗ . These interactions allow testing whether effects of fiscal imbalance on
the EE of a province depend on its economic development level. The LR test statistics
strongly reject the null hypothesizes that the coefficients
TR Dev
β ∗ and
FG Dev
β ∗ (associated respectively to TR Dev∗ and FG Dev∗ ) are equal to zero. This
means that the specifications with interactions are more fit than those without
interactions. Once again, the time-variant model with half-normal distribution is
adopted. Specification tests statistics are summarized in Table 5.8. Regression results
are presented in Table 5.9. (Results with a truncated-normal distribution can be found
in Appendix 5.4.)
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Table 5.8: Specification tests for the 2nd-stage nonlinear effect model
Indicator Specification Null
hypothesis
Tested
against
Log
likelihood
Likelihood
ratio
2
Prob χ> Decision
TR 1. Truncated-normal
with nonlinear VI
464.771
TR 2. Truncated-normal
with linear VI
0
TR GDP
β ∗ = 1 456.362 16.818 0.000 rejected
TR 3. Absence of U
it
0γ = 1 94.405 740.732 0.000 rejected
TR 4. Half-normal 0μ = 1 464.675 0.193 0.661 accepted
TR 5. Time-invariant 0, 0μ η= = 3 459.907 9.536 0.002 rejected
FG 6. Truncated-normal
with nonlinear FG
463.607
FG 7. Truncated-normal
with linear FG
0
FG GDP
β ∗ = 6 456.970 13.274 0.000 rejected
FG 8. Absence of U
it
0γ = 6 92.182 742.850 0.000 rejected
FG 9. Half-normal 0μ = 6 463.529 0.156 0.693 accepted
FG 10. Time-invariant 0, 0μ η= = 9 458.074 10.910 0.001 rejected
It is notable that when interactions are included, both TR and FG as well as their
interactions with income per capita have significant coefficients, suggesting the
significant nonlinear effects of fiscal imbalance on EE. Precisely, the marginal effects
of TR and FG are conditional on income per capita. The more a province is affluent,
the less fiscal imbalance is detrimental to EE, vice versa. These results seem to
confirm the hypothesis that fiscal imbalance has more serious environmental
consequences in poorer localities than in richer ones. In these two nonlinear-effect
models, control variables have the same signs as in previous linear effect models,
although different orders of income per capita become non-significant in TR
regression.
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Table 5.9: Estimates with nonlinear TR and FG effects
With TR With FG
Constant 0.882 (1.203) 1.958*** (2.708)
TR -0.529*** (-4.340)
TR D ev∗ 0.071*** (4.478)
FG -0.362*** (-3.595)
FG D ev∗ 0.047*** (3.841)
Dev3 -0.001 (-0.910) -0.004*** (-3.038)
Dev2 0.038 (1.020) 0.103*** (3.018)
Dev -0.320 (-1.119) -0.783*** (-2.883)
Open 0.011 (1.256) 0.004 (0.420)
FDI -0.153** (-1.890) -0.170** (-2.048)
Edu -0.078 (-1.402) -0.115** (-2.109)
Unemployment -0.126 (-0.497) -0.091 (-0.363)
Urban -0.006 (-0.126) -0.031 (-0.872)
State -0.088 (-1.432) -0.097 (-1.577)
Density 0.144*** (11.681) 0.141*** (22.243)
Coast 0.142*** (12.449) 0.143*** (12.057)
D2006 -0.007*** (-3.208) -0.007*** (-3.613)
D2007 -0.011*** (-2.914) -0.013*** (-3.418)
D2008 -0.015** (-2.337) -0.017*** (-2.617)
D2009 -0.028*** (-3.648) -0.031*** (-3.914)
2
σ
0.085*** (3.954) 0.084*** (3.813)
γ 1.000*** (15223.715) 1.000*** (15304.738)
μ 0 0
η 0.005*** (3.085) 0.005*** (3.907)
Log likelihood function 464.675 463.529
Note: t-student statistics between parentheses, *** significance at 1% level, ** significance at 5% level,
* significance at 10% level.
5.4.4 Robustness considerations: endogenous income per
capita
An important issue worth considering is the potential endogeneity of income per
capita in the 2nd-stage SFA model. As discussed in Stern (2004), income per capita
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can be an endogenous explicative variable of environment. The endogeneity problem
can arise in two ways. On one hand, there may exist simultaneous causality between
income per capita and environment. On the other hand, there may exist missing
explicative variables of environment which are also correlated with income per capita.
In the present study, the endogeneity problem also calls for attention. First one may
think that a more environmentally efficient province is more efficient in resource
allocation thus has better economic performance; secondly it is possible that some
unobserved variables, such as institution quality and demand for environment are
correlated simultaneously with income per capita and EE. Unfortunately, to the
knowledge of the author, no estimator has been developed to address endogeneity
problem in the SFA framework. That’s why several alternative models will be tried in
the following in order to control the potential bias in the 2nd-stage model related to
endogenous income per capita.
5.4.4.1 Two-stage least squares estimate
The first alternative model is a linear instrumental variable (IV) estimator. The linear
IV also has the advantage of allowing controlling provincial fixed effects, which are
not allowed in a TOBIT with instrumental variables.
In the model of Section 5.4.3.2, suspected endogenous variables are Dev3, Dev2,
Dev,
TR Dev∗ and FG Dev∗ . Instruments used in the IV estimator include all of the
internal exogenous variables in Table 5.9 plus the following external instruments:
one-year lagged income per capita (LDev), squared one-year lagged income per capita
(LDev2), cubed one-year lagged income per capita (LDev3), one-year lagged growth
rate (Lgrowth), interaction between TR and LDev (
TR LDev∗ ) and interaction
between FG and LDev (
FG LDev∗ ). These external instruments are assumed to
affect EE only though suspended endogenous variables. The 2nd-stage results of the
IV estimator are presented in Table 5.10. The first stage results and statistics of
related tests are in Appendix 5.5. In the 1st-stage regression results, the
Kleibergen–Paap LM and Wald tests reject their null hypotheses of
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under-identification. The Anderson–Rubin Wald test and Stock–Wright LM test reject
their null hypothesis and indicate that the endogenous regressors are relevant. The
Hansen J statistics can’t reject the null hypothesis of the over-identification of all
instruments. The null hypotheses of redundant instruments are also rejected. The IV
estimator seems to be fit.
Table 5.10: IV estimates with provincial fixed effects (2nd- stage results)
With TR With FG
TR -0.471*** (-2.870)
TR D ev∗ 0.066*** (2.950)
FG -0.292** (-2.180)
FG D ev∗ 0.039** (2.400)
Dev
3 -0.001 (-0.270) -0.003 (-1.240)
Dev
2 0.020 (0.340) 0.075 (1.230)
Dev -0.158 (-0.340) -0.528 (-1.100)
Open 0.016 (1.270) 0.013 (0.970)
FDIi -0.142 (-1.050) -0.153 (-1.150)
Edu -0.068 (-1.060) -0.101 (-1.460)
Unemployment -0.023 (-0.080) 0.079 (0.240)
Urban 0.014 (0.250) -0.026 (-0.410)
State -0.066 (-0.950) -0.054 (-0.840)
Density 0.185*** (3.650) 0.207*** (4.140)
D2006 -0.009*** (-3.320) -0.011*** (-3.610)
D2007 -0.018*** (-3.030) -0.021*** (-3.580)
D2008 -0.026*** (-2.670) -0.032*** (-3.210)
D2009 -0.041*** (-3.350) -0.049*** (-3.810)
R
2 0.820 0.811
Nb. of observations 148 148
Note: Heteroscedastic-consistent t-student statistics between parentheses, *** significance at 1% level,
** significance at 5% level, * significance at 10% level.
Consistent with the results in Table 5.9, TR, FG,
TR Dev∗ and FG Dev∗ have
significant coefficients, suggesting the significant nonlinear effects of fiscal
imbalance on EE. Marginal effects of TR and FG are conditional on income per capita.
The more a province is affluent, the less fiscal imbalance is detrimental to EE, vice
versa. Among control variables, population density and year dummies always have
significant coefficients. Others although not significant, have similar signs to those in
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Table 5.9.
5.4.4.2 SFA with lagged income per capita
The second and third alternative models stay in the SFA framework. The second one
is to replace income per capita (Dev) by one-year lagged income per capita (LDev) in
order to avoid simultaneous bias. Results of SFA with LDev are presented in Table
5.11. Once again, a time-variant half-normal specification is preferred by the LR tests.
Specification tests statistics are reported in Appendix 5.6.
Table 5.11: SFA with LDev (2nd-stage results)
With TR With FG
constant 1.458 (1.622) 2.485*** (2.943)
TR -0.501*** (-3.666)
T R LD ev∗ 0.064*** (3.697)
FG -0.337*** (-3.156)
FG LD ev∗ 0.043*** (3.344)
Dev
3 -0.003 (-1.307) -0.005*** (-3.094)
Dev
2 0.063 (1.386) 0.122*** (3.097)
Dev -0.522 (-1.482) -0.956*** (-3.032)
Open 0.014* (1.680) 0.009 (1.124)
Fdi -0.163* (-1.918) -0.174** (-2.098)
Edu -0.069 (-1.175) -0.108* (-1.856)
Unemployment -0.182 (-0.680) -0.146 (-0.587)
Urban 0.015 (0.283) -0.017 (-0.517)
State -0.082 (-1.269) -0.084 (-1.344)
Density 0.142*** (7.265) 0.141*** (20.030)
Coast 0.143*** (12.424) 0.144*** (12.382)
D2006 -0.007*** (-2.752) -0.008*** (-3.590)
D2007 -0.012** (-2.424) -0.014*** (-3.395)
D2008 -0.008 (-1.284) -0.011** (-2.062)
D2009 -0.021*** (-2.636) -0.025*** (-3.510)
2
σ
0.085*** (3.759) 0.084*** (3.857)
γ 1.000*** (14285.858) 1.000*** (14172.426)
μ 0 0
η 0.005*** (3.112) 0.005*** (3.395)
Log likelihood function 460.107 459.316
Note: t-student statistics between parentheses, *** significance at 1% level, ** significance at 5% level,
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* significance at 10% level.
It is easy to see that the effects of fiscal imbalance indicators are always nonlinear
and consistent with what have been found in previous specifications: marginal effects
of TR and FG on EE are conditional on and offset by one-year lagged income per
capita. Fiscal imbalance is less detrimental to EE provinces which had better
economic performance in the last year, vice versa.
5.4.4.3 SFA with the control function method
The third alternative model to purge potential bias related to endogeneity is to use the
control function method (Hausman, 1978).102 In such a method, predicted residuals of
the first-stage regression of the 2SLS (where suspected endogenous variables are
regressed on exogenous instruments) are introduced into the original reduced form
regression. Since predicted residuals are generated regressors, if their coefficients are
significantly different from zero, their introduction can generate biased
standard-errors which need be corrected (Pagan, 1984). However, the LR test
statistics indicate that the introduction of these residuals don’t make the second-stage
SFA more fit. As a result, I consider that these generated regressors don’t cause
standard-error bias in the present model. Although not conventional in SFA practices,
this control function method allows checking the robustness of previous results. Table
5.12 presents estimation results of SFA with predicted residuals. LR tests allow a
preference for time-variant half-normal specifications. Specification tests statistics are
reported in Appendix 5.7.
Once again, consistent results regarding the nonlinear effects of TR and FG on
EE are obtained. These effects are conditional on and offset by economic
development level of a province. Fiscal imbalance is less detrimental to EE in more
affluent provinces, vice versa.
In summary, different specifications give consistent and comparable results,
indicating that the nonlinear effects of fiscal imbalance on EE are robust. The
102 An alternative method is to introduce predicted endogenous variables and bootstrap the standard-errors.
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coefficients associated with TR vary around -0.5 (from -0.529 to -0.471); the
coefficients associated with FG vary from -0.362 to -0.292; the coefficients associated
with
TR Dev∗ vary from 0.063 to 0.071; and the coefficients associated with
FG Dev∗ vary from 0.039 to 0.047. All of them are significant.
Table 5.12: SFA with control function
With TR With FG
Constant 0.865 (1.051) 1.574** (1.969)
TR -0.478*** (-3.886)
TR Dev∗ 0.063*** (3.869)
FG -0.306*** (-3.132)
FG Dev∗ 0.041*** (3.439)
Dev3 -0.001 (-0.715) -0.003** (-2.116)
Dev2 0.035 (0.822) 0.083** (2.155)
Dev -0.294 (-0.909) -0.631** (-2.087)
Open 0.017* (1.786) 0.011 (1.124)
Fdi -0.152* (-1.885) -0.154* (-1.886)
Edu -0.084 (-1.462) -0.117** (-2.084)
Unemployment -0.099 (-0.390) -0.059 (-0.223)
Urban -0.002 (-0.037) -0.046 (-1.226)
State -0.072 (-1.121) -0.069 (-1.090)
Density 0.135*** (6.900) 0.141*** (21.858)
Coast 0.138*** (11.638) 0.143*** (12.179)
D2006 -0.006*** (-2.959) -0.007*** (-3.611)
D2007 -0.011*** (-2.617) -0.013*** (-3.427)
D2008 -0.014** (-2.020) -0.017*** (-2.561)
D2009 -0.026*** (-3.149) -0.031*** (-3.613)
Residues Dev3hat 0.004 (0.558) -0.001 (-0.145)
Residues Dev2hat -0.083 (-0.531) 0.023 (0.154)
Residues Dev1hat 0.542 (0.444) -0.250 (-0.215)
Residues ( )TR Dev hat∗ 0.131** (2.163)
Residues ( )FG Dev hat∗ 0.097* (1.807)
2
σ
0.085*** (3.877) 0.084*** (4.509)
γ 1.000*** (16147.691) 1.000*** (18462.224)
μ 0.000 0.000
η 0.005*** (3.270) 0.005*** (3.482)
Log likelihood function 468.405 467.771
Note: t-student statistics between parentheses, *** significance at 1% level, ** significance at 5% level,
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* significance at 10% level.
5.4.5 Marginal effects of TR and FG
Overall marginal effects of TR and FG are calculated for the above 4 models and
presented in Table 5.13. Critical values of income per capita below which the
marginal effects are negative are also reported.
Table 5.13: Overall marginal effects of fiscal imbalance
TR FG
SFA 1 SFA 2 SFA 3 IV SFA 1 SFA 2 SFA 3 IV
Mean 0.028 0.003 0.016 0.045 0.008 -0.002 0.017 0.012
Minimum -0.073 -0.089 -0.074 -0.049 -0.060 -0.063 -0.042 -0.043
Lower quartile -0.004 -0.026 -0.013 0.015 -0.014 -0.022 -0.002 -0.006
Median 0.026 0.001 0.014 0.043 0.006 -0.004 0.016 0.011
Upper quartile 0.051 0.023 0.035 0.065 0.022 0.011 0.030 0.024
Maximum 0.137 0.101 0.112 0.145 0.079 0.063 0.080 0.071
S.D. 0.042 0.038 0.049 0.039 0.028 0.026 0.032 0.023
Critical value of
income per capita
1726.152 2450.316 2008.774 1304.812 2190.907 2719.403 1699.318 1891.735
% of observations
with negative
marginal effects
27.0% 47.3% 37.8% 12.2% 43.2% 57.4% 27.0% 33.8%
Observation
number
148 148 148 148 148 148 148 148
Dropped province Qinghai Qinghai Qinghai Qinghai Qinghai Qinghai Qinghai Qinghai
Note: SFA 1 stands for SFA model with Dev. SFA 2 stands for SFA model with LDev. SFA 3 stands
for SFA model with control function. Critical value of income per capita is in 2005 USD.
Among models with TR, the IV estimator gives the lowest critical value of
income per capita at 1305 USD (with 12.2% of all observations having negative
marginal effects), while SFA with LDev gives the highest critical value of income per
capita at 2450 USD (with 47.3% of all observations having negative marginal effects).
Among models with FG, SFA with control function gives the lowest critical value of
income per capita at 1699 USD (with 27% of all observations having negative
marginal effects), while SFA with LDev gives the highest critical value of income per
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capita at 2719 USD (with 57.4% of all observations having negative marginal effects).
5.5Conditional environmental efficiency
In this subsection, CEE scores are calculated using results of the second-stage SFA.
Although different SFA specifications give consistent results regarding nonlinear
effects of TR and FG, the one with TR and predicted residuals of control function has
the highest log likelihood value. According to the Akaike information criterion (AIC),
this model is preferred because it has the minimum AIC value. Thus, the adjusted
environmental efficiency scores are calculated based on SFA with TR and control
function.
Table 5.14: Summary of overall and regional CEE scores
Overall North Northeast East Center South Southwest Northwest
Mean 69.3% 62.5% 74.2% 84.5% 69.8% 75.0% 63.3% 48.9%
Minimum 10.2% 31.7% 53.5% 57.1% 62.9% 58.8% 29.9% 9.9%
Lower
quartile
57.4% 41.1% 54.3% 75.9% 63.5% 59.5% 47.2% 23.9%
Median 71.8% 68.6% 71.4% 89.2% 71.0% 71.0% 66.6% 39.1%
Upper
quartile
89.6% 70.7% 97.0% 99.5% 74.8% 94.7% 79.7% 73.1%
Maximum 99.6% 99.6% 97.1% 99.5% 75.2% 94.7% 89.7% 87.8%
S.D. 0.233 0.243 0.183 0.140 0.050 0.152 0.218 0.301
Nb. of ob. 148 25 15 35 15 15 20 23
Dropped
province
N.a. N.a. N.a. N.a. N.a. N.a. N.a. Qinghai
Summary of provincial overall CEE scores by region is presented in Table 5.14.
It is remarkable that Chinese provinces have on average relatively higher conditional
EE scores once external variables are controlled for. CEE scores vary from 10.9% to
99.6% with an overall mean of 68.8%. Among the seven regions, East China has the
highest mean scores (84.5%), followed by South China (75.0%) and Northeast China
(74.2%). Northwest China has the lowest mean scores (48.9%), far behind the others.
Summary of CEE by year is presented in Table 5.15. It seems that CEE scores are
relatively stable over this period. The three provinces with the highest mean CEE
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scores are Beijing (99.6%), Fujian (99.5%) and Jiangxi (99.5%). The three provinces
with the lowest mean CEE scores are Ningxia (10.9%), Qinghai (24.3%) and Guizhou
(30.5%). The concordance between EE ranking and CEE ranking is positive and
significant: The Spearman rank correlation coefficient between the two measures is
0.770. The null hypothesis that the two rankings are independent can thus be strongly
rejected. The ranking list of mean EE and CEE scores can be found in Appendix 5.9.
Table 5.15: Summary of CEE by year
2005 2006 2007 2008 2009
Mean 69.4% 69.6% 68.2% 68.4% 68.6%
Minimum 9.9% 10.4% 10.9% 11.4% 11.8%
Lower quartile 58.8% 59.1% 57.5% 57.8% 58.0%
Median 70.7% 70.9% 71.0% 71.2% 71.3%
Upper quartile 88.5% 88.6% 88.6% 88.7% 88.8%
Maximum 99.6% 99.6% 99.6% 99.6% 99.6%
S.D. 0.229 0.228 0.238 0.237 0.236
Observation number 29 29 30 30 30
Dropped province Qinghai Qinghai N.a. N.a. N.a.
5.6Concluding remarks
Decentralization has been promoted by major international institutions. Proponent
arguments defending the merits of decentralization are abundant. However, many
studies show that decentralization may be inefficient for environmental protection.
China’s one-sided fiscal decentralization has shown an example. After 1994, public
expenditures are largely decentralized while fiscal revenues are recentralized.
Sub-national governments have huge fiscal imbalance and depend basically on
transfers to fulfill their expenditure responsibilities. It seems that this critical situation
may have negative effects on environmental protection. Localities, especially the poor
ones, are likely to under-provide environmental protection service either due to
incapacity or unwillingness.
In this chapter, I study empirically the environmental effect of this one-sided
decentralization. Precisely, I examine whether fiscal imbalance caused by this
decentralization improves or reduces environmental efficiency of Chinese provinces.
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Following the two-stage EE model developed by Reinhard et al. (2000), I first
calculate with SFA the EE scores of Chinese provinces’ gross regional product over
the period of 2005-2010. After that, using four alternative models, EE scores are
regressed against two fiscal imbalance indicators, VI and FG, in order to test the linear
and nonlinear effects of the latter. Finally, adjusted EE scores are calculated
conditional on fiscal imbalance and other underground variables.
The empirical results are robust and interesting to interpret. During the period of
study, fiscal imbalance has nonlinear effects on EE of Chinese provinces. Moreover,
these effects seem to be conditional on economic development level, i.e., fiscal
imbalance is likely to be more detrimental in less affluent provinces. This finding
suggests the vulnerability of poor localities in face of severe fiscal pressures. In at
least 12% of the cases, larger fiscal imbalance reduces EE. Fiscal imbalance can be
more detrimental to poorer provinces for several reasons. First, poor provinces may be
fiscally incapable to ensure environmental service due to the lack of resources;
secondly, with limited resources, poorer provinces would sacrifice environmental
service for more “productive” ones; and thirdly, poorer provinces may use
sub-optimal environmental stringency as a tool to generate more taxable resources.
Once external factors are controlled for, Chinese provinces have on average a
conditional EE score of 69.3%, considerably higher than 57.3% before the adjustment.
This shift suggests that the overall external context in China contributes to
environmental inefficiency. If all provinces had the same external context as that of
the most advantageous one, mean EE would increase from 57.3% to 69.3%.
Results obtained in this chapter call for attention to the potential negative
environmental effects of the one-sided fiscal decentralization in poor Chinese
provinces. Too many responsibilities without adequate revenues can lead to
inefficient resource allocation; severe fiscal pressures may encourage poor localities
to engage in short-term behaviors, e.g. developing economy at the cost of
environment. Moreover, since the effects are nonlinear, it seems that this fiscal
decentralization has regressive environmental effects in that it contributes to the
disparity across regions in terms of sustainable development. Although the choice
Chapter 5 Effects of one-sided fiscal decentralization on environmental efficiency of Chinese provinces
164
between more revenue autonomy and less expenditure responsibilities is still a
political debate in China, it is a certainty that the balance between expenditure
responsibilities and revenue assignments need to be redressed for a more sustainable
and equitable development across Chinese regions.
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Appendix 5.1: Name and description of variables
Variable Description
Y Gross regional product (10000 USD at 2005 price)
K Provincial capital stock (10000 RMB at 1952 price)
L Total provincial employment at the end of year (10000 persons)
T Time trend
E Total energy consumption ( ton of Standard Coal Equivalent)
TR Share of central transfers in provincial expenditures
FG Fiscal gap
Dev Income per capita (2005 USD)
Open (Exportation + Importation)/ Gross regional product
FDI Foreign direct investments/ Gross regional product
Edu Illiterate rate
Unemployment Unemployment rate
Urban Non-agricultural population/total population
State Employment of state-owned sector/total employment
Density Population /km2
Growth Growth rate of regional gross product
Coast 1 if coast province, 0 otherwise
Dum2006 1 if the year of 2006, 0 otherwise
Dum2007 1 if the year of 2007, 0 otherwise
Dum2008 1 if the year of 2008, 0 otherwise
Dum2009 1 if the year of 2009, 0 otherwise
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Appendix 5.2: Summary statistics of variables
Variable Obs. Mean S.D. Min Max
Y 180 14300000 12900000 663023 69500000
K 180 54300000 49100000 3714443 263000000
L 180 2423.416 1602.439 267.619 6041.557
T 180 3.500 1.713 1 6
E 179 138000000 94900000 8221845 497000000
TR 148 0.509 0.183 0.141 0.857
FG 148 0.478 0.182 0.078 0.818
Dev 148 3102.874 2125.191 616.500 11862.610
Open 148 0.359 0.410 0.045 1.668
FDI 148 0.026 0.020 0.001 0.082
Edu 148 0.088 0.046 0.028 0.223
Unemployment 148 0.038 0.006 0.014 0.056
Urban 148 0.367 0.164 0.158 0.880
State 148 0.111 0.048 0.053 0.245
Density 148 411.474 534.697 7.667 3029.969
Growth 148 0.173 0.056 0.006 0.323
Coast 148 0.372 0.485 0 1
Dum2006 148 0.196 0.398 0 1
Dum2007 148 0.203 0.403 0 1
Dum2008 148 0.203 0.403 0 1
Dum2009 148 0.203 0.403 0 1
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Appendix 5.3: Linear effect of TR and FG with truncated normal distribution
With TR With FG
Constant 1.322* (1.723) 1.386* (1.762)
TR 0.004 (0.210)
FG 0.019 (1.141)
Dev
3 -0.004** (-2.205) -0.004** (-2.137)
Dev
2 0.083** (2.136) 0.082** (2.093)
Dev -0.569* (-1.883) -0.568* (-1.866)
Open 0.021** (2.448) 0.019** (2.121)
Fdi -0.195** (-2.342) -0.172** (-1.993)
Edu -0.111* (-1.885) -0.112** (-1.918)
Unemployment -0.164 (-0.609) -0.172 (-0.642)
Urban -0.041 (-0.719) -0.053 (-0.863)
State -0.097 (-1.463) -0.101 (-1.521)
Density 0.118*** (3.689) 0.114*** (4.045)
Coast 0.124*** (3.112) 0.117*** (3.075)
D2006 -0.010*** (-4.490) -0.010*** (-4.479)
D2007 -0.018*** (-4.383) -0.018*** (-4.346)
D2008 -0.024*** (-3.480) -0.024*** (-3.506)
D2009 -0.037*** (-4.348) -0.038*** (-4.460)
2
σ
0.049 (1.545) 0.045* (1.911)
γ 1.000*** (3243.698) 1.000*** (3906.683)
μ 0.153 (0.982) 0.183 (1.655)
η 0.006** (2.635) 0.007*** (3.046)
Log likelihood function 456.362 456.970
Note: t-student statistics between parentheses, *** significance at 1% level, ** significance at 5% level,
* significance at 10% level.
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Appendix 5.4: Nonlinear effect of TR and FG with truncated normal distribution
With VI With FG
constant 0.852 (1.170) 1.946*** (2.643)
TR -0.525*** (-4.230)
TR D ev∗ 0.070*** (4.334)
FG -0.360*** (-3.546)
FG D ev∗ 0.047*** (3.789)
Dev
3 -0.001 (-0.845) -0.004*** (-2.975)
Dev
2 0.036 (0.951) 0.103*** (2.948)
Dev -0.301 (-1.042) -0.778*** (-2.806)
Open 0.011 (1.323) 0.004 (0.437)
Fdi -0.154* (-1.918) -0.171** (-2.139)
Edu -0.077 (-1.399) -0.115** (-2.108)
Unemployment -0.124 (-0.499) -0.093 (-0.371)
Urban 0.002 (0.033) -0.031 (-0.847)
State -0.088 (-1.417) -0.098 (-1.608)
Density 0.140*** (7.380) 0.141*** (18.083)
Coast 0.141*** (11.629) 0.143*** (11.975)
D2006 -0.007*** (-3.241) -0.008*** (-3.659)
D2007 -0.012*** (-2.936) -0.013*** (-3.424)
D2008 -0.015** (-2.366) -0.017*** (-2.607)
D2009 -0.029*** (-3.653) -0.031*** (-3.890)
2
σ
0.062 (1.611) 0.065* (1.726)
γ 1.000*** (4983.027) 1.000*** (5332.281)
μ 0.096 (0.646) 0.081 (0.612)
η 0.005*** (3.208) 0.005*** (3.511)
Log likelihood function 464.771 463.607
Note: t-student statistics between parentheses, *** significance at 1% level, ** significance at 5% level,
* significance at 10% level.
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Appendix 5.5: 1st- stage and tests of IV with TR
Dev
3
Dev
2
Dev
T R D ev∗
TR -185.999 (-0.950) -14.221 (-0.890) -0.780 (-0.790) -0.092 (-0.140)
Density -117.500 (-1.450) -11.643* (-1.780) -0.845** (-2.080) -0.611** (-2.380)
Open -7.484 (-0.550) -0.558 (-0.510) -0.029 (-0.430) -0.013 (-0.280)
Fdi 48.793 (0.350) 6.598 (0.580) 0.573 (0.800) 0.517 (1.060)
Edu -44.157 (-0.550) -5.590 (-0.880) -0.479 (-1.230) -0.413* (-1.800)
Unemployment -126.100 (-0.340) -11.136 (-0.350) -0.726 (-0.350) -0.583 (-0.460)
Urban 200.252** (2.180) 14.971** (2.090) 0.825* (1.920) 0.137 (0.500)
State 9.809 (0.100) -0.030 (-0.000) -0.055 (-0.110) -0.137 (-0.380)
Dum2006 15.438*** (2.940) 1.293*** (3.420) 0.082*** (3.940) 0.031*** (2.690)
Dum2007 43.623*** (4.900) 3.706*** (5.840) 0.238*** (6.960) 0.103*** (5.580)
Dum2008 76.291*** (5.800) 6.489*** (6.930) 0.416*** (8.230) 0.189*** (6.910)
Dum2009 78.034*** (3.990) 6.707*** (4.800) 0.436*** (5.740) 0.178*** (4.400)
Lgrowth 60.013** (2.540) 5.086** (2.550) 0.326** (2.530) 0.151 (1.630)
LDev -109.483 (-0.220) -0.151 (-0.000) 1.460 (0.600) 1.850 (1.210)
LDev
2 4.506 (0.070) 0.073 (0.010) -0.130 (-0.400) -0.286 (-1.400)
LDev
3 0.667 (0.220) 0.031 (0.130) 0.005 (0.360) 0.013 (1.410)
T R LD ev∗ 12.334 (0.490) 1.032 (0.500) 0.061 (0.470) 1.042*** (11.790)
R
2 0.992 0.992 0.993 0.995
Test of excluded
instruments
Prob > F = 0.000 Prob > F = 0.000 Prob > F = 0.000 Prob > F = 0.000
Kleibergen-Paap
rk LM statistic
Prob > chi2=0.002
Anderson-Rubin
Wald test
Prob > chi2= 0.000
Hansen J
statistic
Prob > chi2= 0.773
IV redundancy
tests
LDev
3
: Prob > chi2= 0.003
LDev
2
: Prob > chi2= 0.004
LDev : Prob > chi2= 0.005
Lgrowth: Prob > chi2= 0.027
V I L D ev∗ : Prob > chi2= 0.000
Nb. of obs. 148 148 148 148
Note: estimates are calculated with heteroskedasticity robust standard errors.
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Appendix 5.6: 1st- stage and tests of IV with FG
Dev
3
Dev
2
Dev
F G D ev∗
FG -332.731* (-1.750) -21.451 (-1.490) -0.948 (-1.130) 0.344 (0.670)
Density -14.742 (-0.180) -4.471 (-0.690) -0.483 (-1.210) -0.627*** (-2.670)
Open -19.459 (-1.380) -1.335 (-1.200) -0.065 (-0.950) 0.002 (0.050)
Fdi 46.404 (0.310) 6.795 (0.560) 0.611 (0.810) 0.673 (1.390)
Edu -41.232 (-0.510) -5.491 (-0.840) -0.479 (-1.200) -0.497** (-2.230)
Unemployment -382.268 (-1.010) -29.321 (-0.920) -1.668 (-0.810) -0.399 (-0.360)
Urban 258.258** (2.310) 18.374** (2.130) 0.952** (1.880) 0.072 (0.240)
State 33.631 (0.320) 1.558 (0.180) 0.020 (0.040) -0.155 (-0.480)
Dum2006 13.300*** (2.780) 1.132*** (3.190) 0.073*** (3.610) 0.022** (2.000)
Dum2007 37.975*** (4.870) 3.291*** (5.740) 0.215*** (6.690) 0.084*** (5.000)
Dum2008 69.203*** (6.010) 5.950*** (7.000) 0.386*** (8.040) 0.157*** (6.150)
Dum2009 64.691*** (3.850) 5.714*** (4.540) 0.381*** (5.290) 0.134*** (3.480)
Lgrowth 59.968** (2.440) 5.111** (2.460) 0.329** (2.460) 0.166* (1.800)
LDev -468.304 (-0.910) -25.505 (-0.620) 0.174 (0.070) 1.996 (1.410)
LDev
2 49.119 (0.730) 3.264 (0.610) 0.034 (0.100) -0.300 (-1.620)
LDev
3 -1.195 (-0.400) -0.102 (-0.430) -0.002 (-0.110) 0.014* (1.670)
FG LD ev∗ 42.385* (1.720) 2.783 (1.510) 0.127 (1.190) 0.992*** (15.670)
R
2 0.991 0.992 0.993 0.998
Test of excluded
instruments
Prob > F = 0.000 Prob > F = 0.000 Prob > F = 0.000 Prob > F = 0.000
Kleibergen-Paap
rk LM statistic
Prob > chi2=0.002
Anderson-Rubin
Wald test
Prob > chi2= 0.000
Hansen J
statistic
Prob > chi2= 0.629
IV redundancy
tests
LDev
3
: Prob > chi2= 0.002
LDev
2
: Prob > chi2= 0.003
LDev : Prob > chi2= 0.004
Lgrowth: Prob > chi2= 0.065
FG LD ev∗ : Prob > chi2= 0.000
Nb. of obs. 148 148 148 148
Note: estimates are calculated with heteroskedasticity robust standard errors.
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Appendix 5.7: Specification tests with LDev
Indicator Specification Null
hypothesis
Tested
against
Log
likelihood
Likelihood
ratio
2
Prob χ> Decision
TR 1. Truncated-normal
stochastic
460.231
TR 2. Absence of U
it
0γ = 1 95.233 729.996 0.000 rejected
TR 3. Half-normal 0μ = 1 460.107 0.248 0.619 accepted
TR 4. Time-invariant 0, 0μ η= = 3 455.262 9.689 0.002 rejected
FG 5. Truncated-normal
stochastic
459.407
FG 6. Absence of U
it
0γ = 5 92.619 733.576 0.000 rejected
FG 7. Half-normal 0μ = 5 459.316 0.181 0.670 accepted
FG 8. Time-invariant 0, 0μ η= = 7 453.935 10.762 0.001 rejected
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Appendix 5.8: Specification tests with control function method
Indicator Specification Null
hypothesis
Tested
against
Log
likelihood
Likelihood
ratio
2
Prob χ> Decision
TR 1. Truncated-normal
stochastic
468.305
TR 2. Absence of U
it
0γ = 1 96.161 744.289 0.000 rejected
TR 3. Half-normal 0μ = 1 468.405 -0.199 1.000 accepted
TR 4. Time-invariant 0, 0μ η= = 3 462.948 10.914 0.001 rejected
TR 5. Without predicted
residuals
Coefficients
of
predicted
residuals are
jointly = 0
3 464.675 7.460 0.113 accepted
FG 6. Truncated-normal
stochastic
467.858
FG 7. Absence of U
it
0γ = 5 94.082 747.551 0.000 rejected
FG 8. Half-normal 0μ = 5 467.771 0.174 0.677 accepted
FG 9. Time-invariant 0, 0μ η= = 7 461.924 11.695 0.001 rejected
10. Without predicted
residuals
Coefficients
of
predicted
residuals are
jointly = 0
7 463.529 8.484 0.075 accepted
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Appendix 5.9: Ranking list of mean EE and CEE scores
Province CEE ranking EE ranking mean CEE score mean EE score Region
Beijing 1 2 0.996 0.974 North
Jiangxi 2 8 0.995 0.760 East
Fujian 3 4 0.995 0.942 East
Heilongjiang 4 11 0.970 0.600 Northeast
Guangdong 5 1 0.947 0.988 South
Anhui 6 9 0.902 0.748 East
Zhejiang 7 5 0.892 0.914 East
Yunnan 8 14 0.886 0.571 Southwest
Xinjiang 9 24 0.877 0.320 Northwest
Jiangsu 10 6 0.796 0.857 East
Shanghai 11 3 0.758 0.970 East
Hunan 12 13 0.750 0.593 Center
Shaanxi 13 18 0.728 0.524 Northwest
Jilin 14 21 0.714 0.503 Northeast
Guangxi 15 10 0.710 0.619 South
Hubei 16 15 0.710 0.564 Center
Inner Mongolia 17 25 0.705 0.313 North
Sichuan 18 22 0.693 0.489 Southwest
Tianjin 19 7 0.686 0.770 North
Chongqing 20 19 0.638 0.516 Southwest
Henan 21 16 0.633 0.557 Center
Hainan 22 17 0.593 0.532 South
Shandong 23 12 0.575 0.599 East
Liaoning 24 20 0.540 0.509 Northeast
Hebei 25 23 0.414 0.401 North
Gansu 26 28 0.388 0.210 Northwest
Shanxi 27 26 0.325 0.244 North
Guizhou 28 27 0.305 0.217 Southwest
Qinghai 29 29 0.243 0.071 Northwest
Ningxia 30 30 0.109 0.068 Northwest
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Main results
The large body of environmental federalism literature is composed of lasting and
inconclusive debate. While some highlight numerous merits of decentralization in
resource allocation and local public good provision, others are more skeptical and
argue that it may also lead to inefficient environmental policy making or enforcement.
In a country as broad and diverse as China, the merits of decentralization seem
particularly attractive and promising. Effectively, since environmental concerns,
preferences, and problems vary from place to place within this country, local
knowledge and expertise are indispensable to develop proper solutions for
environmental problems with local and regional nature. However, despite the de facto
environmental federalism adopted in China, dramatic environmental crises and policy
failures widespread since its economic reforms. In particular, more recently, this
country has seen arise many problems predicted by the opponents of decentralization.
It appears that, contrary to the fiscal decentralization which has substantially
promoted resource mobilization and economic growth, the decentralization of
environmental policy implementation hasn’t worked so well in enforcing
environmental regulation at sub-national level (General Introduction).
With the purpose of providing a better and detailed understanding of the de facto
environmental federalism in China, this thesis follows the different critics in the
literature and test empirically for each of them in the Chinese-specific context. The
main findings of the present dissertation can be summarized as follows.
This dissertation begins with a comprehensive discussion of the de facto
federalism (both environmental and fiscal) in China (Chapter 1). This discussion
makes it obvious that problems associated with decentralization have been to a great
extent responsible for the widespread environmental policy failures at sub-national
level in China. Given the structural conflicts between economic growth and
environment and the national priority on economic growth, the de facto environmental
federalism and the one-sided fiscal decentralization have jointly provided Chinese
sub-national governments with effective autonomy as well as strong economic
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incentives to exercise weak enforcement of environmental regulations. In such an
institutional context, it is not surprising that autonomy in environmental policy
enforcement at sub-national level has been used to facilitate economic growth rather
than (or even in sacrificing) environmental protection.
Following the three main critics of environmental federalism in the literature, this
thesis goes on to conduct a series of empirical studies in the Chinese-specific context,
in order to shed light on the efficiency of the de facto environmental federalism in
China (Chapters 2, 3 and 4).
First of all, the problems related to environmental externality is examined in
Chapter 2. If the border-effect related to pollution free-riding behaviors has been
tested for in the U.S. or cross-country context, no existing literature has studied this
effect in China to the knowledge of the author. Using a unique dataset of polluting
firms and county-level geographical information of Hebei province, this chapter
studies the location choice of recently created polluting firms in Hebei and finds
significant evidence of the border-effect. In effect, during the period of 2002-2008,
counties share a (large part of) common border with another province attract
significantly more polluting firms than interior counties; the closer a county is to the
border, the higher is its probability to attract polluting firms. As a result, it seems that
inter-regional pollution free-riding behaviors do exist in China. Consequently, border
counties suffer disproportionately from pollution because of externality. Moreover,
this problem deserves particular attention because the border-effect has strengthened
over time.
After that, in Chapter 3, I continue to test for the second critic to environmental
federalism- inter-jurisdictional strategic interaction in environmental policymaking.
Using spatial econometric methods and different identification strategies, this chapter
tests for the two theoretical assumptions behind the potential strategic interaction: the
capital-competition model and the pollution-spillovers model. Estimation results
suggest that Chinese provinces do engage in strategic interaction, i.e., they take into
account decisions of other provinces into their own decision, when they fix their
environmental stringency and SO2 emission level. In particular, competition for
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capital would drive them to interact positively with each other in stringency setting,
while pollution spillover considerations would drive them to interact negatively with
each other in SO2 emission. Moreover, it seems that provincial fiscal imbalance due
to the one-sided fiscal decentralization significantly strengthens the
capital-competition driven interaction. Nevertheless, the asymmetric interaction
pattern predicted by “the race to the bottom” theory hasn’t been found.
Chapter 4 furthermore tests for the third critic proposed by environmental
federalism opponents, i.e. “public choice” related rationales. From a political
economy point of view, this chapter examines how political incentives affect
provincial environmental performance before and after 2006. For this purpose, the
ex-ante average growth rate score and the age 65 are used respectively as proxies of
provincial leaders’ political competitiveness and term limit. In revisiting the EKC
hypothesis, empirical results of this chapter indicate that, ceteris paribus, the less
competitive the leader is on the political market, the more he would compromise
environment. Moreover, this political-competitiveness effect is significantly
conditional on term limit. A leader of 65 or older would not conduct such
environment-sacrificing behaviors even if he has less competitive economic
performance score, due to his quasi null political career prospect. Finally, this effect
has been mitigated by the new “pro-environmental” changes since 2006.
At last, after examining the three critic hypotheses related to environmental
federalism, particular attention is paid in Chapter 5 to the role of the one-sided fiscal
decentralization side by side with the de facto environmental federalism. To this end,
the environmental efficiency of provincial gross production and its determinants are
estimated with a two-stage environmental efficiency model. As predicted, estimation
results suggest that fiscal imbalance does affect provincial environmental
performance in China. Precisely, fiscal imbalance has a nonlinear effect on EE scores,
which is conditional on the economic development level of the province. The less the
province is affluent, the more its fiscal imbalance would be detrimental to its EE, vice
versa. In the most poor cases (at least 12%), larger fiscal imbalance reduces EE. This
finding confirms the vulnerability of poor localities in terms of sustainable
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development when they face severe fiscal pressures. It seems that the one-sided fiscal
decentralization in China does have perverse repercussion on environment in poor
provinces. In addition, the overall external context also contributes to environmental
inefficiency in China.
Political implications
The series of empirical studies in this thesis sheds light on the efficiency of the
current de facto environmental federalism in China. Results obtained in this thesis
provide supportive evidence of the opponent arguments on decentralization.
Apparently, the de facto environmental federalism has been a “grabbing hand” rather
than a “helping hand” for environmental governance in China.
However, although the de facto environmental federalism has shown numerous
problems, it doesn’t mean that a centralized environmental policy implementation is
preferred. In practice, many environmental problems are local and regional in nature,
which requires localized knowledge and treatments. Inevitably, much of localized
information is beyond the reach of even the most observant central government. For
example, the most effective and equitable strategy for controlling air pollution will
vary from city to city depending on the local mix of pollution sources, dominant
weather conditions and population’s preference. Some U.S. scholars argue that
environmental policy should be informed by the idea of subsidiarity, where each
environmental problem is dealt with by the level of government best positioned to
address that particular concern (Esty, 1996). As Esty explains, "The challenge is to
find the best fit possible between environmental problems and regulatory
responses—not to pick a single level of government for all problems."
As a result, it seems that it’s not environmental federalism itself which should be
called into question; the questions that Chinese policymakers should really care about
are (1) how to better organize environmental federalism given the country-specific
characteristics and (2) how to form suitable incentives for local officials in order that
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environmental federalism become a “helping hand” in the country’s environmental
management.
a. A new environmental federalism
It is crucial to develop “a new environmental federalism” in China, i.e. a better
reorganization of environmental federalism dependent upon the Chinese-specific
characteristics.
First, one of the fundamental problems in the Chinese environmental governance
is related to the multi-level governance. In China, local EPBs are subordinated to
local governments which have the authority to interfere with local environmental
affairs. To overcome this problem, Xue et al.(2006) propose a realignment of local
environmental management to create a direct vertical line of environmental authority.
Although China hasn’t yet seen this direct vertical line emerge, six regional MEP
offices do have the responsibility to reinforce the vertical control of the MEP.
Nevertheless, the effectiveness of these regional offices’ work needs further
investigation.
Secondly, targeted solutions should be formulated to coordinate inter-regional
environmental conflicts, such as the cross-boundary pollution problems. In effect,
numerous candidate mechanisms can help to address inter-regional environmental
conflicts (Adler, 1998), e.g. inter-regional compacts, regional authorities, pollution
trading and inter-regional ecological compensation. It is notable that the creation of
the MEP regional offices has also the objective to coordinate inter-regional interests.
In addition, although emission trading and ecological compensation practices can be
traced back to as early as 1980’s in China (Sun and Zhou, 2008), both systems are still
under construction. Several pilot emission trading and inter-regional ecological
compensation projects have been launched since the 11th FEYP (Zhang et al., 2007).
In summary, targeted solutions are under formulation but not yet really in place.
Inevitably, a new environmental federalism will unleash greater experimentation
and innovation. Fortunately, the spirit of experimentation is something that the
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Chinese government has kept in mind since the economic reforms and that has proven
to work well in promoting growth. Hope that this spirit will also benefit the
environmental protection.
b. Form a grabbing hand to a helping hand
The “new environmental federalism” will not work efficiently unless another problem
is resolved. As argued by Jin et al. (2005), decentralization can be either a “help
hand” or a “grabbing hand” for tax mobilization; environmental federalism can also
be either helpful or detrimental for environmental protection, all depending on
incentives faced by local officials. This thesis shows that, until very recently, the de
facto environmental federalism has rather been a “grabbing hand”. It is not the
federalism which has created the pollution in China, but it has definitely aggravated
the situation.
In fact, since the political priority has been given to economic growth, the
federalism has created strongly skewed economic and political incentives. Chinese
local officials who face these incentives have naturally promoted economic growth in
sacrificing environment.
In order to transform the “grabbing hand” to a “helping hand”, it is fundamental
to rebalance the formerly skewed incentives. If and only if local governments become
stakeholders of and accountable for their environment performance that they will
effectively involve in meeting environmental goals (Xue et al., 2006). The new
government responsibility system is one step towards this direction. Another
meaningful effort is seen in the 2008 amendments of the water pollution law, which
provide more robust responsibilities for environmental outcomes under the
bureaucratic evaluation system. From then on, local official are accountable for their
environmental outcomes because the fulfillment of water environmental protection
targets constitutes a part of their evaluation criteria (Lan et al., 2011). With these
“pro-environment” changes in the bureaucratic system since 2006, the Chinese
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government has maintained the decentralization and allowed local flexibility (Golding,
2011). However, as argued by Golding, the effects of these measures will be
conditional on citizen involvement, data transparency and public accountability.
Fortunately, growing public participation has been observed since several years,
which has furthermore helped shifting political incentive towards environmental
protection. Actually, China has seen an increasing sensibility of its citizens on
environmental issues: Environment NGOs have expanded during one decade.103
More and more pollution victims go complain.104 In some extreme cases, pollution
has conducted to acute conflicts even violence, which threaten the local security and
governance stability.105 Pollution problems have been largely unmasked and
discussed in the media especially on internet. All of these exercise a greater pressure
on local governments than any other moment in history. In some cases, citizen voice
has indeed reversed political decisions.106 Some officials did lose their posts because
of public pressure after environmental crisis.107 In summary, growing public
participation (either through media or through real protests) contributes to increase
Chinese local governments’ accountability, which is decisive and indispensible for the
change from the “grabbing hand” to a “helping hand”, and for better environmental
governance in this country.
In the end, one must recognize that although environment goals have been
included in national development priority by the CCP and the Chinese central
103 The first environment NGO in China was created in 1994. At the end of 2008, there were more than 3500
environment NGOs in China, according to All-China Environment Federation.
http://news.xinhuanet.com/environment/2008-10/30/content_10282938.htm.
104 In 2009, the Ministry of Environmental Protection of China received 29500 cases of complaints about
pollutions, among which 13100 were on internet (China Environment Yearbook, 2010).
105 Two recent cases took place in Lianhua county, Jiangxi province in August 2011 and in Haining county,
Zhejiang province in September 2011, where peasants protested local factories’ pollution and had conflicts with
the police. http://www.chinese.rfi.fr/中国.
106 For example, due to public pressure in December 2007, the government of Xiamen, Fujian province, reportedly
halted construction on a Taiwanese-invested paraxylene (PX) petrochemical plant and moved it out of the city.
This event is generally considered as a victory for public participation in China.
http://www.chinadialogue.net/article/show/single/en/1626.
107 Xie Zhenghua, former director of SEPA, was relieved of his office after the pollution event of the Songhua
River in November 2005. http://www.china.org.cn/english/2005/Dec/150724.htm. In the last two years, numerous
local officials were dismissed in Inner Mongolia and Hunan because of pollution accidents.
http://www.360doc.com/content/09/0806/22/204175_4717024.shtml;
http://news.xinhuanet.com/local/2010-03/23/content_13226362.htm.
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government, it stays subject to trade off with other social goals e.g. universal illness
assurance and equitable education, etc. As long as the development resource is limited,
trade-off is inevitable. As a result, research on the relationship between
decentralization and more efficient resource allocation has important political
implication. This is especially true in a country like China, where the contrast
between development need and resource constraint is so huge.
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